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Preface
This thesis comprises the results of my PhD. research in the subject of proba­
bilistic measures of coherence. In recent years, this subject has rapidly gained in 
popularity and it is the aim of this thesis to make a number of valuable additions 
to this debate both by proposing a formal framework in which the question of 
measuring coherence can be assessed and by presenting a number of different 
measures of coherence. Also, I will critically discuss the proposals that have been 
made in the literature so far. 
A substantial part of this thesis is derived from papers that are either in press 
or being reviewed at the moment. These papers are: 
– Meijs, W. (2005a) ‘A Corrective to Bovens and Hartmann’s Measure of Co­
herence,’ Philosophical Studies, in press. 
– Meijs, W. (2005b) ‘Coherence as Generalized Logical Equivalence,’ manu­
script. 
– Meijs, W. and I. Douven (2005) ‘Bovens and Hartmann on Coherence,’ Mind, 
in press. 
– Douven, I. and W. Meijs (2005a) ‘Measuring Coherence,’ Synthese, in press. 
– Douven, I. andW. Meijs (2005b) ‘Bootstrap Confirmation Made Quantitative,’ 
Synthese, in press. 
Much of my research, but especially the contents of chapters 2 and 5, is the 
result of joint work with Igor Douven. I would like to thank him for giving me 
the opportunity to work with him on the subject of measuring coherence and 
for the enthusiastic and concerned manner in which he has supervised my PhD. 
research. 
My research has greatly profited from discussions with, among others, Luc 
Bovens, Igor Douven, Branden Fitelson, Stephan Hartmann, Luca Moretti, Jan-
Willem Romeyn, Mark Siebel, Jos Uffink, and Janneke van Lith. 
Furthermore, I would like to thank those who have commented on one or more 
of my papers: Luc Bovens, Branden Fitelson, Stephan Hartmann, Franz Huber, 
Theo Kuipers, Gert-Jan Lokhorst, Luca Moretti, Fred Muller, Bert Postma, Jan­
Willem Romeyn, Mark Siebel, Jos Uffink, Janneke van Lith, Theo van Willigenburg, 
and Christopher von Bülow. 
Also, I would like to thank Michiel Wielema for his very valuable comments 
on an earlier version of this manuscript and Wendy Bos for designing the cover 
of this book. 
Once, somebody very special said to me that the most important people are 
the hardest to thank in words. I could not agree more and will let that remark 
suffice to express a gratitude that words could never describe. 
Chapter 1 
Introduction 
1.1 Probabilistic Measures of Coherence 
The concept of coherence has a long history in the philosophy of science and 
epistemology. A theory that is coherent is by many believed to be a better theory 
than one that is not, all else being equal. But despite the intuitive interpretation 
of coherence as ‘hanging together well’ being virtually uncontested, a formal ex­
plication has not been forthcoming. Instead, a common complaint by those who 
refuse to attach any methodological or epistemological value to coherence is that 
the notion is hopelessly vague. Apparently, this supposedly inherent vagueness 
was one of the main reasons for Laurence Bonjour to abandon his earlier coher­
ence theory of justification (see, for instance, Bonjour 1997). 
The failure of a formal explication of the concept of coherence to materialize 
is a strong impediment for any epistemological theory in which coherence is an 
important ingredient. The general object of this thesis is to take up the challenge 
naturally suggested by this failure by pursuing a number of different explications 
of coherence. More specifically, I will attempt to explicate some of our intuitive 
notions of coherence by constructing a number of different probabilistic mea­
sures of coherence. Such a project faces various problems. Firstly, it is not clear 
at all that our intuitive concept of coherence can be captured fully by any formal 
measure, let alone by a probabilistic one. Nevertheless, it seems that the ques­
tion of the viability of a probabilistic analysis of coherence can only be answered 
after we have actually engaged in such a project. Only after finding a measure 
of coherence will we be in a position to test to what extent (if any) it agrees with 
our intuitive judgements. A second worry is much more important at this stage. 
For the first problem already presupposes that there is something like a good 
explication of the concept of coherence. However, it is not clear what the criteria 
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are by which we can decide that an explication is successful or satisfactory. 
Precisely because in general an intuitive concept is rather vague, we cannot 
exclude the possibility that no explication will fully capture it. Nor can we a priori 
expect there to be only one explication. Therefore, we need a methodological 
procedure, which will help us arrive at an explication and decide between the 
different alternatives if there are more than one. This methodological problem 
will be the subject of this introductory chapter. 
In the 40s and 50s of the last century, Rudolf Carnap faced the same type 
of problems when he tried to formalize the notion of a measure of degree of 
confirmation. Although I do not share his view that such measures need to be 
logical in order to be viable, his general methodological remarks will prove to be 
extremely valuable for the project of measuring coherence. 
In this chapter I will start (section 1.2) with Carnap’s views on the general 
requirements for a formal explication of an inexact, prescientific concept. The 
conclusion from that discussion will be that the description of the informal con­
cept must be very specific in order for its formalization to be as satisfactory as 
possible. The next three sections, sections 1.3 through 1.5, will discuss three 
different senses in which the concept of coherence has been used in modern 
philosophy. 
The variety in meaning should be rather unsurprising for a concept that has 
been around for so long without ever having been given a formal definition. How­
ever, it does pose a problem for anyone who attempts to construct a measure of 
coherence, for it is altogether unclear whether one and the same measure is the 
best formalization of each of these different senses of coherence. Instead, it will 
appear in this thesis that different measures of coherence are best suited to deal 
with some of the different senses in which the concept of coherence has been 
used in the history of the philosophy of science and in that of epistemology. 
1.2 Carnap on Concept Explication 
When trying to formalize our intuitive concept of coherence, it is vital to un-
derstand first how such a formalization is to be realized and what it means for 
such a formalization to be successful. These questions are important, especially 
because they will substantially influence the process by which we arrive at our 
formalization of coherence. When trying to clarify the concept of degree of con­
firmation, Carnap clearly saw the importance of a thorough discussion of the 
methodological requirements for such a project. His account will appear to be 
very helpful for the project at hand. 
In his Logical Foundations of Probability, Carnap sets himself the goal of clari­
fying (1) the concept of degree of confirmation, (2) the logical nature of induction 
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and (3) the concept of probability (Carnap 1950: 1). According to him, the vital 
characteristic of the type of clarification that he envisions is that it makes for­
mally precise one of our informal concepts. This is what he calls an explication: 
[b]y the procedure of explication we mean the transformation of an inexact, 
prescientific concept, the explicandum, into a new exact concept, the explica­
tum. … The explicandum may belong to everyday language or to a previous 
stage in the development of scientific language. The explicatum must be 
given by explicit rules for its use, for example, by a definition which incorpo­
rates it into a well-constructed system of scientific either logicomathematical 
or empirical concepts. (op. cit.: 3) 
The challenging aspect of finding an explication is the fact that the explicandum 
is not a formal notion and therefore the relation between explicandum and ex­
plicatum cannot be one of complete coincidence (op. cit.: 5). But how do we then 
decide whether a certain explication is a good explication? According to Carnap, 
explications may differ with respect to their being satisfactory, or, less stringently, 
in their being more satisfactory than any of the other proposals. For an expli­
cation to be satisfactory it must be exact, fruitful (suggesting further research) 
and as simple as possible, and it must be ‘similar to the explicandum’ (op. cit.: 7). 
The last requirement is especially ambiguous. If the explicatum does not relate 
to the explicandum it is useless, but on the other hand, it does not need to be so 
closely related that in all cases in which the explicandum can be used the expli­
catum applies also. Precisely because the latter is formally precise, whereas the 
former is not, substantial differences in applicability may be appropriate or even 
necessary to avoid inconsistencies. 
It appears, therefore, that these requirements are not very restrictive. Many 
solutions may satisfy them to the same degree or we may disagree about which 
of them satisfies them best. Furthermore, Carnap proposes no lexical ordering, 
which implies that when two solutions satisfy different requirements better no 
decision appears possible. Apparently, more intuitive considerations are nec­
essary to decide which solution is the most satisfactory and we must allow for 
the possibility that two mutually exclusive solutions are equally satisfactory. Al­
though this is of course an unavoidable consequence of trying to formalize an 
inexact notion, Carnap emphasizes that we must describe the explicandum as 
precisely as possible: 
There is a temptation to think that, since the explicandum cannot be given in 
exact terms anyway, it does not matter much how we formulate the problem. 
But this would be quite wrong. On the contrary, since even in the best case 
we cannot reach full exactness, we must, in order to prevent the discussion 
of the problem from becoming entirely futile, do all we can to make at least 
practically clear what is meant as the explicandum. (Carnap 1950: 4) 
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To this effect, one may give a general description of the explicandum, or one 
may provide examples in which the explicatum should be applicable or others in 
which it should not be applicable. For example, one may indicate that the concept 
of salt which is to be explicated is not meant in the sense it has in chemistry, but 
rather in the narrower sense it has in the household language (Carnap 1950: 4–5). 
For an explication of the concept of coherence Carnap’s remarks are especially 
important. In common language, ‘coherence’ has a large number of very different 
usages. As Luc Bovens and Stephan Hartmann (2003a: 31) note, it makes sense 
to talk of the coherence of a law firm or an ant-hill, but it seems arguable that 
the concept of coherence involved is different in both. As a first delineation, I 
propose to consider coherence in the sense it has been given in the modern phi­
losophy of science literature. In this sense of coherence, coherence is a property 
of a set of propositions (or beliefs, hypotheses, axioms, sentences, etc.), which 
can come in degrees: a set can be more or less (in)coherent. Moreover, the co­
herence of a set has something to do with these propositions ‘hanging together’. 
Nevertheless, this does not yet supply as fully an explanation as possible. For 
on closer examination it appears that even in the relatively secluded domains of 
the philosophy of science and epistemology the concept of coherence has been 
used in a number of (possibly very different) senses. The next three sections will 
discuss three different (but not necessarily independent) philosophical senses of 
coherence. My goal is not to do full justice to the discussions in which the con­
cept has emerged, nor to give a full list of all its possible senses. Instead I intend 
to single out a few senses of coherence, each of which will be formalized in the 
remainder of this thesis. Naturally, we should not directly exclude the possibility 
that one measure of coherence is the most satisfactory for all the possible senses 
of coherence. Nevertheless, given the fact that coherence has functioned in so 
many different contexts, this seems rather unlikely. 
1.3 Coherence as an Epistemic Virtue 
The first sense of coherence that this thesis will discuss is coherence as an epis­
temic virtue. One of the philosophies in which this sense of coherence is well 
exemplified is Ernan McMullin’s version of realism. 
In his ‘Epistemic Virtue and Theory Appraisal’ (1996b), McMullin makes a dis­
tinction between a scientific law and a scientific theory. A law is empirical in 
nature and merely reports a correlation. Although this correlation may be ei­
ther statistical or invariable, it is only the truth of the correlation that a law is 
concerned with. In contrast, a theory gives an account of why the correlation 
holds: ‘[t]heories attempt to explain why particular regularities recur; they indi­
cate what the causes may be’ (McMullin 1996b: 18). And whereas a law is only 
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concerned with empirical fit, both empirical fit and explanatory success are re­
quired to make a good theory. Explanatory success is a vague notion andMcMullin 
instead prefers to present an informal list of virtues that promote a theory’s ex-
planatory success. His list of virtues is quite long, and I will not discuss them in 
depth. Instead, let it suffice to note that coherence is one of the three ‘internal’ 
virtues (McMullin 1996b: §4), logical consistency and simplicity being the other 
two. Interestingly, McMullin defines coherence negatively as the absence of ad 
hoc features, since according to him it is in general the lack of coherence that 
plays the most important role in the debate. A theory with many ad hoc features 
is said to be much less likely to be true than a theory without such features, ceteris 
paribus. 
McMullin is not alone in his view on coherence as a theoretical virtue. Indeed, 
many others have discussed coherence as one of the virtues that make for good 
theories. Paul Churchland, for example, lists it as one of the so-called ‘superem­
pirical’ virtues (next to explanatory power and simplicity) and he, too, argues that 
a theory’s excellence (as measured by the virtue of empirical adequacy combined 
with the superempirical virtues) ‘is the ultimate measure of truth and ontology 
at all levels of cognition.’ (Churchland 1985: 35) 
While for McMullin coherence is the absence of ad hoc assumptions, many 
others have given the virtue of coherence a more positive interpretation, in the 
sense that it is good for a theory if its propositions hang together nicely. For 
instance, according to Bonjour (1985: 93) 
[i]ntuitively, coherence is a matter of how well a body of beliefs ‘hangs to­
gether’: how well its component beliefs fit together, agree or dovetail with 
each other, so as to produce an organized, tightly structured system of be-
liefs, rather than either a helter-skelter collection or a set of conflicting sub­
sytems. 
Moreover, he believes (op. cit.: 95–96) that coherence cannot be equated with log­
ical consistency: clearly a system can be intuitively very incoherent even if it is 
logically consistent. Arguably, this is what happens if, for instance, two beliefs 
make each other extremely unlikely without logically contradicting each other. A 
similar argument (op. cit.: 96–97) shows that coherence must be less strict than 
logical entailment: two beliefs (or propositions) can be very coherent without one 
of them entailing the other. 
Although Bonjour discusses a different sense of coherence – that of coher­
ence as a confidence boosting property, to be discussed in the next section – I 
believe that his remarks are valuable also for the explication of coherence as an 
epistemic virtue. Indeed, they seem to come much closer to our intuitive concept 
of coherence (even if considered only in the sense of coherence as an epistemic 
virtue) then the mere absence of ad hoc hypotheses, especially if we add to them 
the remark that coherence can come in degrees. However, this description still 
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remains extremely vague: the descriptions of coherence as hanging together well, 
as being a matter of degree and as being somewhere in between consistency and 
entailment in no way determine a unique notion of coherence. 
Especially the hanging together intuition seems ambiguous. Indeed, chap­
ters 2 and 3 of this thesis will propose two plausible ways in which this intuition 
can be explicated. In chapter 2, a view is examined according to which two propo­
sitions hang together if they probabilistically support each other and in chapter 3, 
hanging together is interpreted as set-theoretic overlap. In both cases there are 
many different measures that can be based on these considerations. However, I 
will attempt to show that not all of these are equally satisfactory by testing them 
against some of our intuitions regarding coherence in specific cases. 
1.4 The Coherence Theory of Epistemic Justification 
Virtually everybody believes that we are justified in holding at least some of our 
beliefs. Unfortunately, it is much less clear why we are justified in holding these 
beliefs. The problem is that most justifications for our beliefs are beliefs them­
selves and thus also in need of justification. 
For instance, beliefs which cannot be verified by evidential considerations 
may be justified by beliefs that can be so verified, but how do we justify these 
evidential beliefs? Some of them may be justified by other evidential beliefs, 
but how do we justify those beliefs or how can we make plausible that they do 
not stand in need of justification? According to the infinite regress skeptic, all 
beliefs need to be justified, but there is no way in which our most basic evidential 
beliefs can be justified. In the skeptic’s view, there are only two options: either 
the justificatory process will go on and on, or it will circle back on itself, but in 
either case we have no real justification of our beliefs. 
Several solutions to the infinite regress problem have been proposed. Foun­
dationalists believe that there are in fact basic beliefs that do not stand in need 
of any justification. These beliefs provide the foundations for our other beliefs. 
Although this clearly halts the infinite regress, it is unclear precisely which of our 
beliefs are basic in the sense of not requiring justification by other beliefs. Co­
herentists on the other hand believe that there are no such basic beliefs, but that 
this does not imply that one cannot be justified in holding any beliefs. According 
to the most popular coherence theory of epistemic justification, one is justified 
in holding a belief that p iff p is an element of a coherent system of beliefs (cf. 
Everitt and Fisher 1995: ch. 7, Hetherington 1996: ch. 25). 
One of those who have attempted to counter the infinite regress problem by 
appealing to coherentist considerations is Laurence Bonjour. In his The Structure 
of Empirical Knowledge, Bonjour argues that coherentism is the best theory with 
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respect to the structure of empirical justification. In his view evidential beliefs 
are justified because they cohere with our other beliefs: their coherence makes 
them more likely to be true. Therefore, coherence in this sense can be said to 
be truth conducive. Bonjour even argues that in some cases we may become very 
sure of a number of quite improbable propositions, if these propositions hang 
together to a high enough degree. For instance, consider the example by Lewis 
of a number of ‘relatively unreliable witnesses who independently tell the same 
circumstantial story’ (Lewis 1946: 346). According to Lewis, 
[f]or any one of these reports, taken singly, the extent to which it confirms 
what is reported may be slight. … But congruence of the reports estab­
lishes a high probability of what they agree upon, by principles of probabil­
ity determination which are familiar: on any other hypothesis than that of 
truthtelling, this agreement is highly unlikely; the story any one false wit­
ness might tell being one out of so very large a number of equally possible 
choices. (ibid.) 
According to Bonjour, this example can even be strengthened in that it is not 
necessary to assume that the witnesses are reliable at all: 
[Lewis’s] example shows quite convincingly that no antecedent degree of 
warrant or credibility is required. For as long as we are confident that the 
reports of the various witnesses are genuinely independent of each other, 
a high enough degree of coherence among them will eventually dictate the 
hypothesis of truth telling as the only available explanation of their agree­
ment – even, indeed, if those individual reports initially have a high degree 
of negative credibility, that is, are much more likely to be false than true …. 
(Bonjour 1985: 148, emphasis in original) 
The example by Lewis and Bonjour’s consequent remark that no antecedent cred­
ibility is required are important from the perspective of probabilistic measures of 
coherence, since the model of independent and unreliable witnesses has played 
an important role in many papers on measures of coherence (for example, Klein 
and Warfield 1994 and 1996; Shogenji 1999; Olsson 2001, 2002 and 2005; Bovens 
and Hartmann 2003a and 2003b). The basic question that all of these approaches 
face is whether, given that we are presented with a number of reports by inde­
pendent and unreliable witnesses, the coherence of the information that they 
present us with adds to the probability of that information. Here the term ‘wit­
nesses’ may be interpreted very broadly as anything that may report evidence, 
i.e., other persons, our senses, measuring equipment, etc. 
The model in which independent, partially reliable witnesses report on propo­
sitions combined with the conception of coherence as being truth conducive 
forms the basis of the first sense of coherence that this thesis will attempt to 
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explicate.1 It is quite plausible that the independent witness-model is not the 
only option for formalizing the coherentist approach to justification. But given 
that it has dominated the discussion on probabilistic measures of coherence so 
strongly, it seems a good place to start. If one were to find that it cannot be 
formalized in a satisfactory way, one may always try to find other models. In this 
sense of coherence, then, coherence is inexorably linked to being truth conducive 
and to a model in which relatively unreliable, independent witnesses supply us 
with reports to the effect that a certain proposition is true. 
Nevertheless, this conception of coherence is quite different from the sense of 
coherence as an epistemic virtue. As is well-known, McMullin believes explana­
tory success to be a sign of a theory’s truth (McMullin 1996b: 29–31, see also 
McMullin 1984, 1996a). Yet for him coherence need not be truth conducive in the 
sense that it has in coherentist accounts of knowledge. Rather, for him coher­
ence is one of the virtues that make a theory more explanatory and, therefore, 
one of the virtues that together with a number of others makes a theory more 
likely to be true. Still we should not underestimate the similarities between the 
two views. Both stress the relation between coherence and the truth of a set of 
beliefs or propositions. And most of those who have discussed coherence as a 
confidence boosting property have similarly argued that coherence should be a 
matter of hanging together and a matter of degree and should be somewhere in 
between logical consistency and entailment. And until very recently, no attempt 
had been made to dissolve the vagueness of the concept in the sense of coherence 
as a confidence boosting property either. 
In his (1985), Bonjour still argued that this vagueness was disturbing but not 
destructive for a theory of coherence, for he believed that coherence is, and seem­
ingly must be, a basic ingredient of virtually all rival epistemological theories as 
well. For accounts of knowledge of the past and, more generally, of all knowledge 
that goes beyond the directly empirical, even strongly foundationalist theories 
will still require an account of coherence. I will come back to this argument in 
the next section. 
However, as announced above, Bonjour later came to repudiate this view and 
instead adopted a version of the foundationalist theory of justification. One of his 
reasons for revising his earlier view is precisely the supposedly inherent vague­
ness of coherence. In his (1999: 124), Bonjour concluded that ‘the precise nature 
of coherence remains a largely unsolved problem’ and that this gives strong rea­
son to despair of coherentism with respect to evidential beliefs. Interestingly, 
1Above I have quoted Bonjour’s remark that no antecedent credibility is required. Consequently, 
one may expect that in my model I would allow for the possibility that the witnesses are completely 
unreliable. However, in my model the reliability of the witnesses will be fixed and for such a model 
it is the case that if the witnesses are fully unreliable, we cannot become more confident that 
the information they report is true. They must be reliable to some degree, even if that degree is 
extremely small. For more on this see Bovens and Hartmann (2003a: 14, 56). 
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at the time Bonjour drew this pessimistic conclusion, the first probabilistic mea­
sures of coherence were being drafted. Moreover, the first of these proposals 
(Shogenji 1999 and Olsson 2002) were based on Lewis’s and Bonjour’s claims 
that coherence can be truth conducive. Therefore, Bonjour’s conclusion seems 
to have been a bit premature and the question whether or not coherence can be 
truth conducive in the above sense remains an open question. 
In chapter 4, I will take up this challenge by discussing critically Bovens and 
Hartmann’s (2003a) work on coherence as a confidence boosting property. 
1.5 Coherence Between Theory and Evidence 
Above I noted Bonjour’s challenge to the foundationalists that they, too, require a 
theory of coherence to justify theoretical knowledge. In his (1999) he formulates 
the challenge as follows: 
[T]he concept of coherence … is also an indispensable ingredient in virtu­
ally all foundationalist theories; coherence must seemingly be invoked to 
account for the relation between the basic or foundational beliefs and other 
nonfoundational or ‘superstructure’ beliefs, in virtue of which the latter are 
justified in relation to the former. (Bonjour 1999: 124) 
According to Bonjour (1999: 140n15), ‘[t]he basic point here is that strictly de­
ductive or even enumerative inductive inference from the foundationalist beliefs 
does not suffice to justify most of the superstructure beliefs that the founda­
tionalist typically wants to claim to be justified.’ Without some recourse to the 
concept of coherence the foundationalist cannot justify the superstructure be­
liefs by reference to the foundational beliefs. Here the foundational beliefs are 
similar to what I above called evidential beliefs and the superstructure beliefs are 
similar to the theoretical beliefs. I will use the latter terminology. 
Although I believe that Bonjour is basically right in arguing that the founda­
tionalist cannot do without some concept of coherence, it is not clear that it is the 
same concept of coherence as any of the two described above (see also Douven 
2005b). For example, the independent witness model discussed above does not 
seem appropriate, especially because there seems to be nothing wrong with the 
idea that one piece of evidence hangs together well with a theory consisting of 
a number of propositions (or beliefs or axioms, etc.). We do not need a separate 
independent source (in this case an evidential belief) to report on each of the 
different propositions (theoretical beliefs). 
Whereas the explications of the other senses of coherence start with our intu­
itive notion of the respective sense of coherence and try to explicate that notion, 
in chapter 5 I will not explicitly start out with the sense of coherence as a relation 
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between the evidence and the theory. Instead, I will attempt to provide a quanti­
tative measure of Clark Glymour’s theory of bootstrap confirmation. Although I 
will argue at the end of that chapter that the concept of bootstrap confirmation 
goes at least some way toward explicating the coherence between a theory and 
the evidence, I will leave open the question of what changes are required in order 
to make it a fully satisfactory explication of that notion. 
1.6 Outline 
In this chapter I have argued that there are at least four different senses in which 
the concept of coherence has been used in the recent literature on the subject: 
coherence as a theoretical virtue in the sense of mutual support, coherence as a 
theoretical virtue in the sense of set-theoretic overlap, coherence as a confidence 
boosting property, and coherence as a relation between evidence and theory. In 
each of these cases, coherence has something to do with propositions (or beliefs, 
axioms, etc.) hanging together and in each of these cases coherence is linked to 
either truth or justified belief. However, it has become clear from the discussion 
that the respective senses of coherence also differ in some important aspects. 
Coherence as used by coherence theories of justification is first and foremost a 
truth conducive property, especially in the sense that it has been given by many 
of those who have worked on the subject of measures of coherence. On the other 
hand, coherence as a theoretical virtue is not a prerequisite for a theory’s truth: if 
a theory has many of the other virtues and a nice empirical fit, its being relatively 
incoherent may not be all that important. Also, the two different interpretations 
of this sense of coherence (coherence as mutual support and coherence as rela­
tive overlap) seem to point to two very different characteristics of a set. Finally, 
the coherence between evidential and theoretical statements seems again to be 
an altogether different relation than the others, and may, therefore, turn out to 
require an altogether different type of explication than the three above. 
As explained above, Carnap believed that after the explicandum has been de­
scribed or circumscribed as fully as may be, we should try and find an explication 
that is fruitful, exact, simple and as similar to the explicandum as possible. I be-
lieve it will be one of the main lessons of this thesis that these requirements, even 
if combined with the descriptions of the different senses of coherence above, do 
not determine the correct measure of coherence for each of the explicanda. In­
stead, Carnap’s (1950: 4) warning that we cannot decide in an exact way whether 
a certain proposal is right or wrong still applies. 
According to John Kemeny and Paul Oppenheim (1952: 308) ‘the commonest 
procedure of explication is to apply a trial and error method till one arrives at an 
ingenious guess, and then try to find intuitive reasons to justify the proposed ex­
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plicatum.’ This, they argue, is precisely what Carnap did when, after arriving at a 
class of symmetric C-functions for his measure of degree of confirmation, he jus­
∗tified his choice for measure C by showing that it had satisfactory consequences 
(ibid.). Nevertheless, they feel that such a procedure is ‘clearly very dangerous: 
the intuition of the most honest and well-trained philosopher is likely at times 
to become a tool for grinding an ax’ (ibid.). Instead, they propose to lay down a 
number of desiderata that in combination determine the form of the appropriate 
measure. For future reference, let us call this the Kemeny–Oppenheim strategy 
for the explication of a concept. 
This strategy will not always be an improvement on the trial and error method, 
especially in cases where the desiderata are justified by reference to intuitions. 
Take for example the sense of coherence as mutual support. A quick look at 
the literature on measures of confirmation reveals that there are a substantial 
number of strikingly different measures of support (see, for example, Eells and 
Fitelson (2000) and (2002)), and it may be extremely difficult to find intuitively 
compelling general desiderata for measures of coherence that significantly de­
crease the number of potential candidates. In such cases, it might be better to 
revert to the method of making a few educated guesses and then trying to find 
out which of these behaves the most satisfactorily in a number of intuitive test 
cases. In fact, this will turn out to be the best approach for both the concept of 
coherence as mutual support and for my measure of bootstrap confirmation. 
For coherence as relative overlap and for coherence as truth conduciveness, 
I will argue that there are enough extremely plausible desiderata to determine a 
single class of measures of coherence. 
In this thesis I will explicate the three different senses of coherence as prop­
erties of sets of propositions, while the concept of bootstrap confirmation will be 
explicated as a property of theories, consisting of hypotheses. Nothing important 
hinges on this of course, but since Glymour has defined bootstrap confirmation 
as a property of theories, while almost all of those who have proposed measures 
of coherence have regarded coherence as a property of a set of propositions, I will 
simply follow suit. Also, the measures I will present will all be completely proba­
bilistic in that they depend only on the probabilistic features of the propositions 
(hypotheses) in the set (theory) and not on any of their nonprobabilistic features. 
This is mainly for the reason that it seems otherwise impossible to construct an 
exact explication of coherence or bootstrap confirmation. We must hope that the 
considerations that often play a role in our intuitive judgements with respect to 
the notion at hand can be explicated by a purely probabilistic measure. 
As a preliminary point, let me also note that throughout much of this thesis I 
will, like Lewis and most other writers on the subject, simply speak of the coher­
ence of a set of propositions, as if the coherence of such a set were determined 
solely by the presence or absence of logical relationships between its elements, 
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or by their contents. But, of course, if coherence is to be given a probabilistic 
analysis, and if, as may be reasonably assumed (pace Carnap 1950), probabilities 
are not (wholly) a matter of logic, then a set of propositions cannot be coherent or 
incoherent intrinsically, but only relative to a given probability function defined 
on the propositions. Thus, the same set of propositions may be coherent relative 
to one probability function and incoherent relative to another. Concomitantly, a 
set of propositions may be more coherent than another relative to one probabil­
ity function, less coherent relative to a second probability function, and the two 
sets may be equally coherent relative to a third such function. The same remarks 
apply to my measure of bootstrap confirmation. 
Each of the next three chapters will try to explicate a different sense of the 
concept of coherence. In each chapter it will appear that one (class of) measure(s) 
is most suited to the specific sense of coherence at stake. Each of the chapters 
will thus present a different measure of coherence as best capturing the specific 
sense of coherence under investigation. To forestall misunderstanding, let me 
emphasize that I am not committed to the argument that these chapters present 
the most important, or even the most common, senses of coherence. If there are 
other senses of the concept it would be interesting to find out whether one of 
the measures proposed in these chapters would be the best explication of it, or 
whether another measure is more satisfactory. I will come back extensively to 
this problem in later chapters. 
This thesis is organized as follows. Chapters 2 and 3 will discuss two possi­
ble explications of the view of coherence as a theoretical virtue. In chapter 2, I 
will discuss the view of coherence as mutual support and show that there are a 
potentially very large number of different classes of measures that can be based 
on this view. By testing some of these classes against an example in which one 
set is obviously more coherent than the other, I will make a tentative choice for 
one of these measures. Furthermore, I will show how each of the measures of 
coherence that so far have been presented is not satisfactory from the viewpoint 
of coherence as mutual support. 
Chapter 3 will explicate a different sense of hanging together, viz., that of 
coherence as relative overlap. First I will present an intuitive argument why a 
single measure of coherence that is both a relative overlap measure and a mutual 
support measure will necessarily be unsatisfactory. Next, I will present a measure 
that appears to be the best explication of coherence as relative overlap. This 
measure, too, will be compared with the existing measures. 
Chapter 4 will consider coherence as truth conduciveness. This chapter will 
be based for the largest part on Bovens and Hartmann’s (2003a) and (2003b) 
model of coherence as a confidence boosting property. After having shown that 
their model is unsatisfactory in several respects, I will propose a model that is 
very similar to theirs and present a measure that does not suffer from the same 
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problematic consequences. 
Chapter 5 will discuss Glymour’s theory of bootstrap confirmation. I will ar­
gue that although his version of his theory has been convincingly refuted, these 
refutations may be evaded by a probabilistic version of his theory. To this end, I 
will provide a quantitative theory of bootstrap confirmation and present a class 
of measures that can be considered to measure the degree of bootstrap confir­
mation. Finally, it will become clear that the resulting measures can also be in­
terpreted as at least partially satisfactory explications of the coherence between 
a theory and the evidence. 
Chapter 6 will discuss a number of anticipated objections to the different 
measures proposed in this thesis. The recent wave of measures of coherence has 
been accompanied by an equally impressive stream of arguments against such 
projects. In this chapter, I will propose a few tentative answers to these criticisms 
and will attempt to show that none of them can make true their claim that the 
project should be abandoned altogether. 
14 CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 
Chapter 2 
Coherence as Mutual Support
2.1 Introduction 
In this chapter I will present one explication of the concept of coherence as an 
epistemic virtue. Many believe that coherence, along with simplicity, consistency 
and possibly other virtues, is an indicator of a theory’s truth and thus distin­
guishes it from other theories that are possibly equally well confirmed by the 
evidence but do not exemplify these virtues to the same degree. 
In chapter 1, I noted that in this sense of coherence it need not be the case 
that coherence is truth conducive per se. For example, McMullin believes that 
explanatory success is an indicator of a theory’s truth and whereas coherence is 
one of the contributors to a theory’s explanatory success, it is surely not the only 
one (in his (1996b) he distinguishes at least 10 different virtues) nor is it clear 
that coherence works on its own and not exclusively in combination with one or 
more of the other virtues. The problem this poses for an explication of this sense 
of coherence is that we are only left with the very general remarks that coherence 
is a matter of degree and that it is a matter of hanging together. And while 
coherence being a matter of degree can be straightforwardly formalized within a 
probabilistic framework, the notion of hanging together may be formalized both 
as mutual support and as set-theoretical overlap. This chapter will explicate 
coherence as mutual support while the next chapter will consider coherence as 
relative overlap. 
My approach will be to begin as generally as possible by focussing on the 
‘mutual support’ intuition and considering various possible ways of making it 
precise. This will result in a probabilistic but still qualitative theory of coherence 
as mutual support (section 2.2). That theory will serve as a stepping stone for 
defining a family of measures of coherence which seem to capture the notion of 
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coherence as mutual support equally well (section 2.3). One of the main problems 
that this chapter encounters is that restricting ourselves to the concept of coher­
ence as mutual support will not uniquely determine which measure of coherence 
best explicates this concept. For although the discussion in sections 2.2 and 2.3 
will exclude a very large number of potential measures, an equally impressive 
number of candidates remains. 
From this it follows that if we are after a single measure of coherence, we will 
need other considerations to substantially decrease the latter class of measures. 
This question will be confronted in section 2.4, where I compare each of these 
measures with an example about which we have very clear intuitions. It will ap­
pear that only one of the measures of coherence proposed in section 2.3 satisfies 
our intuitive judgements in that example. Thus, in parallel to Carnap’s case for 
∗his measure C (see section 1.6), a tentative case can be made for that one mea­
sure of coherence on the basis that it has more satisfactory consequences than 
the others. Next, in section 2.5, the remaining measure is compared with the 
extant accounts of coherence and it is argued that it is preferable as a measure 
of coherence as mutual support. 
Finally, I consider and seek to defuse two objections to which the preferred 
measure (as well as the other measures proposed in section 2.3) seems vulnera­
ble (section 2.6). 
2.2 A Qualitative Theory of Coherence as Mutual Sup-
port 
Almost all the extant accounts of probabilistic measures of coherence place great 
emphasis on the notion of coherence as mutual probabilistic support. Tomoji 
Shogenji (1999) and Branden Fitelson (2003) have both discussed coherence ex­
plicitly as a measure of mutual support, while Bovens and Hartmann (2003a) give 
mutual support a central place in their theory of coherence, too. Presumably, 
the first to make the link between coherence and mutual support was C. I. Lewis, 
who defined coherence (or congruence, as he called it) for a set of statements as 
follows: 
A set of statements … will be said to be congruent [i.e., coherent] if and only 
if they are so related that the antecedent probability of any one of them will 
be increased if the remainder of the set can be assumed as given premises. 
(Lewis 1946: 338) 
Lewis’s definition clearly explicates coherence as probabilistic mutual support. 
However, it also faces a number of difficulties. Firstly, it is still a qualitative 
theory. As noted in chapter 1, intuitively coherence can come in degrees, which 
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means that a satisfactory explication of coherence should allow for more than 
mere categorical (yes/no) verdicts about the coherence of sets of propositions. 
Secondly, Lewis’s theory only considers the support a single proposition receives 
from all the others, while there are clearly many other relations between the 
propositions in a set that may matter for its coherence. In this section, I will 
show how his qualitative framework can be modified in order to set to rights this 
shortcoming, while the next section shows how his revised theory can be adapted 
so as to make coherence a matter of degree. 
The reason why Lewis’s theory does not seem to capture adequately our notion 
of mutual support is that it only considers the (in)dependence of each single one 
element of a set on all the remaining ones. This I will call one–all coherence: 
Definition 2.1 A set S = {R1, . . . , Rn} is one–all coherent precisely if for all i ∈ 
{1, . . . , n} it holds that p(Ri |R1 ∧ · · · ∧ Ri−1 ∧ Ri+1 ∧ · · · ∧ Rn) > p(Ri). 
However, intuitively, other relations between propositions may equally add to a 
set’s propositions beingmutually supportive. Therefore, this definition should be 
strengthened. A first obvious strengthening is to consider the dependence of each 
one element on any non-empty subset not including that element.1 Formally: 
Definition 2.2 A set S = {R1, . . . , Rn} is one–any coherent precisely if for all i ∈ 
′ ′ 
∧
′ {1, . . . , n} and all S ⊂ S \ {Ri} such that S ≠ ∅ it holds that p(Ri | S ) > p(Ri). 
A similarly obvious strengthening is to consider, for each partition of a set into 
two non-empty subsets, the dependence of these subsets on one another, result­
ing in2 
Definition 2.3 A set S = {R1, . . . , Rn} is partition coherent precisely if for all non­
′ ∗ ′ ∗ ′ ∗ 
(∧
′ 
∣
empty S , S ⊂ S such that S ∩ S = ∅ and S ∪ S = S it holds that p S ∧
∗
) (∧
′
)
S > p S . 
And the foregoing definitions can be further strengthened by considering the 
dependence of any non-empty subset on any other non-overlapping, non-empty 
subset, as follows: 
1Another possible strengthening is to require not only that each element be supported by the 
conjunction of the other elements but also that each element have a probability above a given 
threshold value conditional on the conjunction of the other elements (this would go some way 
toward formalizing Hage’s (2004) conception of coherence, which requires, among other things, 
that each element of a set be rationally acceptable relative to the conjunction of the other elements 
of the set). Definitions 2.2, 2.3, and 2.4 could be strengthened in the same way. 
2The notion of partition coherence was suggested to Igor Douven and me by an anonymous 
referee for Synthese, for which we are very grateful. 
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Definition 2.4 A set S = {R1, . . . , Rn} is any–any coherent precisely if for all non­
′ ∗ ′ ∗ 
∣∧ ) (∧
′
)
empty S , S ⊂ S such that S ∩ S = ∅ it holds that p 
(∧
S ′∣ S∗ > p S . 
Before continuing, let me verify that the definitions above are genuinely dis­
tinct notions. It is evident that any–any coherence implies both one–any coher­
ence and partition coherence, and that both one–any coherence and partition 
coherence imply one–all coherence. However, the converse implications do not 
hold. More specifically (for a proof, see Appendix 2 A)3 
Theorem 2.1 
1. One–all coherence does not imply one–any coherence. 
2. One–all coherence does not imply partition coherence. 
3. One–any coherence does not imply any–any coherence. 
4. One–any coherence does not imply partition coherence. 
5. Partition coherence does not imply any–any coherence. 
6. Partition coherence does not imply one–any coherence. 
It follows from theorems 2.1.4 and 2.1.6 that one–any coherence and partition 
coherence are logically independent notions. This means that there is even a 
fifth category of coherence: 
Definition 2.5 A set S is one–any + partition coherent precisely if it is both one– 
any coherent and partition coherent. 
While any–any coherence obviously implies one–any + partition coherence, I 
have so far not succeeded in proving that the converse does not hold. Neverthe­
less, I feel confident enough to make 
Conjecture 2.1 
One–any + partition coherence does not imply any–any coherence. 
Figures 2.1 and 2.2 give a graphic representation of the results so far, given that 
the conjecture does or does not hold, respectively. 
Although we are after a probabilistic measure of coherence and not of inco­
herence, it seems helpful to define incoherence also. In the case of incoherence, 
we will have the distinct notions of one–all, one–any, partition, and any–any in ­
coherence. These can simply be obtained by replacing ‘>’ by ‘<’ in definitions 2.1– 
2.4 (one proves that these are genuinely distinct notions of incoherence in the 
same way as was done for the corresponding notions of coherence). 
3The proofs of this and various other theorems in this thesis have been derived with the help of 
the PrSAT package for Mathematica (version 5), which was written by Branden Fitelson and Jason 
Alexander and is publicly available via http://www.fitelson.org; for some of the theory behind 
it, see Fitelson (2001a: 93–100). 
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Figure 2.1: The relations between the different definitions of coherence, if con­
jecture 2.1 is true. ‘O–A + Part’ stands for One–Any + Partition Coherence 
Assuming that the conjecture is true, these definitions yield a qualitative the­
ory of coherence which divides the class of all finite sets of propositions into 
eleven categories, namely, those that are only one–all coherent, those that in ad-
dition are one–any coherent but not partition coherent, those that are partition 
coherent but not one–any coherent, those that are both one–any and partition 
coherent but not any–any coherent, those that are any–any coherent, those that 
are only one–all incoherent, and so on, plus, of course, a category ‘neither of 
the foregoing.’ The categorization might be extended by defining various other 
notions of probabilistic independence for sets of propositions, most obviously 
by defining different relations of coherence neutrality (for example, by replacing 
‘>’ by ‘=’ in definitions 2.1–2.4). Below, I will not need such different notions of 
neutral coherence, therefore it will suffice to define a set as being independent by 
Definition 2.6 A set S = {R1, . . . , Rn} is independent precisely if for all non-empty ) (∧
′
)
′ ∗ ′ ∗ 
(∧ ∣
S , S ⊂ S such that S ∩ S = ∅ it holds that p S ′ ∣∧S∗ = p S . 
In order to enhance readability, I will no longer use the ‘ ’-symbols when dis­
cussing probabilities in the rest of this thesis. Instead, it will simply be assumed 
that if H is a proposition, then p(H) constitutes the probability of that proposi­
tion (relative to the background knowledge, reference to which will likewise be 
suppressed in the rest of this thesis) and if S is a (finite) set of propositions then 
∧ ∧
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One–All 
One–Any Any–Any Partition 
Figure 2.2: The relations between the different definitions of coherence, if con­
jecture 2.1 is false 
p(S) constitutes the probability that the conjunction of the propositions in that 
set (i.e., S) is true (again, relative to the background knowledge). And similarly 
for p(¬S), p(H ∧ S), which constitutes the probability that H ∧ ( S) is true, 
′ p(S |S ), etc. 
It seems that the notion of any–any coherence (definition 2.4) provides the 
best qualitative explication of the notion of coherence as mutual support. Af-
ter all, one–all coherence may hold for a set S = {R1, . . . , Rn} and yet, as can 
be gleaned from the proof of theorem 2.1.1, there may be i, j ∈ {1, . . . , n} such 
that p(Ri |Rj) < p(Ri), that is, it may contain propositions that undermine one 
another and thus do the exact opposite of being mutually supportive. And al­
though there can be no single propositions undermining each other in a set 
that is one–any coherent, it is an entirely straightforward, albeit somewhat te­
dious, task to verify that it follows from the second probability model specified 
in the proof of theorem 2.1 that a set S = {R1, . . . , Rn} can be one–any coher­
ent and yet for all i, j, k, l ∈ {1, . . . , n} such that i ≠ j ≠ k ≠ l it may hold that 
p(Ri ∧ Rj |Rk ∧ Rl) < p(Ri ∧ Rj).
4 Arguably, if each conjunction of two propo­
sitions in a set is undermined by any conjunction of two other propositions in 
that set, then the propositions in the set do not really hang together all that well. 
4A point concerning notation: throughout this thesis, I use i ≠ j ≠ k as an abbreviation of 
i≠j ∧ j≠k ∧ i≠k, and similarly for similar expressions. 
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A similar claim holds for the notion of partition coherence: the third probability 
model specified in the proof of theorem 2.1 shows that a set of propositions may 
be partition coherent, yet for each proposition in the set there may be a pair of 
other propositions in the set whose conjunction undermines the former. If, on 
the other hand, a set is any–any coherent, then every ‘bit’ of it is supported by 
every other ‘bit’ of it. It seems that the propositions of such a set can be truly 
said to be mutually supportive. 
This concludes the qualitative explication of coherence as mutual support. As 
noted above, to be satisfactory an explication of the concept of coherence should 
be sensitive to different degrees of coherence. This is especially important, since 
the sensitivity to degree may even interfere with the different qualitative classes 
distinguished above. For instance, it may not be the case that each any–any coher-
ent set of propositions will intuitively always be more coherent than a one–any 
or even a one–all coherent set. In a one–any coherent set, at least some parts 
of the set may undermine each other with respect to some other parts, but this 
undermining may be compensated for by other parts’ supporting each other very 
well. In that case, such a set may turn out to be intuitively more coherent than 
an any–any coherent set, in which every ‘bit’ of it is only minimally supported 
by any of its other ‘bits’. Therefore, we need our explication to be sensitive to 
the degrees of mutual support. I now turn to the task of generalizing the above 
qualitative theory of coherence into a quantitative theory of coherence as mutual 
support. 
2.3 Quantitative Measures of Coherence as Mutual Sup-
port 
This section will begin with showing how the above general qualitative frame­
work can be generalized toward a general quantitative framework of coherence 
as mutual support. The result will be five different classes of measures of co­
herence, each of which in turn consists of a large number of different classes of 
measures. With the help of two plausible considerations it will appear possible 
to limit significantly the number of potential measures of coherence as mutual 
support. However, the conclusion of this section will still be that the sense of co­
herence as mutual support allows for an important number of strikingly different 
measures. 
Each of the above qualitative classes of coherence can readily be made quanti­
tative by using one of the Bayesian measures of support (which will be introduced 
below). Recall that one–all coherence is a matter of each proposition in a set be-
ing probabilistically supported by the conjunction of all the other propositions 
in that set. To obtain a corresponding measure of coherence once can simply 
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proceed as follows: measure the extent to which each proposition is supported 
by the conjunction of the remaining members of the set and take some average 
of the results for all propositions in the set. The same procedure can be followed 
for the other four notions of coherence. 
To make this idea more precise, let m be some measure of confirmation and 
let [S] indicate the set of ordered pairs of non-empty non-overlapping subsets of {
′ ∗
∣
′ ∗ ′ ∗ 
}
S = {R1, . . . , Rn}, that is, [S] = 〈S , S 〉 ∣ S , S ⊂ S \∅ ∧ S ∩ S = ∅ . Then, in 
correspondence to definitions 2.1–2.5, let us define the following sets: 
{ ∣ }
α(S) = m(Ri, S \{Ri}) ∣ 1 à i à n (2.1) {
′ 
∣
′ 
}
β(S) = m(Ri, S ) ∣ 1 à i à n ∧ S ⊂ S \{Ri} (2.2) {
′ ∗ 
∣
′ ∗ ′ ∗ 
}
γ(S) = m(S , S ) ∣ 〈S , S 〉 ∈ [S] ∧ S ∪ S = S (2.3) 
δ(S) = β(S)∪ γ(S) (2.4) {
′ ∗ 
∣
′ ∗ 
}
ǫ(S) = m(S , S ) ∣ 〈S , S 〉 ∈ [S] (2.5) 
These definitions provide us with five different classes of measures of coher­
ence, to wit, those that take the degree of coherence of a given set S to be some 
average of α(S), β(S), γ(S), δ(S) and ǫ(S), respectively. Each of these classes 
contains infinitely many subclasses of measures, since there are in principle in­
finitely many weighing procedures for each of these classes. Moreover, each of 
these subclasses again has a number of subclasses, since so far more than ten 
measures of confirmation have been proposed in the literature. Thus, it will be 
clear that each of these classes contains a vast number of different measures of 
coherence.5 
How can we commence decreasing this vast number of different measures of 
coherence? Well, for a start it certainly seems preferable to have a measure of 
coherence that takes into account all the correlations and anti-correlations that 
may exist between the different non-empty subsets of a set of propositions, i.e., 
it seems preferable to measure the coherence of a set S of propositions by taking 
some average of ǫ(S). A measure based on β(S) would for instance miss the 
negative dependencies between all pairs of conjunctions of two propositions not 
sharing a proposition in the case of the set of propositions specified in the proof 
of theorem 2.1.3; a similar remark would apply to a measure based on γ(S).6 
Furthermore, absent an argument to the contrary, one may argue that a straight 
5And yet these classes of measures are not exhaustive; for instance, both Shogenji’s (1999) 
measure and Olsson’s (2002) measure – see the next section for definitions – are outside any of 
these classes. 
6Fitelson (2003) rightly criticizes Shogenji’s (1999) measure of coherence for only considering 
whether the set as a whole is dependent or not. However, Fitelson’s own measure as presented 
in his (2003) is open to the same type of criticism, given that it does not take into consideration 
correlations that may exist between some of the subsets of a set. More recently, Fitelson (2004) has 
reformulated his measure in order to make it sensitive to relations of the latter kind, too. 
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average seems preferable to a weighted one.7 Although these considerations 
narrow considerably the number of remaining candidates – only the ten or so 
different measures of support remain – it is much less clear on what grounds 
we are to choose one of these measures as our measure of coherence as mutual 
support. 
In section 1.6, I distinguished two different approaches for arriving at an expli­
cation of an intuitive concept. One of these – presumably the one Carnap availed 
himself of – involves making a few educated guesses on the basis of the expla­
nations and examples presented to describe the intuitive concept. Out of these 
educated guesses, the one with the most favorable consequences is put forward as 
the most satisfactory explication. The other approach, proposed by Kemeny and 
Oppenheim’s (1952), is an attempt to construct as many desiderata as required 
to narrow down the class of viable explications enough to single out one alterna-
tive. Above I have indicated that while the latter approach, if feasible, is the most 
satisfactory, it is not at all clear that we can always find (enough) desiderata that 
are intuitively compelling. This seems to be the case for a measure of coherence 
as mutual support. For which requirements could be proposed in order to decide 
between the various measures of coherence? In his (2003), Fitelson proposes 
that sets consisting of only equivalent propositions are always more coherent 
than sets that do not consist of only equivalent propositions. Unfortunately, as 
will be shown in the next chapter, the combination of this requirement with a 
view of coherence as mutual support leads to some very counterintuitive results. 
Since until now no other general desideratum has been proposed for measures of 
coherence, we thus have no other choice than to pursue a few educated guesses 
and see whether at least one of these has satisfactory consequences. 
The question of whether a measure has satisfactory consequences will be 
answered by presenting a number of test cases, that is, cases in which there is 
an intuitively indisputable verdict as to which of two sets of propositions is the 
more coherent one (if there is a more coherent one; sets can intuitively be equally 
coherent of course).8 And as it will turn out, at least one of the measures that is 
proposed below is able to handle perfectly the test cases, those already present 
in the literature as well as those to be added in the present chapter, and in effect 
is, on balance, better able to handle these than any of the measures currently to 
be found in the literature. 
Let me begin with narrowing down the number of possible measures to the 
three which seem to be the most popular.9 Evidently, if all of these turn out to be 
7But given such an argument to the contrary, it is straightforward to adapt the measures of 
coherence to be defined below to ones that take weighted averages. 
8Bovens and Hartmann (2003a, Ch. 2) is a real treasure trove for such test cases. 
9For a discussion and comparison of these measures, see Eells and Fitelson (2002), who make a 
strong case for d and l on the basis of symmetry considerations. 
〈( )
( ) ( )
24 CHAPTER 2. COHERENCE AS MUTUAL SUPPORT 
unsatisfactory, we can still turn to one of the others and see how these behave.10 
The three that I will consider in this chapter are: 
– the difference measure: d(R1, R2) =df p(R1 |R2)− p(R1); 
– the (log-)ratio measure: r(R1, R2) =df p(R1 |R2)/p(R1) (or, as some prefer, 
r(R1, R2) = log [p(R1 |R2)/p(R1)]); 
– the (log-)likelihood measure: l(R1, R2) =df p(R2 | R1)/p(R2 | ¬R1) (or a 
logarithm of that ratio). 
It is readily seen how each of these can be generalized so as to apply to ordered 
pairs of sets. Let us denote the generalized versions of the difference measure, 
ratio measure and likelihood measure as d, r and l, respectively. 
′ ′ – d(〈S, S 〉) =df p(S |S ) − p(S); 
′ ′ – r(〈S, S 〉) =df p(S |S )/p(S); 
′ ′ ′ – l(〈S, S 〉) =df p(S |S)/p(S |¬S). 
Let m be a variable for such generalized measures. Further, let [[S]] denote the 
number indicating the cardinality of [S].11 Then the following defines a family 
of three measures of coherence as relative overlap: 
Definition 2.7 Given a set S = {R1, . . . , Rn} and an ordering Sˆ1, . . . , Sˆ[[S]] 
〉
of the 
members of [S], the degree of m-coherence of S is given by the function 
∑[[S]] 
1 m(Sˆi)Cm(S) =df 
i= , (2.6) 
[[S]] 
for m ∈ {d, r, l}. 
The question of choosing between d, r and l would be substantially relieved if 
all of the resulting measures of coherence were ordinally equivalent. Here, two 
10 Other measures of coherence can be found in, for example, Kemeny and Oppenheim (1952), 
Nozick (1981), Gaifman (1985), Christensen (1999), Eells and Fitelson (2000), and Kuipers (2000). 
Note that if a measure of confirmation has been shown to be problematic or even unsuited qua 
measure of confirmation, then that does not automatically mean it is unsuited to build a measure 
of coherence on. I will come back extensively to the Kemeny–Oppenheim measure in chapter 3. 
11Note that for any set S = {R1, . . . , Rn} it holds that [[S]] = 
∑n−1 n
(2n−i −1). After all, from i=1 i 
n 
every set with n elements we can choose 1 singletons as the first element of an ordered pair, 
n 
2 
sets of two elements as the first element of an ordered pair, etc. For each subset with i elements 
(i à n) there exist 2n−i−1 non-empty non-overlapping subsets. So, for every subset with i elements 
that serves as the first member of an ordered pair we can choose 2n−i −1 subsets of the required 
sort that can serve as a second member. 
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′ ′ measures of coherence m and m are ordinally equivalent if, for all sets S, S , 
′ ′ ′ ′ m(S) > m(S ) iff m (S) > m (S ) (cf. Fitelson 2005b). If all measures of coherence 
always agreed on which set is the more coherent of two sets of propositions, then 
our measure of coherence would at least get all the comparative judgements right. 
Moreover, to arrive at the most satisfactory measure, we could simply compare 
each of these measures with different sets about which we have clear intuitions 
with respect to the degree of their coherence. However, as the next theorem 
shows, things are not that easy (see Appendix 2 B for a proof): 
′ Theorem 2.2 For any pair of distinct m, m ∈ {d, r, l} there exist infinitely many 
′ ′ ′ triples 〈S, S , p(·)〉 such that either Cm(S) > Cm(S ) and Cm ′(S) < Cm ′(S ) or 
′ ′ Cm(S) < Cm(S ) and Cm ′(S) > Cm ′(S ). 
This proposition does not guarantee at all that the measures also disagree in any 
′ of the test cases of coherence. That is, there may exist no triples 〈S, S , p(·)〉 
such that the measures do not all agree on which of the sets is the more coherent 
one (relative to p(·)) and such that one set is intuitively clearly more coherent 
than the other. In fact, when applied to the many test cases that so far have been 
presented in the literature, all measures Cm assign a higher value to the set that is 
intuitively the more coherent one. Nonetheless, in the next section I will compare 
the three different measures defined above in the light of some new, relatively 
clear examples, and we will see that there is at least some reason to prefer Cd to 
the other measures. 
Preliminary to that, let me briefly note that in the presence of a quantitative 
theory of coherence, the qualitative theory of section 2.2 is not altogether re­
dundant. For although – as noted above – it may very well be the case that an 
any–any coherent set is intuitively less coherent than a one–any coherent set, the 
definitions of any–any coherence and any–any incoherence are quite valuable as 
limiting cases of coherence as mutual support. That is, if a set is any–any co­
herent, then it should have positive coherence and if it is any–any incoherent, 
it should have negative coherence. Thus, we have a good guideline for judging 
measures with respect to their being measures of coherence as mutual support: 
if they do not assign all any–any coherent sets both a positive degree of coher­
ence and a higher degree of coherence than all independent sets have, then they 
cannot be measures of coherence as mutual support. 
Moreover, in combination the two theories suggest some interesting psycho­
logical questions. To mention but one, it would be interesting to know whether 
people are more likely to believe a story that is any–any coherent than one that is 
only one–any coherent even if the second has a higher degree of coherence than 
the first. This question and similar ones our theories allow us to formulate seem 
open to empirical investigation. 
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2.4 Comparing the Measures Cm 
Above I indicated that the view of coherence as mutual support does not de­
termine which of the many measures of confirmation is the correct one for the 
project of measuring this type of coherence. Moreover, I also noted that there 
does not seem to be a general requirement that could be combined with the view 
of coherence as mutual support in order to significantly decrease the number 
of measures of coherence left. Therefore, it seems appropriate to test each of 
the measures that have been presented so far against some of our more specific 
intuitions about coherence. If one of the measures performs better in all the test 
cases of coherence, then it seems that this measure is the most satisfactory. A 
test case in this context is an example in which two or more sets are compared 
with each other and about which we intuitively feel very strongly which of the 
two is more coherent. Or, alternatively, a test case is an example about which a 
group of respondents would almost unanimously agree which one of the two (or 
more) sets presented in the example is the most coherent. 
In this chapter, coherence is explicated in terms of mutual support. Unfor­
tunately, it seems too far-fetched to argue that we have specific intuitions with 
respect to this (broad) notion of coherence as mutual support. Instead, we must 
revert to our basic intuitions with respect to the general notion of coherence. This 
need not be problematic. As argued in chapter 1, all the different senses of co­
herence share the notion of ‘hanging together,’ and it may turn out that in many 
cases this notion is defined well enough for us to make an intuitive judgement 
that should be respected by all different explications of the concept of coherence. 
Indeed, in this and the next chapters it will appear that the majority of test-cases 
are in fact respected by all the preferred explications of the different senses of 
coherence. 
On the other hand, we should not always expect this to be the case. If the 
different senses of coherence are best captured by different explications then we 
should expect that some of our intuitions are only compatible with some of these 
explications. For instance, as we will see below (section 2.6), some of the coun­
terexamples that have been proposed against Fitelson’s measure of coherence as 
mutual support are based on a conception of coherence as relative overlap. 
In such cases, the example cannot be a genuine test-case in the sense that 
it is a test case for all different explications of coherence. Be that as it may, 
in this section I will present an example about which – I will argue – we have 
clear intuitions with respect to coherence and which certainly seems applicable 
to the project of explicating coherence as a theoretical virtue (and, a fortiori, to 
the sense of coherence as mutual support). More specifically, I will argue that 
we feel intuitively that one of the two sets I will describe below is much more 
coherent than the other. It will appear that only Cd supports this intuition. Thus, 
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this example shows that measure Cd has more satisfactory consequences than 
the other two and, therefore, that we have a reason to (weakly) prefer it over the 
others, pending any examples to the contrary.12 
Here is the example. Consider two situations in both of which it is assumed 
that a murder has been committed in a street in a big city with 10,000,000 in­
habitants, 1,059 of them being Japanese, 1,059 of them owning Samurai swords, 
and 9 of them both being Japanese and owning Samurai swords. In situation I 
we assume that the murderer lives in the city and that everyone living in the city 
is equally likely to be the murderer. In situation II, on the other hand, we make 
the assumption that the victim was murdered by someone living in the street 
in which her body was found. In that street live 100 persons, 10 of them being 
Japanese, 10 owning a Samurai sword, and 9 both being Japanese and owning a 
Samurai sword. 
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Figure 2.3: Diagrams of the probability distributions corresponding to situations 
I (left) and II (right) 
Next, consider the set of propositions S = {J, O} with 
J: The murderer is Japanese; 
O: The murderer owns a Samurai sword. 
Let us compare the degrees of coherence assigned to S by the three different mea­
sures of coherence as mutual support, when we make the probabilistic assump­
tions corresponding to situation I and, respectively, situation II (see figure 2.3; 
12One may feel that there is also a strong reason to prefer Cd over Cl. For – as can easily be seen – 
′ ∗ ′ ∗Cl is not defined if a set of propositions has at least two subsets S and S such that p(S | ¬S ) = 0. 
However, in chapter 6, I will argue that there are good reasons to exclude such sets entirely from 
the intended domain of our measures of coherence. 
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note that the diagrams are not drawn to scale). These are given in the following 
table: 
I II 
.0084 .8Cd 
80.3 9.0 Cr 
80.9 81.0 Cl 
What does intuition say about these situations? Clearly, an appeal to mutual 
support considerations will not be very helpful here. In both situations, propo­
sitions J and O support one another, and we cannot ask whether they support 
one another more in one situation than in the other without having a particular 
measure of support in mind. And the problem is that the measures of confir­
mation we considered give very different outcomes here – which is precisely why 
Cd, Cr, and Cl disagree so starkly on this case. Thus, we must revert to our more 
general intuitions about coherence. And from that perspective, I think there is 
an intuitive pull toward saying that in the first situation S is much less coher­
ent than in the second. Although it is tricky to put down your finger on what 
precisely motivates this intuition, it seems that here we are influenced at least 
partly by considerations of relative overlap. In the second situation, the overlap 
of the set of Japanese suspects and that of suspects owning a Samurai sword 
is very large: there are 9 Japanese owners of a Samurai sword versus only one 
non-Japanese owner of such a sword and one Japanese non-owner. In the first 
situation, however, the relative overlap is extremely small: while there are still 9 
suspects that both are Japanese and own a Samurai sword, there are 1,050 non-
Japanese owners of a Samurai sword and just as many Japanese non-owners of a 
Samurai sword. 
It may seem awkward to introduce considerations of relative overlap in an 
analysis of coherence as mutual support, especially because the next chapter 
will analyze coherence as relative overlap. However, since we are now concerned 
with our general intuitions with respect to coherence, nothing obstructs our use 
of other considerations than those inspired by a view on coherence as mutual 
support. Nonetheless, precisely because this analysis does not aim at capturing 
all of our relative-overlap intuitions, I need not endorse the general claim that 
such considerations should always play a vital role in deciding intuitively which 
set is more coherent, even if only in cases where the measures of confirmation fail 
to provide a unanimous answer to the question whether the given propositions 
support one another more in one situation than in another. Instead, different 
considerations may influence our intuitive judgements in different cases. 
As an illustration of this, consider a third situation in which we have 12 sus­
pects who all live in the same house, and that 10 of them are Japanese, 10 own 
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a Samurai sword, and 9 are both Japanese and Samurai sword owners. One can 
verify that here, too, the measures of confirmation do not answer unanimously 
the question whether J and O support one another more or less in this third 
situation than they do in situation I of the example above. So, if relative-overlap 
considerations were to be the arbiter in this kind of case, then, since the relative 
overlap of J and O is the same in situation III as it is in situation II, we would be 
compelled to say that in situation III, {J,O} is more coherent than it is in situation 
I. Yet here I believe we do not feel that relative-overlap considerations have the 
same force in the new example as they have in the example in the text. Rather, 
our intuition says that both in situation I and in situation III, {J,O} is not very 
coherent and that it is not crystal-clear which of situations I and III makes {J,O} 
more coherent. The intuition that in situation III, {J,O} is not very coherent may 
be due to the fact that in situation III, J and O are almost independent; if, for 
example, the one person that is now assumed to be a non-Japanese non-owner 
of a Samurai sword were to own a Samurai sword as well, then the propositions 
would even be negatively related.13 
But regardless of whether considerations of overlap are the correct explana­
tion of our intuition with respect to situations I and II, I think that the Samurai 
example sketched above constitutes a counterexample against measures Cr and 
Cl and thus in favor of measure Cd. Let me at once admit that I do not feel that 
this intuition is strong enough to give us strong reason to prefer Cd. However, 
it does seem to tip the balance somewhat in favor of the former measure. If we 
were to find an example in which Cd behaves counterintuitively, while one of the 
other two measures does not, it may turn out to be the case that one of the other 
two options is the most satisfactory after all. Naturally, in that case, we should 
first study the other measures of confirmation and see what the results would be 
of using them for our measure of coherence. 
As a last remark, let me note a striking asymmetry between the measures 
of coherence as mutual support presented above. It can easily be checked that 
Cr and Cl both have range [0,∞). This may be unsurprising, since r and l have 
likewise range [0,∞). But whereas d has range (−1,1), it can be verified that Cd 
1
has range (−2 ,1).
14 Nonetheless, this need not worry us too much, since there 
exist ordinally equivalent measures for each of the measures r, l and d which lead 
to all of the measures Cm having range (−1,1). These ordinal equivalents will be 
discussed at the end of the next chapter. 
13I am much indebted to Mark Siebel for pressing Igor Douven and me to be more explicit about 
what role is to be given to relative-overlap considerations in this sort of examples. 
′ ′14In short, this is due to the fact that if d(〈S, S 〉) approximates −1, it follows that d(〈S , S〉) 
′ ′ ′ approximates 0. More generally, for any S and S , the average of d(〈S, S 〉) and d(〈S , S〉) cannot be 
equal to or lower than −1/2 and thus the lower bound of Cd – which takes the average of all such 
′ pairs – is likewise −1/2. On the other hand, when d(〈S, S 〉) approximates 1, it can still be the case 
′ that d(〈S , S〉) approximates 1 also. 
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2.5 Comparing Cd With the Extant Measures of Coher-
ence 
In this chapter I explicated coherence in the sense of mutual support and pre­
sented three potential measures of coherence, one of which appeared to be the 
most satisfactory. However, several other probabilistic accounts of coherence 
have been proposed in the literature. Although none of these have been explicit 
attempts to explicate coherence as mutual support,15 this does not mean that 
they cannot capture this sense of coherence, or cannot outperform my proposal 
Cd. The next four subsections will consider each of the four proposals to be 
found in the literature. 
2.5.1 Shogenji’s Measure S 
Shogenji’s (1999) was the first to propose a probabilistic measure of coherence. 
His measure was constructed as a response to the argument by Peter Klein and 
Ted Warfield (1994) and (1996) that coherence cannot be truth conducive per 
se. Clearly, then, Shogenji’s proposal seems to be a proposal for a measure of 
coherence as truth conduciveness much more than for coherence as mutual sup­
port. Nonetheless, this should not directly discredit his measure as a measure of 
coherence as mutual support. 
For a set S = {R1, . . . , Rn}, Shogenji’s probabilistic measure of coherence is 
defined thus: 
p(R1 ∧ · · · ∧ Rn)
S(S) =df ∏ . (2.7) n 
i=1 p(Ri) 
That is, the coherence of a set is the probability that all of its propositions are true 
divided by the product of the marginal probabilities of all of its propositions. It 
is easy to see that for sets consisting of two propositions, this measure is actually 
equivalent to measure Cr. For a set S = {R1, R2}, Cr(S) gives: 
Cr(S) = 
= 
= 
1 
2 
(
p(R1 |R2) 
p(R1) 
+ 
p(R2 |R1) 
p(R2) 
)
(2.8) 
p(R1 ∧ R2) 
p(R1)p(R2) 
(2.9) 
S(S) (2.10) 
However, for three and more propositions this is no longer the case. Instead, 
Shogenji’s measure is not sensitive to relations of the any–any coherence type. 
Therefore, if one agrees with my arguments for choosing a measure from class ǫ 
15Although Fitelson has proposed to analyze coherence as mutual support, his object is to expli­
cate coherence as the generalization of logical equivalence. More on this in the next chapter. 
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above, then Shogenji’s measure is plainly unsatisfactory as a measure of coher­
ence as mutual support. 
2.5.2 Olsson’s Measure O 
Erik Olsson (2002) is equally concerned with Klein and Warfield’s argument that 
coherence cannot be truth conducive. However, contrary to Shogenji, Olsson 
believes that Klein and Warfield are right and that coherence cannot be truth 
conducive. The question of truth conduciveness will be pivotal in chapter 4 of 
this thesis, but Olsson also proposes a measure of coherence and, therefore, we 
have another competitor for a measure of coherence as mutual support. 
For a set S = {R1, . . . , Rn}, Olsson’s (2002: 249) measure reads as follows: 
p(R1 ∧ · · · ∧ Rn)
O(S) =df . 
p(R1 ∨ · · · ∨ Rn) 
That is, the coherence of a set is the probability that all of its propositions are 
true divided by the probability that at least one of its propositions is true. Or, in 
set-theoretical terms, it is the ratio of the area where all the propositions overlap 
and the total area encompassed by all the propositions. The latter definition 
has the advantage that it makes clear what Olsson’s measure does: it measures 
the relative overlap of the propositions in a set. As such it can never be a mutual 
support measure: there will be sets in which all the propositions are independent 
or even negatively dependent that are more coherent as measured by O than sets 
in which all of the propositions are mutually supportive. 
To illustrate this, consider the following example of an independent set, orig­
inally due to Bonjour (1985: 96) and discussed in Bovens and Hartmann (2003a: 
40–43). Consider set S = {C,E, T} with 
C: This chair is brown; 
E: Electrons are negatively charged; 
T : Today is Thursday. 
Assume that the propositions in this set are independent. This squares well with 
intuition: the fact that it is Thursday does not seem to affect the color of the 
chair or the charge of electrons, nor vice versa. In the original example, Bonjour 
compares this set with a set in which some of the propositions seem, intuitively, 
′ to support each other. Thus consider the set S = {A,R, B} with 
A: All ravens are black; 
R: This bird is a raven; 
B: This bird is black. 
According to Bonjour (1985: 96), set S possesses ‘a very low degree of coherence,’ 
′ while in set S 
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the component propositions, rather than being irrelevant to each other, fit 
together and reinforce each other in a significant way; from an epistemic 
standpoint, any two of them would lend a degree of positive support to the 
third (though only very weak support in two out of the three cases). (ibid.) 
Bovens and Hartmann (2003a) agree with this. According to them ‘[t]here is no 
′ doubt that set [S ] is more coherent than set [S]’ (op. cit.: 29). Both Bonjour and 
Bovens and Hartmann present their conclusion without any qualifications. Ap­
parently, as long as the propositions in the first set are independent and as long 
as any two propositions in the second set support the third, the second set should 
be more coherent than the first. More specifically, neither Bonjour nor Bovens 
and Hartmann let their conclusions depend on the marginal probabilities of the 
propositions in these sets: as long as they are independent in the first set and 
positively dependent in the second, it seems to matter little how probable they 
16 are.
Nonetheless, the problem with this example is that the second set still consists 
of two pairwise independent propositions and, consequently, that the set is not 
any–any coherent as defined by definition 2.4. Moreover, as the quote above by 
Bonjour already indicates, the mutual support relations do not seem to be very 
′′ strong in two of the three cases. Therefore consider a similar set S = {B,O,M} 
with 
B: This bird is black; 
O: This bird is a crow; 
M : This bird has a lifelong mate. 
Presumably, in this case it can be assumed that each subset of propositions 
greatly supports any of the other subsets. More precisely, assume that in the 
population we are studying most of the black birds are crows and have lifelong 
mates, most crows are black and have lifelong mates and most birds that have 
lifelong mates are crows. For all probability models in which this is the case, Bon-
jour’s example is even strengthened: we now have a set in which each proposition 
is supported both by each of the other propositions and by the combination of 
them. And consequently, from the standpoint of coherence as mutual support, 
it should be the case that the second set is more coherent than the first for all 
probability models such that the second is an any–any coherent set and the first 
is an independent set. 
16Although Bovens and Hartmann present their conclusion in an unqualified manner, in the prob­
ability model that they later construct to represent these two sets, all propositions have almost the 
same probability. Therefore, they may have intended their conclusion to hold only in a ceteris 
paribus way, i.e., for instance, given (almost) equal marginal probabilities. Nevertheless, it will ap­
pear below that for their own theory, the conclusion does not hold for any of the most plausible 
ceteris paribus conditions. 
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However, on Olsson’s measure this is not the case. For suppose that the 
′′ probability distributions of sets S and S are as in figure 2.4. It can easily be 
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Figure 2.4: Diagrams of the probability distributions corresponding to sets S (left) 
′′ and S (right) 
checked that for these probabilities set S is independent in the sense defined 
′′ above, while set S is any–any coherent. However, on Olsson’s measure set S is 
′′ ′′ much more coherent than set S : O(S) ≈ .516 and O(S ) ≈ .113. Clearly, from 
the view of coherence as mutual support this is not satisfactory. 
Let me note in passing that Olsson’s measure does satisfy the requirement 
that any–any coherent sets are more coherent than independent sets in a ceteris 
paribus-sense. For if two sets have an equal number of propositions and if these 
propositions have equal marginal probabilities, then it will always be the case 
that an any–any coherent set has a higher degree of coherence as measured by 
Olsson’s measure than an independent set. 
′ For consider a set S = {R1, . . . , Rn} that is any–any coherent and a set S = 
′ ′ {R1, . . . , Rn} that is independent and assume that all propositions have the same 
′ ′ probability in both sets. In that case, p(R1 ∧ · · · ∧ Rn) > p(R 1 ∧ · · · ∧ Rn) 
′ ′ and p(R1 ∨ · · · ∨ Rn) < p(R 1 ∨ · · · ∨ Rn), from which it follows directly that 
′ O(S) > O(S ). 
2.5.3 Fitelson’s Measure Ck 
Of all the measures of coherence that have been proposed in the literature so 
far, Fitelson’s measure of coherence is the only measure that fits the general 
framework presented in section 2.3 above. That is, his measure Ck also measures 
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coherence as the average of the degree of any–any coherence of a set.17 However, 
instead of using one of the three measures of confirmation discussed above, Fitel­
son proposes to measure support by means of the Kemeny–Oppenheim measure 
k:18 
′ ′ 
′ p(S |S)− p(S |¬S) k(〈S, S 〉) =df ′ ′ . (2.11) p(S |S)+ p(S | ¬S) 
Clearly, the measure that results when we substitute k in definition 2.7 is a mea­
sure of mutual support. Furthermore, as the following theorem shows, the mea­
sures k and l are ordinally equivalent, where two generalized measures of con­
′ ′ ∗firmation m and m are ordinally equivalent if for all subsets S and S of a set 
′ ∗of propositions S = {R1, . . . , Rn} and subsets T and T of a set of propositions 
′ ∗ ′ ∗ ′ ′ ∗ ′ ′ ∗T = {Q1, . . . , Qn}, m(〈S , S 〉) > m(〈T , T 〉) iff m (〈S , S 〉) > m (〈T , T 〉) (for 
a proof see Appendix 2 C, for further discussion see also Fitelson (2005a)): 
Theorem 2.3 The measures k and l are ordinally equivalent for all pairs of sets of 
′ ∗ ′ ∗ ′ ∗ ′ ∗propositions 〈S , S 〉 and 〈T , T 〉 such that p(S | ¬S ) > 0 and p(T | ¬T ) > 
0. 19 
This would suggest that since we only found a reason to weakly prefer Cd over 
Cl, we would similarly only have a reason to weakly prefer Cd over Ck. However, 
the fact that k and l are ordinally equivalent does not guarantee that Cd and Cl 
are also ordinally equivalent as defined in section 2.3. Instead, as the following 
theorem shows, this is not the case (for a proof see Appendix 2 C): 
Theorem 2.4 The measures of coherence Ck and Cl are not ordinally equivalent. 
Moreover, I believe we have a good reason to strongly prefer Cl over Ck. For 
consider again the Samurai example above. I argued there that situation I is intu­
itively less coherent than situation II. It appeared that on the likelihood measure 
both situations were almost equally coherent. This holds true for Fitelson’s mea­
sure Ck as well. However, in both situations it comes out as being close to the 
maximal degree of coherence a set can have on Fitelson’s measure (which is 1, 
as can easily be ascertained): for situation I, Ck(S) ≈ .97559 and for situation 
II, Ck(S) ≈ .97561. This strikes me as being wrong in at least the first situation, 
17Strictly speaking, this is not true for his (2003) definition, but only for his (2004) definition of 
his measure Ck. In what follows I will always consider the latest version of his measure as described 
in his (2004). 
18In fact this is only the definition for the cases in which S contains contingent propositions only. 
However, the clauses for the other cases can be ignored for the purposes of this chapter. I will 
present the complete definition in the next chapter (section 3.2, definition 3.1). 
′ ∗ ′ ∗19The reason for the additional constraints that p(S | ¬S ) > 0 and that p(T | ¬T ) > 0 is the 
fact that the likelihood measure is not defined for cases in which these constraints do not hold. 
See also note 12 above. 
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given that there the relative overlap between the set of Japanese suspects and 
the set of suspects owning a Samurai sword is very small, so that, intuitively, 
one would suppose it to be extremely easy to considerably increase the degree of 
coherence of S – namely, simply by increasing the amount of overlap of the two 
sets of suspects. But, of course, on Fitelson’s measure there is only room for a 
very insubstantial increase. This gives a strong reason to prefer measure Cl over 
Ck, for in the former there still is much room left for an increase in coherence. 
2.5.4 Bovens and Hartmann’s Difference Function fr 
Finally, there is Bovens and Hartmann’s (2003a) and (2003b) account of coher­
ence. Just as the other proposals, Bovens and Hartmann’s measure is not in­
tended to be a measure of coherence as mutual support. Instead, Bovens and 
Hartmann believe that our intuitive judgements of coherence ‘rest on the subtle 
interplay between the degree of positive relevance relations and relative overlap 
relations between propositions’ (Bovens and Hartmann 2003a: 53). Moreover, 
they are concerned with coherence as a confidence boosting property which in­
troduces a number of difficulties which Bovens and Hartmann solve in a very 
ingenious manner. One of the differences between their approach and the one 
followed in this chapter is that instead of defining their measure for a set of 
propositions, they make the additional assumption that one has been informed 
about each proposition in any given set by a separate, partially reliable witness. 
Nonetheless, just as the above measures, their measure may indeed do justice 
to our mutual-support intuitions even if it has not specifically been designed to do 
so. Therefore, let us see how satisfactory their theory of coherence can explicate 
the concept of coherence in the sense of mutual support and postpone a more 
elaborate discussion of their theory to chapter 4. 
To this effect, assume that we are informed about each proposition in any 
given set by a separate witness. These witnesses are assumed to be independent 
of one another and to be equally reliable to a degree r ∈ (0,1), where r = 1 
indicates full reliability and r = 0 full unreliability. Next, define the relation 
of being no less coherent than, ‘≽.’ Let ‘ai ’ be the sum of the probabilities of all 
conjunctions of n− i elements of S and the negations of the remaining i elements 
of S. For a set S = {R1, . . . , Rn}, the function cr (S) is given by: 
ma0 + (1 − a0)(1 − r)
cr (S) = ∑ . (2.12) m 
ai(1 − r)i i=0 
′ ′ ′ Then for any two sets S = {R1, . . . , Rm}, S = {R1, . . . , Rn}, the relation ‘≽’ is 
defined as follows: 
′ ′ S ≽ S iff fr (S, S ) á 0 for all values of r ∈ (0,1), (2.13) 
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′ with fr (S, S ) – called the difference function – being the difference between the 
values of cr for the respective sets: 
fr (S, S 
′ ) = 
= 
cr (S)− cr (S 
′ ) (2.14) 
a0 + (1 − a0)(1 − r)
m ∑m 
i=0 ai(1 − r)
i 
− 
a ′ 0 + (1 − a 
′ 
0)(1 − r)
n ∑n 
i=0 a 
′ 
i (1 − r)
i 
(2.15) 
′ ′ (a0 indicates the probability of the conjunction of the elements of S , etc.) As 
Bovens and Hartmann note, ‘≽’ merely induces a so-called quasi-ordering on the 
set of information sets, that is, an ordering that is reflexive and transitive but 
′ not necessarily complete. This means that there may be sets S and S such that 
′ ′ neither S ≽ S nor S ≽ S. According to them this fact does justice to our intu­
itions: intuitively, we are sometimes unable to decide which of two sets is the 
more coherent, even in cases in which it is not clear either that they have equal 
coherence.20 
For example, in situations II and III of the Samurai example above (section 2.4) 
it is not clear at all that the set has an equal degree of coherence in both situations: 
they are very different from each other, so we have little reason to expect the 
degree of coherence in both cases to be precisely the same. But if any of the 
two sets is more coherent than the other, intuitively, it seems hard to say which 
one it is. Measure Cd solves this problem by ruling that indeed one of the two 
situations is more coherent than the other, but that the difference is minimal 
(≈ .06 on a (−1/2,1) scale). Arguably, this is a satisfactory explanation for why 
our intuitions are at a loss in these situations. However, an approach that leaves 
such cases indeterminate seems to be equally satisfactory. 
Nonetheless, this does not mean that it would never count against their theory 
if it produced an ‘indeterminate’ judgement in a specific example. For example, 
from the standpoint of coherence as mutual support, an any–any coherent set 
should always be more coherent than an independent set, even if the difference 
is but small. Bovens and Hartmann may be expected to agree, since, as discussed 
above, they believe that in Bonjour’s example the independent set is very clearly 
less coherent than the set in which some of the propositions support each other 
and none of the propositions undermine each other. 
However, from the example used to discredit Olsson’s theory as a theory of co­
herence as mutual support it follows that this conclusion does not hold for Bovens 
and Hartmann’s difference function either. From the values in diagram 2.4, it fol­
lows that in this case, for set S, we have a0 = .512, a1 = .384, a2 = .096 and 
′′ ′′ ′′ ′′ ′′ a3 = .008, and for S , we have a0 = .016, a1 = .126, a2 = 0 and a3 = .858. So 
20Bovens and Hartmann (2003a: 40) present one example in which we are, according to them, 
unable to decide which of two sets is the more coherent. I will discuss this example briefly in 
section 4.6. 
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the difference function for the two sets is this: 
.512 + .488(1 − r)3 ′′ fr (S, S ) = − 
.512 + .384(1 − r)+ .096(1 − r)2 + .008(1 − r)3 
(2.16) 
.016 + .984(1 − r)3 
. 
.016 + .126(1 − r)+ .858(1 − r)3 
And, as figure 2.5 shows, the graph of this function crosses the r -axis. Therefore, 
′′ it is not the case that fr (S, S ) > 0 for all values of r ∈ (0,1) and so neither of 
the two sets is more coherent than the other according to Bovens and Hartmann’s 
theory of coherence. 
1 
.1 
.2 
.2 
.3 
.4 .6 .8 
′′ Figure 2.5: fr (S, S ) 
However, the case is even worse: while for Olsson’s measure the requirement 
that any–any coherent sets are more coherent than independent sets remains 
true in a ceteris paribus sense, for Bovens and Hartmann not even this is the 
case. For consider the new probability distribution for sets S = {C,E, T} and 
′′ S = {B,O,M} (as defined above) in figure 2.6. It can easily be verified that in 
this case the marginal probabilities of all propositions are equal: all propositions 
have a marginal probability of .1. However, as can be seen from figure 2.7, the 
case is still indeterminate. 
Here one may feel that different ceteris paribus conditions might work. For 
example, one may propose that instead of the unconditional probabilities, the 
′′ probabilities that all propositions are true should be equal, i.e., a0 = a0 . However, 
in that case similar examples are possible. For example, consider any probability 
′′ ′′ ′′ ′′ model for set S in which a0 = .001, a1 = .03 and a2 = 0 and compare this 
′′ ′′ with the independent set S above. In this case, a0 = a0 , while S is still any–any 
′′ coherent. Still, fr (S , S) < 0 for r > .9875. 
Alternatively, one may propose that the value of an must remain equal, which 
means, informally put, that the total area within the circles of the propositions 
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Figure 2.6: New diagrams of the probability distributions corresponding to sets 
′′ S (left) and S (right) 
must remain equal. I cannot see any justification for that move, although in 
′ Bovens and Hartmann’s discussion of Bonjour’s example the values for an and an 
are indeed equal. However, this alternative would not work either. For in this case 
′′ ′′ ′′ ′′ take any probability model for set S in which a0 = .122, = .149 and a2 = 0a1 
′′ and compare this set with S. It can easily be checked that S is any–any coherent 
′′ ′′ and that a = an. However, fr (S , S) < 0 for r < .14. n 
1 
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′′ Figure 2.7: fr (S , S) for the new probability distribution 
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2.6 Anticipated Objections 
Above (section 2.5.3) I noted that Fitelson’s approach is the only approach to mea­
suring coherence that can be made to fit into the general framework presented 
in sections 2.2 and 2.3. In this section I will consider two different arguments 
which have been leveled against Fitelson’s measure. It will appear that both argu­
ments are not specific to Fitelson’s measure but apply to all measures that can be 
formulated using the above scheme. Nevertheless, I will show that in both cases 
the intuitions underlying the arguments are not valid within an explication of 
coherence as mutual support. To forestall misunderstanding, let me emphasize 
that these are not the only objections that have been or can be raised against 
measures of coherence as mutual support. In chapter 6, I will consider some ob­
jections that could be leveled against all of the measures of coherence proposed 
in this thesis, and, consequently, also against measures of coherence as mutual 
support. 
2.6.1 Siebel’s Objection Against Fitelson’s Measure 
Consider the following example by Mark Siebel (2004). Suppose that there are 
ten suspects in a murder case. Suppose furthermore that each of them has a .1 
probability of having committed the crime and that each of them has committed 
at least one earlier crime: eight of them have committed pickpocketing, eight have 
committed a robbery, and six have done both. Now consider the set S = {P,R} 
with 
P : The murderer has committed pickpocketing; 
R: The murderer has committed a robbery. 
The probability model for this set is given by figure 2.8. According to Siebel 
(2004: 190), the mere fact that there is ‘a strong coincidence’ between the two 
propositions makes set S intuitively coherent. Presumably, the strong coinci­
dence between the propositions is due to the fact that most of those who have 
committed pickpocketing have also committed a robbery, and vice versa. And 
since on Fitelson’s measure S comes out as being incoherent (Ck ≈ −0.14), Siebel 
believes we thus have a counterexample against Fitelson’s measure. Since all of 
the above measures of coherence as mutual support agree with Fitelson’s measure 
that the set is incoherent, we would have a counterexample against all measures 
of coherence as mutual support. 
I indicated above that when we explicate a specific sense of coherence we must 
be careful in applying our basic intuitions with respect to the general concept of 
coherence. Although in some cases it seems that such intuitions may provide a 
tool for distinguishing the most satisfactory measures, in other cases it may be 
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Figure 2.8: Diagram of the probability distribution for set S 
that the intuitions are fueled by one of the alternative senses of coherence. For 
instance, the example with the independent and the any–any coherent sets by 
Bonjour may be an example which is at home within the concept of coherence 
as mutual support, but not in the sense of coherence as relative overlap. As 
the counterexample against Olsson’s measure shows, the relative overlap of the 
propositions of an independent set may be much larger than that of an any–any 
coherent set. Alternatively, some intuitions may be informed by the sense of 
coherence as relative overlap and not be applicable to coherence in the sense of 
mutual support. This, I believe, is what is going on in this example. 
Presumably, the two propositions in set S ‘coincide’ because they overlap for a 
large part. However, this does not directly imply that the set is any–any coherent 
as defined by definition 2.4. If in a set both propositions have a .9 marginal 
probability, then they still have a .81 overlap if they are independent. If they 
have a .99 probability, the overlap in case of independence is even .9801 and, 
therefore, an overlap of less than .98 would imply that the propositions, though 
overlapping very much, actually undermine each other. And this is precisely what 
is going on in Siebel’s example. 
As Siebel (2004: 190) notes, the set S = {P,R} is an example of a subcontrary 
set, which is a set in which all propositions cannot be jointly false. A quick cal­
culation shows that subcontrary sets consisting of two propositions are always 
any–any incoherent. Consequently, a measure of coherence as relative overlap 
should be negative for the above example: each any–any incoherent set should 
have negative coherence. Therefore, Siebel’s intuition that the set in his example 
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Figure 2.9: cr (S) for values of .01 à x à .9 
is coherent cannot follow from a view of coherence as mutual support. Instead, 
his conviction seems to be based on the intuition that a large overlap merits a pos­
itive degree of coherence, an intuition that appeals to a conception of coherence 
as relative overlap. 
2.6.2 Bovens and Hartmann’s Objection Against Fitelson’s Mea-
sure 
Bovens and Hartmann (2003a: 50 f) consider a set consisting of two propositions, 
R1 andR2, for which they take the probability of their conjunction – their ‘overlap’ 
in set-theoretic terms – variable, p(R1 ∧ R2) = x, and set both p(R1 ∧ ¬R2) and 
p(¬R1 ∧ R2) equal to .05. According to them, increasing x from .01 to .8 should 
monotonically increase the coherence of the set: ‘[i]ntuitively, one would think 
that when keeping the non-overlapping area fixed, then, the more overlap, the 
greater the coherence’ (Bovens and Hartmann 2003a: 51). Figure 2.9 shows the 
graph of cr (S) for values of x between .01 and .9. Evidently, the graph increases 
monotonically and therefore, the set will be more coherent in case x is larger. 
As Bovens and Hartmann note, on Fitelson’s measure this is not the case: 
[t]he measure first increases from [p(R1 ∧ R2) = .01] and then reaches its 
maximum for [p(R1 ∧ R2) ≈ .17] and subsequently decreases again. We fail 
to see any intuitive justification for this behaviour of the measure. (Bovens 
and Hartmann 2003a: 51) 
It can easily be checked that precisely the same objection holds for Cd, which like­
wise increases until it reaches its maximum for x ≈ .17 and decreases afterwards. 
The graphs of these measures are given in figure 2.10. 
What happens in the example is that the probability that both propositions 
are true increases, while the probability that precisely one of the two proposi­
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Figure 2.10: Ck (left) and Cd (right) for values of .01 à x à .9 
tions is false remains the same. In some cases this strategy intuitively increases 
the coherence of a set, most notably if two inconsistent propositions are made 
consistent by increasing the value of x from 0 to a value x0 > 0. Nevertheless, one 
should also expect coherence to decrease for certain values of x, precisely because 
for x = .9 the set in this example has become a subcontrary set. Since, as noted 
above, the coherence of a subcontrary set consisting of two propositions must 
be negative, one would expect the coherence to decrease as x approximates .9. 
Thus, from the point of view of coherence as mutual support, coherence should 
not be a monotonically increasing function of x. 
The replies to Siebel’s (2004) and Bovens and Hartmann’s (2003a) examples do 
not discredit the intuitions that they appeal to per se. However, they do show that 
these intuitions are not at home in an analysis of coherence as mutual support. 
Instead, it will appear that a measure of coherence as relative overlap does in 
fact do justice to those intuitions. Whether or not it is possible to construct an 
account of coherence that does justice to both intuitions of mutual support and 
relative overlap will be considered in sections 3.3, 3.6 and 3.7. 
2.7 Conclusion 
In this chapter I have explicated the notion of coherence as mutual support. From 
the general discussion in the first sections it appeared that there are a large num­
ber of candidates for the explication of coherence as mutual support. Therefore, 
I have limited my discussion in a number of ways. Firstly, I have argued that 
one should consider only those measures that measure the degree of any–any 
coherence. Secondly, I have preferred measures that take a straight average over 
measures that take a weighted average of the different elements. And thirdly, I 
have only discussed measures of coherence that are based on the three most pop­
ular measures of confirmation. I believe I have given good reasons for the first 
limitation, but not for the other two. Most notably, it remains to be seen that 
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none of the other measures of confirmation performs better than the measures 
of coherence discussed in this chapter. 
In order to decide which of the measures of confirmation provides the best 
basis for a measure of coherence, the analysis of the first sections of this chapter 
will not be of much help. That is, for all measures of confirmation c such that 
′ ′ c(H, H ) is positive if H probabilistically confirms H , negative when H proba­
′ bilistically disconfirms H and zero when the two are independent, the general 
discussion above will not tell us which of the measures gives the most satisfactory 
analysis of coherence. 
In order to bring the number of potential measures of coherence down to a 
single measure, we need to bring in our basic intuitions with respect to coherence. 
On the basis of an example purportedly displaying one of these intuitions, I have 
made a tentative case for measure Cd. 
Also, I have considered the extant accounts of coherence and discussed in 
how far they are satisfactory as measures of coherence as mutual support. It 
appeared that none of the accounts constitutes a satisfactory explication of this 
sense of coherence. Shogenji’s measure is not sensitive to coherence relations of 
the any–any type, while Olsson’s and Bovens and Hartmann’s measures are not 
measures of mutual support at all. Finally, Fitelson’s account, while definitely 
a measure of mutual support, also has a strikingly unsatisfactory consequence. 
Therefore, the tentative conclusion of this chapter must be that Cd provides the 
most satisfactory explication of coherence in the sense of mutual support. 
Finally, I have considered two objections that have been proposed against Fi-
telson’s measure of coherence and that are equally applicable to the measures of 
coherence as mutual support proposed in this chapter. While it appeared that 
these objections are not valid from the point of view of coherence as mutual sup­
port, they do seem to suggest that the concept of coherence as mutual support 
does not respect all of our intuitive judgements of coherence. In the next chap­
ter, I will propose a measure of coherence as relative overlap that respects the 
intuitions underlying the examples put forward by Bovens, Hartmann and Siebel. 
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Appendix 2 A: Proof of Theorem 2.1 
Theorem 2.1 
1. One–all coherence does not imply one–any coherence. 
2. One–all coherence does not imply partition coherence. 
3. One–any coherence does not imply any–any coherence. 
4. One–any coherence does not imply partition coherence. 
5. Partition coherence does not imply any–any coherence. 
6. Partition coherence does not imply one–any coherence. 
Proof: Theorem 2.1.1 follows from the first probability model, theorems 2.1.2, 
2.1.3, and 2.1.4 follow from the second probability model, and theorems 2.1.5 
and 2.1.6 follow from the third. 
Model 1: 
R1 R2 R3 probability R1 R2 R3 probability 
T T T .00296053 F T T .000103878 
T T F .00131579 F T F .0811461 
T F T .000986842 F F T .009375 
T F F .894737 F F F .009375 
Model 2: 
R1 R2 R3 R4 probability R1 R2 R3 R4 probability 
T T T T .000938319 F T T T .0204122 
T T T F .00404002 F T T F .0058595 
T T F T .00542335 F T F T .00447617 
T T F F .0208483 F T F F .0630022 
T F T T .00539031 F F T T .0159602 
T F T F .0225303 F F T F .0498692 
T F F T .0289642 F F F T .0434353 
T F F F .0368652 F F F F .671985 
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Model 3: 
R1 R2 R3 R4 probability R1 R2 R3 R4 probability 
T T T T .000732422 F T T T .0000610352 
T T T F .00268555 F T T F .00335693 
T T F T .000549316 F T F T .0133057 
T T F F .0272827 F T F F .0770264 
T F T T .00341797 F F T T .00964355 
T F T F .0244141 F F T F .0806885 
T F F T .0265503 F F F T .0707397 
T F F F .0393677 F F F F .620178 
( )( )
( ) ( )
( )( )
( )( )
( )
( ) ( )
+ ( )( )
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Appendix 2 B: Proof of Theorem 2.2 
′ Theorem 2.2 For any pair of distinct m, m ∈ {d, r, l} there exist infinitely many 
′ ′ ′ triples 〈S, S , p(·)〉 such that either Cm(S) > Cm(S ) and Cm ′(S) < Cm ′(S ) or 
′ ′ Cm(S) < Cm(S ) and Cm ′(S) > Cm ′(S ). 
Proof: Consider the class of all sets containing exactly three propositions for 
which the following hold (where I use r1, r2, and r3 as propositional variables): 
• p(r1 ∧ r2 ∧ r3) ∈ (0, .1875); 
• p(r1 ∧r2 ∧¬r3) = p(r1 ∧¬r2 ∧r3) = p(¬r1 ∧r2 ∧r3) = p(r1 ∧r2 ∧r3)+1/20; 
• p(r1 ∧¬r2 ∧¬r3) = p(¬r1 ∧ r2 ∧¬r3) = p(¬r1 ∧¬r2 ∧ r3) = 1/30. 
Without loss of generality, assume that for every x ∈ (0, .1875) there is exactly 
one set in the just-defined class such that the probability of the conjunction of its 
members equals x, and denote that set by S(x). We then can write the formulas 
for the three measures as functions of x, as follows:    ( ) 3 2 x 3 1 x − −Cd S(x) = − 3x + + − 2x + 
12 15 1 + 2x 12 20 
2 
+ 3x20 15  
1 
+ 2x6 2 −+ − 3x + 20 
12 15 2 + 3x15 
   
1 ( ) + 2x  6 x   Cr S(x) = 6 ( 20 )2 + 112 2 12 + 2x 2 + 3x+ 3x 20 15 15 

19 
 
13 

− 2x x 3 15 − 3x x ( ) 3 20  ( )( )+Cl S(x) = 1 1 212 + 2x 2 + 2x 12 + x + 3x20 15 20 15 
13 
− 3x 
1 

+ 2x6 15 20  
1 212 + x + 3x12 15 
One easily verifies that for x going from 0 to .1875, Cd S(x) first monotonically 
increases until it reaches its maximum at x ≈ .0314 and then monotonically 
decreases; Cr S(x) monotonically increases until it reaches its maximum at x ≈ 
.0166 and then monotonically decreases; and Cl S(x) monotonically increases 
until it reaches its maximum at x ≈ .0177 and then monotonically decreases. Let 
′ ′ ′ ′ ′ ′ S = {R1, R2, R3} with p(R1 ∧ R2 ∧ R3) = a and S = {R1, R 2, R 3} with p(R 1∧ R2∧ 
′ R3) = b such that a, b ∈ (.0166, .0314) and a < b; obviously there are infinitely ( ) (
′
) ( ) (
′
)
many such pairs of sets. Then it will hold that Cd S > Cd S but Cr S < Cr S . 
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〈
′ 
〉
In the same way one proves the existence of infinitely many triples S, S , p(· ) 
for the other combinations of two measures such that these measures disagree 
′ in their verdict as to which of S and S is the more coherent set. 
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Appendix 2 C: Proof of Theorems 2.3 and 2.4 
Theorem 2.3 The measures k and l are ordinally equivalent for all pairs of sets of 
′ ∗ ′ ∗ ′ ∗ ′ ∗propositions 〈S , S 〉 and 〈T , T 〉 such that p(S |¬S ) > 0 and p(T |¬T ) > 0. 
′ Proof: Remember that two measures of coherence m and m are ordinally equiva­
′ ∗lent if for all subsets S and S of a set of propositions S = {R1, . . . , Rn} and 
′ ∗ ′ ∗subsets T and T of a set of propositions T = {Q1, . . . , Qn}, m(〈S , S 〉) > 
′ ∗ ′ ′ ∗ ′ ′ ∗m(〈T , T 〉) iff m (〈S , S 〉) > m (〈T , T 〉). Next, rewrite the Kemeny–Oppen-
heim measure: 
′ ′ 
′ p(S |S)− p(S |¬S) k(〈S, S 〉) = 
′ ′p(S |S)+ p(S |¬S) 
′ p(S |S) 
′ − 1p(S |¬S) 
= ′p(S |S) 
′ + 1p(S |¬S) 
′ l(〈S, S 〉)− 1 
= 
′ 
,
l(〈S, S 〉)+ 1
′ ′ in which I have assumed that p(S |¬S) > 0. Next, consider two subsets S and 
∗ ′ ∗S of a set of propositions S = {R1, . . . , Rn} and two subsets T and T of a set of 
′ ∗ ′ ∗propositions T = {Q1, . . . , Qn}. Assume that p(S |¬S ) > 0 and p(T |¬T ) > 
′ ∗0. Then, one can suppose without loss of generality that l(〈S , S 〉) = α and 
′ ∗l(〈T , T 〉) = β. In that case 
α− 1′ ∗ k(〈S , S 〉) = 
α+ 1 
and 
β− 1′ ∗ k(〈T , T 〉) = . 
β+ 1 
Clearly, k and l are ordinally equivalent if 
α− 1 β− 1 
> iff α > β 
α+ 1 β+ 1 
But it is easy to see that this is indeed the case: 
α− 1 β− 1 
> 
α+ 1 β+ 1 
α− 1 β− 1 
⇔ − > 0 
α+ 1 β+ 1 
(α− 1)(β+ 1) (α+ 1)(β− 1) 
⇔ − > 0 
(α+ 1)(β+ 1) (α+ 1)(β+ 1) 
( ) ( )
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(α − 1)(β + 1)− (α + 1)(β − 1) 
⇔ > 0 
(α + 1)(β + 1) 
⇔ (αβ + α − β − 1) − (αβ − α + β − 1) > 0 
⇔ 2α − 2β > 0 
⇔ α > β 
Therefore, k and l are ordinally equivalent for all pairs of sets of propositions 
′ ∗ ′ ∗ ′ ∗ ′ ∗〈S , S 〉 and 〈T , T 〉 such that p(S |¬S ) > 0 and p(T |¬T ) > 0 
Theorem 2.4 The measures of coherence Ck and Cl are not ordinally equivalent. 
Proof: The proof is similar to the proof of theorem 2.2. In this case, consider the 
class of all sets containing exactly two propositions for which the following hold: 
• p(r1 ∧ r2) ∈ (0, .25); 
• p(r1 ∧¬r2) = .35; 
• p(r1 ∧¬r2) = .01; 
By reasoning similar to that in the proof of theorem 2.2, one can verify that for 
x going from 0 to .25, Ck S(x) first monotonically increases until it reaches 
its maximum at x ≈ .148 and then monotonically decreases and that Cl S(x) 
monotonically increases until it reaches its maximum at x ≈ .235 and then 
′ monotonically decreases. Let S = {R1, R2, R3} with p(R1 ∧ R2) = a and S = 
′ ′ ′ ′ {R1, R 2} with p(R 1∧ R2) = b such that a, b ∈ (.149, .235) and a < b; again, there ( ) (
′ 
)
exist infinitely many such pairs of sets. Then it will hold that Cl S > Cl S but ( ) (
′ 
)
Ck S < Ck S . From which it follows directly that Ck and Cl are not ordinally 
equivalent. 
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Chapter 3 
Coherence as Relative Overlap
3.1 Introduction 
In the introductory chapter I briefly discussed the view of Kemeny and Oppen­
heim that the best way to construct a measure of confirmation is by listing enough 
desiderata to single out one specific class of possible measures. According to 
them, our intuitions are too vague to ensure that we arrive at the most satisfac­
tory explication of the concept of confirmation and we would be much better 
off if we arrived at a measure through listing a number of desiderata that such 
a measure should clearly satisfy. Although their argument seems applicable to 
measures of coherence as well, I pointed out in section 1.6 that the Kemeny– 
Oppenheim strategy may be problematic if the general desiderata which are to 
determine the appropriate measure are justified by an appeal to our intuitions 
about the concept we are explicating. 
For this reason, I dismissed this strategy in the previous chapter and instead 
chose to compare the different measures of coherence with an example appeal­
ing to our basic intuitions. However, some may feel that this dismissal of the 
Kemeny–Oppenheim strategy was too quick. For there is indeed a general desider­
atum that has been proposed by both Fitelson (2003) and Bovens and Hartmann 
(2003a). Indeed, Fitelson uses this desideratum – together with a view that a mea­
sure of coherence must be a mutual-support measure – to do something very close 
to what Kemeny and Oppenheim propose, namely, to bring the class of possible 
measures of coherence down to one ordinal class. The additional desideratum 
that Fitelson, Bovens and Hartmann propose says, roughly, that sets consisting 
of equivalent propositions should have maximal coherence. Although I noted 
this possibility in section 2.4, I postponed criticizing it until this chapter. The 
reason for this is that the discussion of this desideratum will make plain that it – 
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just like Bovens and Hartmann’s (2003a) and Siebel’s (2004) critiques of Fitelson’s 
measure – is only compatible with a view of coherence as relative overlap. 
More specifically, from a discussion of Fitelson’s desiderata-based approach, 
in section 3.2, it will appear in section 3.3 that the combination of the view that 
sets consisting of equivalent propositions have maximal coherence and the view 
that a measure of coherence should be a member of class ǫ (as defined in sec­
tion 2.3) leads to some very counterintuitive consequences. In order to do justice 
to the former view, we need a measure of coherence as relative overlap, which is 
defined in section 3.4. For this project the Kemeny–Oppenheim strategy is much 
more suitable than for measuring coherence as mutual support. It will appear 
that one single desideratum (which seems very appropriate) is sufficient to deter­
mine the appropriate measure up to ordinal equivalence. Moreover, as I will show 
in section 3.5, the measure proposed in section 3.4 provides a better explication 
of coherence as relative overlap than any of the extant measures of coherence. 
The discussion in this and the previous chapter will leave us with two different 
measures of coherence as an epistemic virtue. Although some may not find this 
objectionable – if our intuitions hinge on two different conceptions of coherence, 
then perhaps we should also have two different explications of coherence – others 
may agree with Bovens and Hartmann that a measure of coherence should do 
justice to both of these intuitions at the same time. In that case, we would have 
one single measure of coherence as an epistemic virtue. The matter of measuring 
coherence as an epistemic virtue will be the subject of the last two sections of 
this chapter. First, in section 3.6, I will show that the only measure of coherence 
that could be interpreted as measuring coherence as both mutual support and 
relative overlap – Bovens and Hartmann’s difference function – is not satisfactory 
as such. Next, section 3.7 will tentatively propose a specific measure of coherence 
as an epistemic virtue, which takes a straight average of a measure of coherence 
as mutual support and a measure of coherence as relative overlap. 
3.2 Fitelson’s Theory of Coherence 
Although Fitelson’s measure of coherence can be made to fit the general frame­
work of the previous chapter, his aim is not to explicate our intuitive notion of 
coherence. Instead, his measure of coherence is intended to be a quantitative 
generalization of a deductive (logical) concept. In order to make clear what this 
means it is instructive to first consider Fitelson’s views on measures of confirma­
tion. 
As is well-known, Carnap (1950) tried to construct a logical theory of confir­
mation. According to him, ‘[d]eductive logic may be regarded as the theory of 
the relation of logical consequence, and inductive logic as the theory of another 
∧
∧
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concept which is likewise objective and logical, viz., … degree of confirmation’ 
(Carnap 1950: 43). Confirmation, he argued, can be a logical relation if it is con­
sidered to be a quantitative generalization of the logical (or deductive) notion of 
entailment. In his (2001b) and (2005a), Fitelson combines the Carnapian view 
of confirmation as generalized logical entailment with the Kemeny–Oppenheim 
strategy for explicating an intuitive concept (see section 1.6). To this effect, he 
formulates a number of desiderata for measures of confirmation that he believes 
flow from our intuitive conception of generalized entailment. Together these 
desiderata succeed in limiting the number of viable measures to a single ordinal 
class of measures. 
For reasons that will become clear below, it is helpful to divide Fitelson’s 
desiderata into two subsets, which I will call the entailment desiderata and the 
dependence desiderata. Consider two sets of propositions S = {R1, . . . , Rm} and 
′ ′ ′ ′ S = {R1, . . . , Rn} with m, n > 1 and a measure of confirmation c (R,R ) which ∧
′ 
∧
′ gives the degree to which R confirms R, where R and R are subsets of sets S 
′ and S , respectively. Then the two subsets of desiderata are (cf. Fitelson 2005a): 
Entailment Desiderata 
′ 
∧
′ (e1) c (R,R ) is maximal and positive if R entails R;
1 
′ 
∧
′ (e2) c (R,R ) is minimal and negative if R entails ¬ R. 
Dependence Desiderata 
′ ′ (d1) c (R,R ) > 0 if p(R |R ) > p(R); 
′ ′ (d2) c (R,R ) = 0 if p(R |R ) = p(R); 
′ ′ (d3) c (R,R ) < 0 if p(R |R ) < p(R). 
In Fitelson’s view, no other considerations should be taken into account when 
deciding which measure of confirmation is to be preferred. That is, all measures 
which satisfy these desiderata are equally suitable. Such an approach would not 
be very conducive to the project of measuring confirmation if it turned out that 
a large number of very different measures each satisfied the desiderata. Fortu­
nately, most of the measures of confirmation that can be found in the literature 
violate the entailment desiderata. For instance, the difference measure, the ra­
tio measure and Carnap’s relevance measure (Carnap 1950: §62) are not maxi­
mal for equivalent propositions. Furthermore, as Fitelson (2005a) notes, all the 
1Here entailment must be interpreted as logical entailment relative to the background knowledge, ∧
′ 
∧ ∧
′ i.e., R entails R iff K∪R ⊢ R, where K is the background knowledge. As in the other chapters, 
I will suppress reference to the background knowledge. 
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known measures that do satisfy both subsets of desiderata (like, for instance, the 
Kemeny–Oppenheim measure and the log-likelihood measure) are members of 
the same ordinal class (as defined in subsection 2.5.3). Thus, given the mea­
sures that have been proposed so far, the desiderata are sufficient to deter­
mine the desired measure of confirmation up to ordinal equivalence (cf. Fitelson 
2005a). From the class of potential measures, Fitelson chooses the Kemeny– 
Oppenheim (1952) measure of factual support, which has been defined earlier 
(equation (2.11)). Here is the definition of the Kemeny–Oppenheim measure as a ∧ ∧
′ measure of the degree of confirmation of R by R :2 
′ ′ 
′ p(R |R) − p(R | ¬R) F (R, R ) =df ′ ′ . (3.1) p(R |R) + p(R | ¬R) 
It is one question whether there exists a measure satisfying the desiderata; 
it is another question whether the desiderata are acceptable. To see that this 
seems indeed to be the case, first note that the members of each of the subsets 
fit together very naturally. For example, keeping the desideratum that entailment 
provides maximal confirmation, while rejecting the desideratum that contradic­
tion provides minimal confirmation, makes little sense. And similarly, without 
the desideratum that independence provides zero confirmation, the desidera­
tum that positive (negative) dependence provides positive (negative) confirmation 
seems to be ungrounded, and vice versa. 
Secondly, the dependence desiderata remain virtually uncontested, since the 
conditions in (d1)–(d3) are generally seen as the standard definitions of proba­
bilistic confirmation, independence, and disconfirmation, respectively. However, 
the same does not apply to the entailment desiderata above. In an earlier paper 
with Ellery Eells, Fitelson presented a number of symmetry considerations – all of 
which seem quite plausible – which may lead to very different measures of con­
firmation (Eells and Fitelson 2002). So why should we accept Fitelson’s (2005a) 
preference for the entailment desiderata? 
I believe the answer to this question is that the entailment desiderata flow nat­
urally from his view of confirmation as the quantitative generalization of logical 
entailment. For if confirmation is to be the generalization of logical entailment, 
then it seems at least initially plausible that logical entailment and logical contra­
diction should be the extremities of such a measure. Therefore, the dependence 
and the entailment desiderata together result from his view of confirmation as 
the probabilistic generalization of logical entailment. 
Apparently, but not surprisingly, the logical notion a certain measure is sup­
posed to generalize plays a crucial role in deciding which measure is appropriate 
and which is not. However, whereas it is clear which logical notion is generalized 
2Again, the definition is for contingent propositions only. The definition of Fitelson’s measure 
of coherence presented below will apply also to noncontingent propositions. 
∧55 3.2. FITELSON’S THEORY OF COHERENCE 
by confirmation, the case is somewhat more obscure for coherence. In his (2003: 
194), Fitelson considered coherence to be the generalization of logical coherence. 
Unfortunately, of course, there is no generally accepted notion of logical coher­
ence, and therefore it seems hard to see what desiderata would follow from such 
a concept. In his (2004) he therefore specified his views and suggested that co­
herence should be taken as the quantitative generalization of logical consistency. 
At first sight, this seems a natural choice. If one restricts the search for such 
a notion to the most common logical concepts, then the only alternatives seem 
to be equivalence and consistency, and it seems that either one of these could 
be linked to our intuitive concept of coherence. However, a closer look reveals 
that the concept of consistency has a serious drawback: for unlike equivalence, 
consistency can be the property both of a theory and of a single proposition, 
while in general coherence is considered to be a relation between propositions 
and not a property of propositions (but see Akiba 2000 and Moretti and Akiba 
2005). Therefore, the concept of equivalence seems to be the best choice. Re­
cently, Fitelson has indicated that he, too, has come to hold this view (personal 
communication). 
As observed in the previous chapter, the measure proposed in Fitelson (2004) 
differs in a number of other ways from his (2003) proposal. In what follows I will 
discuss the latest version of his theory. 
In this proposal, measures of coherence measure the coherence of a set of 
propositions S = {R1, . . . , Rn}. Fitelson’s procedure for the construction of his 
′ measure consists of two steps: first he defines a measure c (R, R ) for the mea­
sure in which one subset of propositions R ⊂ S coheres with another subset of 
′ propositions R ⊂ S and then he constructs a measure C (S) of the coherence of 
set S on the basis of these c-values. Clearly, in order to uphold a desiderata-based 
approach, it is necessary to list desiderata for both c and C. Fitelson’s desiderata 
for c are almost the same as his desiderata for a measure of confirmation. 
Equivalence Desiderata ∧ ∧
′′ (q1) c (R,R ) is maximal and positive if R and R are equivalent;
3 
∧ ∧
′′ (q2) c (R,R ) is minimal and negative if R and R are inconsistent. 
Dependence Desiderata 
′ ′ ′ ′ (d1) c (R,R ) > 0 if p(R |R ) > p(R) (and hence p(R |R) > p(R ); 
′ ′ ′ ′ (d2) c (R,R ) = 0 if p(R |R ) = p(R) (and hence p(R |R) = p(R )); 
′ ′ ′ ′ (d3) c (R,R ) < 0 if p(R |R ) < p(R) (and hence p(R |R) < p(R )). 
3Where equivalence, too, must be understood as relative to the background knowledge: R and ∧
′ 
∧∧
′ ′ R are equivalent iff K ∪ R ⊢ R and K ∪ R ⊢ R, where K is the background knowledge. 
〈56 CHAPTER 3. COHERENCE AS RELATIVE OVERLAP 
Clearly, the dependence desiderata remain the same. So the only difference be­
tween the desiderata for measures of confirmation and measures of coherence 
is that for the latter the entailment desiderata are replaced by the equivalence 
desiderata. 
Fitelson’s desiderata for C are quite straightforward as well. According to him, 
a measure of coherence for a set S should simply calculate the average coherence 
of each subset of S with each disjoint non-empty subset of S (as measured by 
c). Combining this with the desiderata for c, it follows that a measure of coher­
ence that takes the average of the Kemeny–Oppenheim measures for all disjoint 
subsets of S satisfies both constraints. 
Above, in subsection 2.5.3, I defined Fitelson’s measure of coherence as mea­
sure Ck, i.e., as the measure which takes the straight average of the Kemeny– 
Oppenheim measure applied to each of the members of class ǫ. However, the 
precise definition of Fitelson’s measure includes two subclauses for the cases 
in which at least one of the subsets in set S has either zero or unit probabil­
ity. Let me present the full definition here. Let [S] again indicate the set of 
ordered pairs of non-empty non-overlapping subsets of S = {R1, . . . , Rn}, that is, {
′ ∗ ′ ∗ ′ ∗ 
}
[S] = 〈S , S 〉|S , S ⊂ S\∅ ∧ S ∩ S = ∅ and let [[S]] again denote the car­
dinality of [S]. For mnemonic purposes, I will call Fitelson’s complete measure 
F(S): 
Definition 3.1 Given a set S = {R1, . . . , Rn} and an ordering Sˆ1, . . . , Sˆ[[S]] 
〉
of the 
members of [S], the degree of coherence of S is given by the function 
∑[[S]] 
i=1 k (Sˆi)F(S) =df , (3.2) 
[[S]] 
with 
∗ ′ ∗ ′ p(S |S )−p(S |¬S )  ∗ ′ ∗ ′  p(S∗|S )+p(S∗|¬S ) if S ⊬ S and S ⊬ ¬S ; 
′ 
′ ′ 
′ ∗k (S , S ∗ ) =df 1 if S∗ ⊢ S and S ⊬ ⊥; (3.3)  ∗ ′  −1 if S ⊢ ¬S . 
Fitelson’s definition of k differs from the Kemeny–Oppenheim measure F (as de­
fined above) in the additional two constraints. The reason for these constraints 
′ is that F is not defined for cases in which S has probability 0 or 1. 
Clearly, Fitelson’s measure is an example of a measure of coherence that is 
a measure of mutual support and that satisfies the requirement that sets con­
sisting of equivalent propositions have maximal coherence. In subsection 2.5.3, 
I showed that as a measure of coherence as mutual support it also has some 
very counterintuitive consequences. Nevertheless, in the example given there I 
presupposed that Fitelson’s measure is intended to be an explication of our intu­
itive concept of coherence as mutual support. However, neither Fitelson (2003) 
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nor Fitelson (2004) purports to explicate our intuitive concept of coherence at 
all, let alone our notion of coherence as mutual support. Instead, his measure is 
simply intended to be the quantitative generalization of a logical notion and our 
intuitive concept of coherence may be quite irrelevant to that project. If it were 
truly irrelevant, then that would not threaten the main thesis of this chapter. For 
this chapter, like the earlier chapters, is concerned with our intuitive concept of 
coherence and its main thesis is that in order to be a satisfactory explication of 
our intuitive notion of coherence, a measure of coherence cannot satisfy both the 
dependence and the equivalence desiderata. Nevertheless, I do not believe that 
our intuitive notion of coherence can be irrelevant to Fitelson’s project. 
In fact, when we consider possible rationales for Fitelson’s desiderata, it be­
comes apparent that he needs more than the concept of generalized equivalence 
in order for all of his desiderata to be acceptable. To see this, let us review each 
of the (subsets of) desiderata in turn. 
For C there does not seem to be any problem: it seems at least quite natural 
′ ′ that if c (R,R ) gives the coherence of R with R , the overall coherence of a theory 
′ can be calculated by taking a (possibly weighted) average of the values of c (R, R ) 
′ for all disjoint subsets R and R . Next, the equivalence desiderata follow from the 
view of coherence as generalized equivalence in the same way as the entailment 
desiderata follow from the view of confirmation as generalized entailment: again, 
the extremities should be given by, in this case, equivalence and inconsistency. 
But why would we accept the dependence desiderata as desiderata for a mea­
sure of coherence? I noted above that for the project of measuring confirmation 
the dependence desiderata follow quite straightforwardly from the definition of 
probabilistic (dis)confirmation, but we are after a measure of coherence now and 
there is no similar standard probabilistic definition of (in)coherence. Thus, there 
is no straightforward manner in which the dependence (or any other) desiderata 
can be introduced. In this connection it is telling that the only other measures 
that satisfy the equivalence desiderata – Olsson’s (2002) measure of coherence 
and Bovens and Hartmann’s (2003a) difference function – both violate the depen­
dence desiderata.4 
It seems that in order to defend the dependence desiderata for his measure 
of generalized equivalence, Fitelson needs a conception of generalized equiva­
lence as mutual support. But this conception of mutual support does not follow 
directly from the concept of generalized equivalence in the way the equivalence 
desiderata do. Instead, Fitelson needs our intuitive conception of coherence as 
mutual support in order to defend his view of a measure of generalized equiv­
alence as a measure of mutual support. It thus appears that Fitelson cannot 
escape referring to our intuitive concept of coherence, even if he does not need 
to present his measure as an explication of our intuitive concept of coherence as 
4As I showed in subsections 2.5.2 and 2.5.4. 
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mutual support.5 Initially, this conclusion seems rather harmless. Why would 
Fitelson call his measure a measure of coherence if it is not meant to appeal to 
any of our intuitive conceptions with respect to coherence? However, the next 
section will show that the combination of the two subsets of desiderata will nec­
essarily lead to a very counterintuitive consequence, from which it follows that 
Fitelson’s measure clearly fails to be a satisfactory explication of our intuitive 
concept of coherence. And if I am right in arguing that he needs to present his 
measure as a measure of our intuitive concept of coherence, then his proposal 
must be rejected. 
3.3 Dependence Desiderata Versus Equivalence Desid-
erata 
Above I discussed Fitelson’s proposal that a measure of coherence must satisfy 
both the dependence and the equivalence desiderata. I also showed that his pro­
posal needs to be concerned with the explication of our intuitive concept of co­
herence. If it is presented as such, then Fitelson’s desiderata are in accordance 
with the view of Kemeny and Oppenheim that the explication of an intuitive con­
cept should proceed by listing enough desiderata to determine a single ordinal 
class of appropriate measures. In chapter 2, I indicated that I do not believe that 
such a project is viable for measures of coherence as mutual support, precisely 
for the reason that the equivalence desiderata are intuitively incompatible with 
the dependence desiderata. The discussion of Fitelson’s measure has paved the 
way for the presentation of this argument. 
First, a close look at the two sets of desiderata reveals that there is at least 
some reason to worry about the combination of the two sets of desiderata. For 
consider two tautologies T1 and T2. What should the coherence be of the set 
{T1, T2}? According to the equivalence desiderata, it should be maximal: they 
are equivalent. But according to the dependence desiderata, it should be neutral: 
p(T1 | T2) = p(T1) and p(T2 | T1) = p(T2). So the desiderata as defined above 
are actually inconsistent. As Fitelson has remarked (personal communication), 
however, the inconsistency can easily be removed. One obvious way to do this is 
by replacing d2 by 
′ ′ ′ (d2) c (R, R ) = 0 if p(R |¬R ) = p(R), 
5There seems to be at least some support for this position in Fitelson’s work. For example, Fitel­
son (2003: 196–197) argues that his measure is a better alternative than Shogenji’s (1999) measure 
and Fitelson (2005c) argues that it is not too different from Bovens and Hartmann’s proposal, both 
of which are presented as measures of coherence and both of which are explicitly linked to our 
coherence intuitions. If Fitelson’s measure was not intended to be a competitor to these measures 
of coherence, then no such comparisons would be sensible. 
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Figure 3.1: Diagrams of the probability distributions corresponding to situations 
I (left) and II (right) 
′ ′ since p(R | ¬R ) is not defined if p(R ) = 1. Although this move may seem 
′ somewhat ad hoc, I believe anyone would agree that the desiderata d1, d2 and d3 
can still be considered as desiderata for coherence as mutual support. Unfortu­
nately, this solution only applies to cases concerning necessary truths, while the 
real problem is much wider. Indeed, in some cases concerning propositions with 
a very high probability, the equivalence desiderata and the dependence desider­
ata pull in opposing directions too, which leads to some very counterintuitive 
results. To see what I mean consider the following example. 
Suppose there is a small island somewhere in the Pacific Ocean which has a 
population of 102 rabbits. Consider two different situations. In the first situation, 
100 of the rabbits are grey and have two ears, one rabbit has two ears but is an 
albino, and one rabbit is grey but misses one ear. In the second situation, again 
100 of the rabbits are grey and have two ears, but now the remaining rabbits are 
both one-eared albinos. 
Next, consider the set of propositions S = {G, E} with 
G: This rabbit is grey; 
E: This rabbit has two ears. 
What difference should there be in the degree of coherence of S in the two sit­
uations (which are represented in figure 3.1)? Well, intuitively it seems that the 
set in the second situation is more coherent than in the first situation: the non­
overlapping areas are smaller in the second situation while the overlapping area 
is equal in both cases. Intuitively, the satisfaction of these two facts seems to 
constitute a general condition under which a set is more coherent than another. 
But secondly, it also seems that the difference should not be very large: after all, 
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Figure 3.2: Diagrams of the probability distributions corresponding to situations 
III (left) and IV (right) 
the non-overlapping areas have decreased only a little. But whereas Fitelson’s 
measure agrees with the first intuition, it starkly disagrees with the second: on 
his measure the difference between the two situations is 1.005 on a scale of −1 
to 1: the set goes from being (slightly) incoherent to being maximally coherent. 
Strikingly, this result does not depend on the number of rabbits that share 
both characteristics; it only depends on the number of rabbits that do not share 
one of them. To appreciate this consider a much larger island with 10 million 
rabbits. In situation III, again all rabbits are grey with two ears, except for two 
rabbits: one being an albino rabbit with two ears and the other being a grey 
one with one ear. Contrasting this with a fourth situation in which both of the 
remaining rabbits are one-eared albinos (the probabilities can be read off from 
figure 3.2), it again results that according to Fitelson’s measure the difference 
between the two situations is slightly more than 1. More generally, it can be said 
that as long as in the first situation there is precisely one grey one-eared rabbit 
and one albino two-eared rabbit and in the second situation there are two albino 
one-eared rabbits, the number of grey rabbits with two ears may be arbitrarily 
large. The larger the number of grey rabbits, the more closely the difference in 
coherence between the two sets will approximate 1, but it will never become equal 
to or smaller than 1. 
Clearly, this is a highly unsatisfactory consequence of Fitelson’s measure of 
coherence. What may be initially less clear is that it is a necessary consequence 
of the combination of the dependence desiderata and the equivalence desiderata. 
To see that this is indeed the case, first note that in situations II and IV the two 
propositions are equivalent relative to the background knowledge: if the rabbit 
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is grey it has two ears, and if it has two ears it is grey. Therefore, coherence 
must be maximal. In situations I and III, by contrast, the set consists of subcon­
trary propositions. In section 2.6, I noted that subcontrary sets consisting of two 
propositions must always be any–any incoherent. Therefore, in the first and third 
situation the coherence must be smaller than zero. Thus, if C is to be some sort 
of averaging procedure, it follows that the difference in coherence in the above 
examples must always be larger than the difference between neutral and maximal 
coherence. 
It seems safe to conclude that all measures of coherence that are based on both 
the dependence and the equivalence desiderata will necessarily have some very 
counterintuitive consequences. For Fitelson’s measure, this implies that coher­
ence as a quantitative generalization of logical equivalence cannot be a measure of 
mutual support and for the project of explicating coherence in general this means 
that an explication of coherence must either reject the equivalence desiderata or 
reject the view of coherence as mutual support. In chapter 2, I pursued coherence 
as mutual support. In the next section I will pursue the equivalence desiderata 
by trying to find an alternative desideratum that can be combined with them in 
order to yield an alternative measure of coherence (which, preferably, could also 
function as a substitute for Fitelson’s generalization of logical equivalence). The 
measure that results from this will appear to formalize the intuition that lies at 
the basis of Siebel’s and Bovens and Hartmann’s critiques of Fitelson’s measure 
(see section 2.6), namely, the intuition that coherence should have something to 
do with relative overlap. 
3.4 Measuring Coherence as Relative Overlap 
In chapter 1, I introduced the concept of coherence as an epistemic virtue as hav­
ing something to do with hanging together and as being somewhere in between 
consistency and equivalence. I argued there that there are at least two different 
interpretations of the ‘hanging together’ property: coherence as mutual support 
and coherence as set-theoretical overlap. Although the first conception has been 
the one most commonly appealed to in the literature on coherence, it appeared 
especially in section 2.6 that at least some authors have made implicit references 
to intuitions of relative overlap. 
Above I argued that the equivalence desiderata cannot be combined with a 
view of coherence as mutual support. Evidently, this does not imply that they 
cannot be combined with a view of coherence as an epistemic virtue. Only if they 
could not be combined with a view of coherence as relative overlap would the 
conclusion follow. However, it is easy to see that this is not the case. Instead, 
one can construct an overlap desideratum from which the equivalence desiderata 
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follow as consequences. Since relative overlap is maximal in case of equivalence 
′ and minimal in case of inconsistency, a desideratum to the effect that c (R, R ) 
′ should depend on the relative overlap of R and R would directly guarantee that 
equivalent (subsets of) propositions have maximal coherence and inconsistent 
(subsets of) propositions have minimal coherence. 
How should we formalize such a desideratum? Arguably, relative overlap 
differs from support in being a property of a set of propositions instead of a 
relation between (sets of) propositions. While there is a clear difference between 
′ ′ the support R lends to R and the support R lends to R, there is, intuitively, no 
′ similar difference between the relative overlap of R and R on the one hand and 
′ R and R on the other. Given this, the following desideratum seems to make the 
most sense:6 
Overlap Desideratum 
(o) c (S) increases as the relative overlap between the propositions in S in­
creases, 
with relative overlap defined as 
p(S) 
h (S) =df ∨ , (3.4) 
p( S)
with S a set with two or more propositions. A concomitant result of considering 
overlap as a property of a subset is that the coherence of a set should be measured 
by averaging over the relative overlap of all its different subsets. To formalize 
this, let [S]1 indicate the set of all subsets of S with cardinality greater than 1. 
Let [[S]]1 denote the cardinality of [S]1.
7 Then the overlap measure of coherence 
is defined as follows: 
6If one disagrees with this argument and feels, to the contrary, that relative overlap, too, should 
be formalized as a relation between (sets of) propositions, then another definition of relative overlap 
is required. An obvious alternative would be 
′ 
′ ′ p(R ∧ R )h (R, R ) = ∨ .df p( R) 
I am not sure whether this approach would differ much from the one proposed below, although 
of course the summation will be over a much larger number of elements and would therefore be 
much more intricate than the approach proposed below. As such, it would fail to satisfy Carnap’s 
requirement that an explication should be as simple as possible (discussed in section 1.2). However, 
in the end it may turn out that my proposal below has a number of unsatisfactory consequences 
that the more intricate approach would help to solve. In that case, of course, we would have a good 
reason to pursue the latter method. 
7For a set S = {R1, . . . , Rn} it holds that [[S]]1 = 2
n − n − 1 (the number of the elements of the 
powerset of S minus the number of sets with only one element and minus 1 for the empty set). 
〈
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Definition 3.2 Given a set S = {R1, . . . , Rn} and an ordering Sˆ1i , . . . , Sˆ1[[S]]1 
〉
of the 
members of [S]1, the measure of overlap coherence of S is given by the function ∑[[S]]1 h (ˆ
R (S) =df 
i=1 S1i ) , (3.5) 
[[S]]1 
with h (S) the relative overlap of S. 
Contrary to the measures of coherence as mutual support, it is not directly clear 
which value would constitute neutral coherence. Whereas for a measure of co­
herence as mutual support, sets consisting of independent propositions have 
neutral (zero) coherence, the range of this measure is (0,1) and there seems to 
be no clear equivalent to the zero coherence in the former case. However, of 
course we can still compare sets to see which one is more coherent in the sense 
of relative overlap.8 
This measure is clearly an explication of coherence as relative overlap. As such 
it does justice to the intuitions in the rabbit example above and to both Siebel’s 
and Bovens and Hartmann’s intuitions with respect to the examples discussed in 
section 2.6 of the last chapter. 
Firstly, in the rabbit example above (section 3.3) I argued that the differences 
with respect to degree of coherence between situations I and II and between sit­
uations III and IV should not be too large. This intuition is respected by measure 
R: the difference in coherence as measured by R is .02 for the example with 100 
rabbits and .0000002 for the example with 10 million rabbits, both on a scale of 0 
to 1. 
Next, Siebel’s example (see section 2.6.1) concerns a subcontrary set consist­
ing of two propositions with a relatively large overlap: out of ten murder suspects, 
six had committed two earlier criminal acts, while 4 had committed only one 
criminal act. For this example, R = .6, which seems to accord well with Siebel’s 
intuition that the set must be quite coherent. Finally, this measure also gives 
the answer to Bovens and Hartmann’s example (which I have discussed in sec­
tion 2.6.2) that they believe is the intuitively correct one. According to them, if in 
a set S = {R1, R2}we set p(R1∧R2) = x and both p(R1∧¬R2) = p(¬R1∧R2) = .05, 
then increasing x from .01 to .8 should monotonically increase the coherence of 
the set. As graph 3.3 shows, R(S) satisfies this requirement. 
But measure R also seems better suited for analyzing coherence as a quantifi­
cation of generalized equivalence. For although from that standpoint the overlap 
desideratum may appear just as unfounded as the dependence desiderata in Fitel-
son’s approach, the former agrees much better with the equivalence desiderata. 
8Alternatively, we could simply pick a value in the interval (0, 1) as being that neutral value. 
Also, one could pick an ordinal equivalent measure that has range (−1, 1) so that 0 would again 
constitute neutral coherence. An ordinal equivalent to h with that range is discussed below in 
section 3.7. 
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Figure 3.3: R(S) for values of .01 à x à .9 
And thus, if one would accept Fitelson’s argument that equivalence and inconsis­
tency should constitute the extremities of a measure of generalized equivalence, 
the overlap measure would appear to be a much better candidate for coherence 
as generalized equivalence than Fitelson’s proposal. 
3.5 Comparing R With the Extant Measures of Coher-
ence 
So far in this chapter, I have proposed a measure of coherence as relative over­
lap. But just as in the previous chapter it might have turned out that one of the 
extant measures of coherence was more satisfactory as a measure of coherence 
as relative overlap than Cd, in the case of coherence as relative overlap too, it 
may be the case that R is less satisfactory qua measure of relative overlap than 
any of the extant accounts. Arguably, any measure of coherence as relative over­
lap should accord both situation III and situation IV a high degree of coherence 
(both have a very large overlap). This directly excludes Fitelson’s and Shogenji’s 
proposals and the measures Cd, Cr and Cl introduced in chapter 2. Thus, the only 
two measures that appear eligible are Olsson’s (2002) proposal and Bovens and 
Hartmann’s (2003a) difference function. 
Of these two, Olsson’s measure seems to be the most obvious option for a 
measure of coherence as relative overlap, since it measures the degree to which 
all propositions in a set overlap (see subsection 2.5.2). However, just as Shogenji’s 
measure is not sensitive to relations of the any–any coherence type, Olsson’s mea­
sure is not sensitive to relations of relative overlap other than the ones between 
all propositions. As an example by Bovens and Hartmann (2003a: 44–45, 50) 
shows, this has some untoward consequences. Consider the sets S = {B,G} and 
′ S = {B,G, P} with 
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′ Figure 3.4: Diagrams of the probability distributions for S (left) and S (right) 
B: Our pet Tweety is a bird; 
G: Our pet Tweety is a ground dweller; 
P : Our pet Tweety is a penguin. 
Assume that relative to the background knowledge P entails both B and G and 
assume further that the probability models for the two sets are such that B and G 
are individually quite probable and conditionally on each other highly improba­
ble. More specifically, assume that the probability models for both sets are given 
′ by the diagrams in figure 3.4. As Bovens and Hartmann note, set S is intuitively 
more coherent than set S. However, on Olsson’s account, both sets have equal 
′ coherence: O(S) = O(S ) = 1/99. This, as Bovens and Hartmann rightly remark, 
is a very counterintuitive result. 
Unsurprisingly, according to measure R, in the second situation set S is more 
coherent than the first. The reason for this is, of course, that in the second set 
some of the subsets have a higher relative overlap than the two propositions in 
the first set. Thus, the average overlap increases, just as we would have expected. 
Here one may counter that the increase in coherence is less than we would have 
′ expected: R (S) ≈ .01, while R (S ) ≈ .015. But from the standpoint of coherence 
as relative overlap, this is precisely what should be expected: the propositions 
that Tweety is a penguin and that Tweety is a bird do not overlap very much and 
similarly for the other two subsets. Furthermore, note that the difference in this 
situation is not fixed by the desiderata as is the case for Fitelson’s measure in the 
rabbit example. For example, one may also choose to take the natural logarithm 
of O, in which case the difference between the two situations becomes much 
larger.9 
9In that case, maximal coherence would equal 0, minimal coherence would equal −∞. I will not 
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′ Figure 3.5: Diagram of the new probability distribution for S 
Somewhat ironically, slightly changing Bovens and Hartmann’s own example 
against Olsson yields an equally devastating argument against their own account. 
For let us assume that some (but very few) people hold ostriches as pets. This will 
change the probability model, for then the probability that our pet is a non-flying 
bird that is not a penguin is no longer zero. Suppose that it is one in a million (see 
figure 3.5). Then, obviously, it should still be the case that adding proposition P 
to set S results in a more coherent set. However, from figure 3.6 it follows that on 
Bovens and Hartmann’s account it is indeterminate which of the two sets is the 
more coherent. Therefore, it seems that Bovens and Hartmann’s proposal is just 
as unsatisfactory as Olsson’s measure with respect to the question of explicating 
coherence as relative overlap. 
3.6 Toward a Single Measure of Coherence as an Epis-
temic Virtue 
Until now, I have presented the concept of coherence as an epistemic virtue as 
being based on two different intuitions: mutual support and relative overlap. 
By means of an example about which we have very clear coherence intuitions, I 
have shown that no single measure of coherence can be a satisfactory explication 
here delve into the question of the desirability of a measure with a range of (−∞, 0), especially 
because many other scales are possible also. 
PSfrag
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′ Figure 3.6: fr (S, S ) for 0 < x < .0005 
of both coherence as mutual support and coherence as relative overlap. Never­
theless, the above argument does not show that no measure of coherence can 
be satisfactory in the sense of always giving the intuitively correct answer to the 
question of which of two sets has the highest coherence in the sense of coherence 
as an epistemic virtue. The reason for this is that although it is clear that a mea­
sure of coherence cannot be both a measure of mutual support and a measure of 
relative overlap, it cannot be directly excluded that there exists a measure that 
gives the intuitively correct judgement in all of the test cases. That is, it cannot 
be excluded that for all genuine test cases there is a measure that does justice 
to our mutual-support intuitions when these are the overriding intuitions and to 
our relative overlap intuitions if those have overriding force. 
And here, finally, Bovens and Hartmann’s measure may be vindicated after 
all. For although I have shown that it is an unsatisfactory explication of coher­
ence as mutual support and of coherence as relative overlap, it may be that their 
measure can be considered as taking the middle ground between these. Such con­
siderations are reinforced by their own view that coherence relations are a matter 
both of positive relevance relations and of relative overlap relations between the 
propositions in a set (Bovens and Hartmann 2003a: 53). I believe that especially 
the Tweety example presented in the last section would give us reason to doubt 
that this is indeed the case. However, there is an example which makes even more 
clear that their measure cannot be interpreted as a measure of coherence as an 
epistemic virtue. 
For it is evidently the case that if coherence is both a matter of overlap and of 
positive relevance, and of nothing else, then it should be the case that if a set S 
has both a higher relative overlap and a higher degree of positive relevance than 
′ ′ another set S , S should have a higher degree of coherence than S . However, on 
Bovens and Hartmann’s account this is not the case. 
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′ Figure 3.7: Diagram of the new probability distribution for S 
For consider the following example, which is a variant of a similar example 
discussed by Bovens and Hartmann (2003a: 39–40). In the example, a murder 
has been committed in Tokyo but the corpse is still to be found. A 100-square 
grid has been drawn over the map of the city and initially the corpse is equally 
likely to be found in any of the squares. Now consider two situations in each of 
which we receive reports about the location of the corpse from two independent 
and equally but only partially reliable witnesses. In the first situation, witness 1 
reports that the corpse is somewhere in squares 14 to 60 (call this report ‘R1’), and 
witness 2, that it is somewhere in squares 31 to 78 (R2). In the second situation, 
′ witness 1 reports that the corpse is somewhere in squares 33 to 50 (R1), and 
′ witness 2, that it is somewhere in squares 50 to 67 (R2). 
Figure 3.7 makes it easy to verify that for S we have a0 = .3, a1 = .36 and 
′ ′ ′ ′ a2 = .34, and for S we have a0 = .01, a1 = .34 and a2 = .65. So the difference 
function for the two sets is this: 
fr (S, S 
′ ) = 
.3 + .7(1 − r)2 
.3 + .36(1 − r)+ .34(1 − r)2 
− 
.01 + .99(1 − r)2 
(3.6) 
.01 + .34(1 − r)+ .65(1 − r)2 
. 
And, as figure 3.8 shows, the graph of this function crosses the r -axis. Hence, 
according to Bovens and Hartmann there is no fact of the matter as to which of 
′ S and S is more coherent. 
To see that this is a true counterexample against the proposal to use Bovens 
and Hartmann’s theory as a theory of coherence as an epistemic virtue, first 
note that the propositions in S (greatly) support one another—p(R1) = p(R2) = 
′ .48 < p(R1 |R2) = p(R2 |R1) = .625—while those in S (greatly) undermine one 
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′ ′ ′ ′ ′ ′ another—p(R 1) = p(R 2) = .18 > p(R 1 |R2) = p(R 2 |R1) ≈ .056. And since it is 
equally clear that the propositions in the first set overlap much more than they 
′ do in the second set, it is both the case that set S is any–any coherent while set S 
is any–any incoherent and that the propositions in S have a much higher relative 
′ ′ overlap than those in S . Therefore, set S should be more coherent than set S 
and since the differences for both the mutual support and the relative overlap 
are so large, this should certainly not constitute an indeterminate case. But, as 
we have seen above, it does for Bovens and Hartmann’s theory. 
The above result can even be generalized. For consider the following theorem 
(for a proof see Appendix 3 A): 
′ ′ ′ Theorem 3.1 Given two sets S = {R1, . . . , Rm} and S = {R1, . . . , Rn} such that 
m, n > 1 and a probability distribution p(· ) for the two sets such that (1) aj = 
′ ′ a = 0 for all 1 à j à m − 2 and 1 à k à n − 2 and (2) am−1 < an−1. In that case k 
′ set S cannot be more coherent than set S on Bovens and Hartmann’s account. 
The reason this result is so counterintuitive is that it is independent of the values 
′ ′ of a0 and a0. That is, a0 may be arbitrarily small in comparison with a0 without 
′ S becoming more coherent than S . 
To illustrate the theorem, assume for the corpse in Tokyo example that an 
x-square grid (with x a large integer) has been drawn over the map of the city 
and, furthermore, that initially the corpse is equally likely to be found in any 
of the squares. In that case the probability that the corpse is in square i is 1/x. 
′ Furthermore, assume that the following values for the ai and ai hold: 
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′ S S 
′ a0 = .2 a0 = .0000001 
′ aj = 0, for all j ∈ {1, . . . ,m− 2} a = 0, for all k ∈ {1, . . . , n− 2}k 
′ am−1 = .14 an−1 = .13 
It follows from the proof of theorem 3.1 that for all values of m,n > 1, set S is 
′ ′ no more coherent than set S . Also, decreasing the value of a0 even further to 
.00000001 or even smaller does not alter this result. Thus, we are left with a 
large class of counterintuitive examples against Bovens and Hartmann’s theory 
of coherence. 
In their (2005), Bovens and Hartmann have tried to defuse this type of coun­
terexample. Put briefly, they argue that there is a third constituent of our intuitive 
judgements of coherence, namely, the specificity of the information. According 
to them, if coherence depends on positive relevance, relative overlap and speci­
ficity and if, furthermore, a set must outscore another set on all three points in 
order to be more coherent than that set, the examples above are no longer coun­
terexamples against their account. For according to them it is the case in both 
corpse in Tokyo examples presented above that the information is more specific 
in the intuitively less coherent set, so that it performs better on that score. And 
while the much higher mutual support and relative overlap of the one set may 
intuitively make up for its slightly lower degree of specificity, this does not mean 
that a coherence ordering must follow suit: 
Where some considerations are pulling so heavily in one direction that this 
compels our intuitive judgment, the slightest counterforce from a conflicting 
consideration can be sufficient for the criterion not to impose an ordering. 
(Bovens and Hartmann 2005) 
Evidently, this rebuttal does not diminish the worth of these examples, since 
in this section I am specifically concerned with a notion of coherence as an epis­
temic virtue, which I have described as being a matter of both mutual support 
and relative overlap and of nothing else. However, their remark does suggest 
a third interpretation of coherence as an epistemic virtue, namely coherence as 
specificity. Unfortunately, they do not give a formal definition of this ‘specificity’ 
and it seems that we can only decide whether this notion would be a valuable 
addition to the other two explications of coherence as a theoretical virtue after 
Bovens and Hartmann provide us with such a definition. 
Let me note in passing that it remains uncertain whether an appeal to speci­
ficity will cope with all possible counterexamples against Bovens and Hartmann’s 
theory. For instance, the most obvious option, namely, the value of an (the higher 
it is, the more specific is the information in that set), does not work. For as fig­
ures 2.6 and 2.7 in the previous chapter have shown, there exist pairs of sets such 
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that for one set the positive relevance is higher, the relative overlap is higher and 
the value of an is higher than those of the other set, while the two still constitute 
an indeterminate case. 
Unfortunately, all of the other options that I can think of are too strong. 
′ For example, one may stipulate that a set S is more specific than a set S iff ∑n−1 ∑n−1 ′ 
i=1 ai < i=1 ai for all 1 à i à n − 1 (assuming both sets have the same num­
ber of propositions). Arguably, it seems that if we accept Bovens and Hartmann’s 
suggestion, it must also be the case that if a set is less specific than another set, it 
cannot be more coherent. But this is not the case for this proposal. For consider 
any probability model for two sets, each consisting of three propositions, such 
′ ′ that for set S we have a0 = .1, a1 = .06 and a2 = .12, and for S we have a0 = .1, 
′ ′ a = .03 and a2 = .18. It can easily be checked that according to Bovens and 1 
′ Hartmann’s difference function, it is the case that set S is more coherent than 
set S. However, according to the proposal for a definition of specificity at hand, 
′ it is the case that set S is more specific than set S . 
Finally, one could attempt to stipulate that a set S is more specific than a set 
′ ′ S iff ai < ai for all 1 à i à n−1. However, this would be a very strong condition 
indeed, and there seems to be little justification for it. A further complication of 
this suggestion is that it allows for indeterminate cases with respect to specificity 
and it is not clear what a measure of coherence should do in such cases. 
3.7 A Measure of Epistemic Coherence E 
In this section I will explore the option of measuring coherence as an epistemic 
virtue with the help of the measures of mutual support and relative overlap de­
fined in this and the previous chapter. This section is highly tentative: as will 
appear below, there are a very large number of options to be explored, and I will, 
with only a few quite insufficient arguments, limit myself to considering only 
three of these. I invite everyone to experiment for him- or herself in order to find 
the most satisfactory measure. 
The most obvious way to do justice to both intuitions of overlap and intu­
itions of mutual support would be by presenting the measure of coherence as an 
epistemic virtue as a (possibly weighted) average of coherence as mutual support 
and coherence as relative overlap. Given a measure of coherence as mutual sup­
port Cm and a measure of coherence as relative overlap Rn, the measure of total 
coherence Em,n would then be given by: 
Em,n =df aCm + bRn, (3.7) 
with a and b averaging constants. The values of a and b can be adjusted according 
to what our intuitions say about certain examples, but I will only consider a = 
b = 1/2. 
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What measures should we choose for Cm and Rn? In the last chapter I pro­
posed measure Cd as the most satisfactory measure of coherence as mutual sup­
port and in this chapter I have proposed measure R as the most satisfactory 
measure of coherence as relative overlap. So should we not simply opt for the 
average of these two measures? I believe things are a bit more complicated than 
that. Recall that my case for Cd in section 2.4 was based on considerations of 
relative overlap. I argued there that this need not be a problem for a measure 
of mutual support: if the measures of confirmation disagree with respect to the 
question of whether the propositions in one set support each other more than 
in another, or vice versa, other considerations may be used to decide which of 
these measures is the most satisfactory. Nonetheless, in case we are looking for 
the best measure of coherence as mutual support to combine with a measure of 
relative overlap in order to yield a complete measure of coherence as an epis­
temic virtue, it may turn out that other intuitions should influence our choice of 
a measure of coherence. 
Moreover, in order to compare the two measures on an equal basis it is prefer­
able if they have the same range. If, for example, one of the measures has a range 
[0,∞) (as do Cl and Cr) while the other has a [0,1] range (as does R), then a 
weighing procedure would make little sense. Indeed, in many cases it seems 
to make little sense to use an averaging procedure if both measures have range 
[0,∞). This poses an important dilemma for the project of measuring coherence 
as an epistemic virtue with measure Em,n. For although both R and Cd have finite 
1
range, they do not have the same range ([0, 1] and (− 2 , 1), respectively). More­
over, it is not clear whether the other two measures, Cl and Cr, have any ordinal 
equivalents with finite range. At any rate, of the four measures discussed above, 
none have the same finite range. 
It thus seems we have good reason to look at other measures of confirmation 
and relative overlap. Nevertheless, we need not diverge much from the four mea­
sures discussed above. For each of the measures of confirmation and of relative 
overlap discussed so far has at least one ordinal equivalent with a (−1,1) range. 
One of these we have already encountered: the Kemeny–Oppenheim measure is 
ordinally equivalent to the likelihood measure and the resulting measure Ck has 
the required range. Furthermore, an ordinal equivalent to the difference measure 
is 
q(〈S, S ′ 〉) =df 2 − 2
1−d(〈S,S ′ 〉) (3.8) 
= 2 − 21−p(S|S 
′ )+p(S) , (3.9) 
and it can be shown that the resulting measure Cq has range (−1,1). Note care­
fully, though, that I do not claim that Cq and Cd are ordinally equivalent. I only 
claim that q and d are ordinally equivalent and that Cq has the required range. 
The same will hold for the other measures proposed below. 
( )
〈〈
( )
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Third, 
′ 
′ r(〈S, S 〉)− 1 s(〈S, S 〉) =df ′ (3.10) r(〈S, S 〉)+ 1 
′ p(S |S )− p(S) 
=
′
(3.11) 
p(S |S )+ p(S) 
′ is ordinally equivalent to r(〈S, S 〉) and the resulting measure Cs has a (−1,1) 
range. Finally, 
o (S) =df 2 h (S) − 1 (3.12) 
′ p(S ) 
= 2 ∨ − 1. (3.13) 
′p( S ) 
is ordinally equivalent to h and 
∑[[S]]1 o (ˆ
Ro =df 
i=1 S1i ) (3.14) 
[[S]]1 
has range (−1, 1). 
Similarly to the definition of a family of three measures as mutual support 
(definition 2.5), we can now define a family of three measures of coherence as an 
epistemic value: 
Definition 3.3 Given a set S = {R1, . . . , Rn} and an ordering Sˆ1, . . . , Sˆ[[S]] 
〉
of the 
members of [S] and an ordering Sˆ11 , . . . , Sˆ1[[S]] 
〉
of the members of [S]1, the degree 
of epistemic coherence of S is given by the function 
∑[[S]] ∑[[S]]1 o (ˆ1 i=1 m(Sˆi) i=1 S1i ) + , (3.15) Em,o =df 
2 [[S]] [[S]]1 
for m ∈ {q, s, k}. 
Again, we are left with a family of three measures and, again, it seems we will 
need a ‘test case’ to decide which of these is the most appropriate. 
I believe that the following variation of the Samurai example constitutes such 
a test case for Em,o. Consider again the set S = {J,O} with 
J: The murderer is Japanese; 
O: The murderer owns a Samurai sword. 
But now consider two new situations. In the first situation, situation α, it is 
assumed that the murderer may be anyone living in a city of 10,000,000 inhabi­
tants, 7 of them being Japanese and 7 of them owning Samurai swords, and 1 of 
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Figure 3.9: Diagrams of the probability distributions corresponding to situations 
α (left) and β (right) 
them both being Japanese and owning a Samurai sword. In the second situation, 
situation β, we consider a nearby village with 100 inhabitants, 30 of them being 
Japanese, 30 owning a Samurai sword, and 9 both being Japanese and owning a 
Samurai sword (see figure 3.9). 
I would propose that intuitively the set is more coherent in the first situation 
than in the second. Clearly, the set is independent in situation β and any–any 
coherent in situation α. But more importantly, intuitively the propositions seem 
to hang together relatively well in the first situation. For although the overlap 
in both cases is not very large, in situation α this seems compensated for by 
the fact that on the supposition of the other proposition the probability of each 
proposition is raised from .0000007 to approximately .14. Therefore, I would 
tentatively suggest that situation α is more coherent than situation β. 
The outcomes for the measures of epistemic coherence Em,o are given in the 
diagram below (all values are rounded to three decimal places):10 
α β 
Eq,o −.329 −.324 
Es,o .0769 −.324 
Ek,o .0769 −.324 
Clearly, only according to Es,o andEk,o is it the case that situation α is more coher­
ent than situation β and we therefore have a tentative case against Eq,o. Moreover, 
10The reason why they all give the same value for situation β is that in that case S is independent 
and therefore has zero mutual support. 
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the rabbit example discussed above can still function as a counterexample against 
measure Ek,o; for although the difference between the two situations is no longer 
necessarily larger than 1, it is still necessarily larger than 1/2, which remains much 
larger than we would intuitively feel appropriate. Therefore, measure Es,o seems 
the most satisfactory measure of coherence as an epistemic virtue. 
As a concluding remark, let me again emphasize the tentative character of 
this last section. I have limited myself to considering only one ordinal equivalent 
of only three measures of confirmation, and have not pursued the question of 
different weighing factors: either for the two measures that make up Em,o or for 
the multitude of elements that make up Cm and Ro. Therefore, there is much 
room for experiment here and those who feel unconvinced by the version of the 
Samurai example presented in this section are free to substitute their own favorite 
measure of confirmation or to fiddle around with different weighing factors. 
3.8 Conclusion 
This chapter has presented two different measures of coherence. From a discus­
sion of Fitelson’s view of coherence as generalized equivalence it has appeared 
that only a measure of relative overlap can do justice to the desiderata that follow 
from such a conception of coherence. Moreover, it appeared that the resulting 
measure R does justice to coherence intuitions that are not respected by a mea­
sure of coherence as mutual support. Those who agree with the intuitions pro­
posed by Bovens and Hartmann and Siebel concerning their examples will find 
that R completely accords with these intuitions. 
Secondly, I have presented a measure of coherence as an epistemic virtue that 
purports to do justice to our intuitions of coherence both as mutual support and 
as relative overlap. Those who have tried the resulting measure for some of the 
test cases of coherence (both the ones discussed in this thesis so far and others 
present in the literature) will have found that Em,o gives the intuitively correct 
answer in many cases. 
Although it would be preferable to have a single measure of coherence as an 
epistemic virtue, one should be aware of the limitations of such an approach. 
For even if Em,o gives the intuitively correct answer in many cases, it can never 
be a complete measure of mutual support or of relative overlap. For example, 
according to Em,o it will not be the case that an independent set is always less 
coherent than an any–any coherent set. Nor is it the case that Em,o is a monoton­
ically increasing function of x in the example that Bovens and Hartmann use to 
criticize Fitelson’s measure of coherence (see subsection 2.6.2). Thus, in order to 
do full justice to our intuitions of mutual support and of relative overlap we will 
still require two different measures. 
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What has become clear, however, is that none of the extant measures of co­
herence is satisfactory for measuring coherence as an epistemic virtue, even if we 
agree that we would require two different measures to measure the two different 
aspects of that notion. Altogether, this may not be surprising, especially because 
none of the extant measures of coherence has been presented as an explication 
of coherence as an epistemic virtue. And while Fitelson’s approach seems to 
encounter fatal difficulties even as a measure of generalized equivalence, I have 
not yet considered the other measures as measures of coherence as a confidence 
boosting property. To this subject I will turn in the next chapter. 
)( ) (( ) )
( )
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Appendix 3 A: Proof of Theorem 3.1 
′ ′ ′ Theorem 3.1 Given two sets S = {R1, . . . , Rm} and S = {R1, . . . , Rn} such that 
m, n > 1 and a probability distribution p(· ) for the two sets such that (1) aj = 
′ ′ a = 0 for all 1 à j à m − 2 and 1 à k à n − 2 and (2) am−1 < an−1. In that case k 
′ set S cannot be more coherent than set S on Bovens and Hartmann’s account. 
′ For it to be the case that S is not more coherent than S, there must be at least 
′ one value r0 such that fr0(S , S) < 0. Furthermore, note that for this to be the 
′ case it would suffice if the derivative of fr (S , S) is negative in r = 0, since this 
′ implies that fr (S , S) < 0 for values of r approximating 0.
11 
′ To find the expression for the derivative of fr (S , S) for r = 0, first consider 
∗ ∗ cr (S ) for a set S = {R1, . . . , RK} with K propositions: 
a0 + (1 − a0)(1 − r)
K 
∗ c(S ) = ∑K , 
ai(1 − r)i i=0 
where I have dropped the subscript r . Next, substitute 1 − r = x. Then: 
∗d c(S ) d c(x) 
= − . 
dr dx 
For r approximating 0, x approximates 1. Next, calculate 
(d c(x) 
x=1 using dx ∑K 
i=0 ai = 1: 
d c(x) 1 
= K(1 − a0)x
K−1 − 
dx x=1 
∑K 
aixi x=1i=0   ∑K 
a0 + (1 − a0)x
K ( i=0 aiixi−1   )2 ∑K 
aixi i=0 x=1  ∑K  aii ∑K = 1 K(1 − a0) − (a0 + (1 − a0)) ( i=0 )2 
i=0 ai 
∑
i
K 
=0 ai  
K  aii= K(1 − a0) − 
i=0  
K−1 = K(1 − a0) −  iai + KaK 
i=0   
K−1 K−1 = K(1 − a0) −  iai + K1 − ai 
i=0 i=0 
11I thank Stephan Hartmann for pointing out that this approach is much easier than the one I 
originally had in mind. 
∑∑
∑
∑
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 
K−1 = (K − Ka0) − K + (i − K)ai 
i=0  
K−1 = −Ka0 −  (i − K)ai 
i=0 
K−1 
= − (i − K)ai.
i=1
∗ 
Since 
d c(S ) 
= −
d c(x) 
, it follows that dr dx 
( ∗ ) K−1d c(S ) 
= (i − K)ai. (3.16) 
dr r=0 i=1 
′ ′ ′ Now consider two sets S = {R1, . . . , Rm} and S = {R1, . . . , Rn} such that m, n > 1 
′ and a probability distribution p(· ) for the two sets such that (1) aj = a = 0 for k 
′ all 1 à j à m − 2 and 1 à k à n − 2 and (2) am−1 < an−1. Using equation (3.16), it 
′ follows that the derivative of f (S , S) for r = 0 is negative: 
( ′ ) n−1 m−1d f (S , S) ′ = (i − n)ai − (i − m)aidr r=0 i=1 i=1 
′ = ((n − 1)− n)an−1 − ((m − 1)− m)am−1 
′ = am−1 − an−1 
< 0 
′ Thus, set S is no more coherent than set S.  
Chapter 4 
Coherence as a Confidence 
Boosting Property 
4.1 Introduction 
In this chapter I will explicate the notion of coherence as a confidence boosting 
property. In the introductory chapter I discussed how Lewis and Bonjour have 
introduced coherence as part of a rebuttal to the epistemic skeptic, who argues 
that we have no justification for any (or most) of our knowledge claims. According 
to Bonjour, if we are presented with a number of reports by independent, highly 
unreliable witnesses, we may still be justified in accepting each of these reports 
if they are sufficiently coherent. That is, if the information we are presented with 
is very coherent, then it is much more likely to be true. Evidently, this assumes 
that coherence is truth conducive. 
This view has been challenged by, among others, Klein and Warfield (1994) 
and (1996). According to them, adding a proposition to a set of propositions 
can intuitively increase its coherence while it can never increase its probability 
(at best, the probability will remain the same). Their argument has led to the 
first tentative proposals of measures of coherence by Shogenji (1999) and Olsson 
(2002). Although all of these authors have taken for granted the model of wit­
nesses reporting on propositions (or sentences), none of them have taken these 
reports themselves into consideration. Instead, they regard only the probability 
of the propositions in a set and do not take into consideration the probability 
we would assign to these propositions if witnesses with a given reliability had 
reported on them.1 
1This remark no longer applies to Olsson’s (2005) paper, more on which below (chapter 6). 
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In their Bayesian Epistemology, Bovens and Hartmann improve on these dis­
cussions by explicating the notion of coherence as a confidence boosting prop­
erty, where the confidence boost is the increase in our confidence that the in-
formation is true due to witness reports to that effect. In taking this view, they 
present the concept of Bayesian Coherentism as a formal description of the view 
of coherence as being truth conducive. From their discussion of Bayesian Coher­
entism it follows that no theory of coherence could ever aspire to yield a com­
plete coherence ordering on all sets of propositions. The best we can hope for 
is a quasi-ordering, that is, an ordering which is reflexive and transitive, but not 
necessarily complete. I will discuss this claim in section 4.2, while in section 4.3 
I will present their theory of coherence as a confidence boosting property. 
Although their theory of coherence clearly is a great improvement on its pre­
decessors, sections 4.4 and 4.5 will show that it runs into some serious trouble. 
Fortunately, this trouble may be relieved if we remove a small element from their 
theory of coherence, namely (what I will call) the maximality requirement. This 
requirement is highly reminiscent of Fitelson’s equivalence desiderata (see sec­
tion 3.3) and in section 4.6 I will show how abandoning it will enable us to formu­
late a new measure of coherence that is equally based on the idea of coherence 
as a confidence boosting property, but that does not yield the counterintuitive 
consequences that Bovens and Hartmann’s account yields. Indeed, this revised 
theory of coherence as a confidence boosting property will solve almost all of the 
counterexamples against Bovens and Hartmann’s theory presented in this and 
the previous chapters. 
The conclusion of this chapter, therefore, will be that the examples proposed 
in this and earlier chapters do not necessarily challenge Bovens and Hartmann’s 
basic intuitions. 
4.2 Bovens and Hartmann’s Impossibility Result 
As noted above, Bovens andHartmann follow Lewis’s and Bonjour’s general thrust 
by considering only propositions that have been reported by independent, par­
tially reliable witnesses. To make this formally precise, they define the notion 
of an information set S as a finite set of propositions about each of which we 
have been informed by a separate source. These information sources are called 
witnesses and it is assumed that they are independent of each other and that they 
are neither fully reliable nor fully unreliable. Also, it is supposed that they supply 
only positive or negative reports, that is, the witnesses report that something is 
or is not the case; they do not report probabilities. Next, S is defined as the set 
of all such information sets. 
As will be clear from the introduction, the question at stake in this chapter 
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is whether coherence can be a confidence boosting property. Or put differently, 
does the fact that propositions in an information set cohere increase our confi­
dence that the information is true? To answer this question we must first de-
termine what other factors influence our confidence that the information is true 
(otherwise we could never say whether the increase in confidence is due to an 
increase in coherence or an increase in any of the other factors). 
Thus the following question arises: assuming positive reports on all of the 
propositions in an information set, what are the factors that determine our con­
fidence that the conjunction of the propositions in that set is true? According to 
Bovens and Hartmann, there are three such factors: the prior probability that the 
information is true; the reliability of the witnesses; and the extent to which the 
propositions cohere. These factors should be expressed as ceteris paribus claims. 
The ceteris paribus condition for the prior probability stipulates that ‘the more 
expected (or equivalently, the less surprising) the information is, the greater our 
degree of confidence, ceteris paribus’ (op. cit.: 11). Similarly, an increase in wit­
ness reliability will make us more confident that the information is true, ceteris 
paribus. Finally, the ceteris paribus condition for coherence reads: ‘[w]hen we 
gather information from independent and partially and equally reliable sources, 
the more coherent the story is, the more confident we are that the story is true, 
ceteris paribus’ (op. cit.: 31). Clearly, the latter statement expresses the view that 
coherence is a confidence boosting property. However, it is still rather vague. To 
make it more precise, Bovens and Hartmann define the notion of Bayesian Coher­
entism (henceforth BC), as the combination of BC1 and BC2, which are defined as 
follows: 
BC1 ‘For all information sets S, S 
′ ∈ S, if S is no less coherent than S ′ , then 
our degree of confidence that the content of S (i.e. the conjunction of the 
propositions in S) is true is no less than our degree of confidence that the 
content of S ′ is true, ceteris paribus.’ (op. cit.: 11) 
BC2 The relation of ‘being no less coherent than’ is an ordering and is fully 
determined by the probabilistic features of the information sets contained 
in S (cf. Bovens and Hartmann 2003a: 25). 
To evaluate these claims, it is helpful to derive an expression for our confidence 
that the content of an information set is true. That is, we need to determine the 
probability that the conjunction of propositions in a set S is true, given positive 
reports on all of these propositions. 
To this effect, consider an information set S = {R1, . . . , Rn} and a probability 
distribution p( · ) over the elements of S, and let ‘ai ’ stand for the sum of the 
probabilities of the conjunctions consisting of n − i elements of S and the nega­
tions of all the remaining elements of S. So, for instance, if S = {R1, R2}, then 
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a0 = p(R1∧R2), a1 = p(R1∧¬R2)+p(¬R1∧R2), and a2 = p(¬R1∧¬R2). Further­
more, let REPRj be a report by witness j to the effect that Rj is the case (there is 
one witness for each proposition). To model the reliability of the witnesses, let 
pj =df p(REPRj |Rj) (4.1) 
be the true-positive rate of witness j with respect to proposition Rj and let 
qj =df p(REPRj |¬Rj) (4.2) 
be the rate of false positives. Assume that all witnesses are equally reliable: for 
all j , we have pj = p and qj = q. Next, define 
r =df 1 − q/p (4.3) 
as the reliability of the witnesses.2 They are assumed to be neither fully reliable 
(r ≠ 1) nor fully unreliable (r ≠ 0); thus, r ∈ (0, 1). With these instruments, it 
becomes possible to calculate the posterior probability 
∗ p (R1 ∧ · · · ∧ Rn) =df p(R1 ∧ · · · ∧ Rn |REPR1 ∧ · · · ∧ REPRn), (4.4) 
which gives the probability of the conjunction of the elements of set S given 
positive reports with respect to all of these elements. It can be shown (see Bovens 
and Hartmann 2003a, Appendix A1) that if a0 > 0, the following relation holds: 
∗ a0 p (R1 ∧ · · · ∧ Rn) = ∑ . (4.5) n 
i=0 ai(1 − r)
i 
According to Bovens and Hartmann, the reliability of the witnesses should not 
influence the coherence of an information set. This seems to make sense, since 
we would not want to adopt a model in which an information set becomes more 
coherent if the witnesses become more reliable. Given this assumption, BC will 
′ be refuted if we find probability distributions for two sets S and S such that 
they have equal prior probability and such that there are values of the reliability 
parameter r1 and r2 such that our confidence in set S is higher than our confi­
′ ′ dence in set S given reliability r1 and our confidence in set S is higher than our 
confidence in set S given reliability r2. For in both cases (r = r1 and r = r2) there 
∗is a difference in the posterior probability p of both sets that is not caused by 
differences in prior probability or witness reliability (since both are fixed in both 
cases). Since the posterior probability is different for the two cases, it follows 
that there are only three options left (if we want to save the concept of coherence 
as confidence boosting): (1) coherence depends on the reliability of the witnesses; 
2Bovens and Hartmann (op. cit.: 22) show that the precise way in which the reliability of the 
witnesses is modeled does not affect their impossibility result. 
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(2) there is a fourth factor that determines our confidence in the information set; 
or (3) the coherence ordering is not complete. If we find (1) counterintuitive and 
if we agree with Bovens and Hartmann (op. cit.: 21–22) with respect to (2) that it 
is completely unclear what this fourth factor might be, then we are left with the 
conclusion that BC2 is false. 
But it is easy to see that such cases exist. For example, all probability distrib­
′ ′ ′ ′ utions for sets S = {R1, R2, R3} and S = {R1, R 2, R 3} for which 
′ S S 
a0 = .05 a = .05 0 
′ a1 = .30 a1 = .20 
′ a2 = .10 a = .70 2 
′ 
have the required characteristics for a counterexample (see Bovens and Hartmann 
2003a: 20). The difference between the posterior probabilities of the sets for all 
∗ ∗ ′ values of 0 < r < 1 has been plotted in figure 4.1. Clearly, p (S) > p (S ) for 
∗ ′ ∗r < .8 and p (S ) > p (S) for r > .8 and since the prior probability of both sets 
is equal, we have a genuine counterexample against BC. Thus if we accept that 
coherence is not influenced by the reliability of the witnesses and if we believe 
∗that there is no fourth factor that determines p , it follows that BC is refuted. 
What does this mean for Bayesian Coherentism? Does it mean that the epistemic 
skeptic was right all along and that no matter how coherent the information we 
receive is, this does not give us any reason to be confident that it is true? Well, 
contrary to the claims of Klein and Warfield, this proof does not purport to show 
that no form of Bayesian Coherentism is possible. Instead, Bovens and Hartmann 
(2003a: §1.5) show that if BC2 is replaced by 
′ BC 2 The relation of ‘being no less coherent than’ is a quasi-ordering and is fully 
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determined by the probabilistic features of the information sets contained 
in S, 
the impossibility result no longer goes through (recall that a quasi-ordering is an 
ordering that is reflexive, transitive, but not necessarily complete). In that case 
′ the sets S and S used in the derivation of the impossibility result above could 
simply be an example of an indeterminate case, to wit, a case in which there is 
no coherence ordering possible. And, as will appear below, this is precisely what 
Bovens and Hartmann’s theory of coherence will tell us about these two sets. For 
′ future reference, define BC* as the conjunction of BC1 and BC 2. 
4.3 Bovens and Hartmann’s Theory of Coherence 
Bovens and Hartmann define the probability boost b (R1 ∧ · · · ∧ Rn) as the ratio 
of the posterior probability and the prior probability: 
∗p (R1 ∧ · · · ∧ Rn)
b (R1 ∧ · · · ∧ Rn) = . (4.6) 
p(R1 ∧ · · · ∧ Rn) 
If coherence is to be a confidence boosting property, then it must be the case 
that if the coherence increases, the value of b increases also. As noted above, 
Bovens and Hartmann believe that there are three different factors that influence 
the probability boost: witness reliability, prior probability, and coherence. To 
find a true measure of coherence, therefore, one needs to distinguish the degree 
to which coherence contributes to the value of b (R1 ∧· · ·∧Rn) from the contri­
butions of witness reliability and prior probability. But it is not straightforward 
how this may be achieved. The basic problem is that although reliability may be 
convincingly portrayed as being independent from coherence, this does not hold 
for the prior probability. To see this, remember that the prior probability of the 
information set is the prior probability that all the elements of the information 
set are true, or, in other words, the measure in which they overlap. In each of 
the examples presented in earlier chapters, the extent to which the propositions 
in a set overlap seemed to play an important role in our intuitive judgements of 
coherence. 
Therefore, neither BC nor BC* will be of much help in determining a measure 
of coherence. If the element that plays an important role for coherence (to wit, 
the prior probability) must be kept constant for the definition to apply, then we 
will have no guidance on how to measure the contribution of the prior probability 
to the coherence. An additional element or criterion is required to disentangle 
the prior probability from the coherence of a set. 
The element that Bovens and Hartmann add and which I will call the maximal­
ity requirement is highly reminiscent of the equivalence desiderata discussed in 
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chapter 3. According to them a set is maximally coherent if it consists of equiva­
lent propositions (op. cit.: 32–35), where two propositions Ri andRj are equivalent 
if they are logically equivalent relative to the background knowledge. Call such a 
set an equivalent set and call a set nonequivalent if not all of its propositions are 
logically equivalent relative to the background knowledge. Furthermore, let two 
sets of propositions Si and Sj be equivalent if the conjunctions of the proposi­
tions in the sets are equivalent relative to the background knowledge. According 
to Bovens and Hartmann, the property of maximal coherence should not depend 
on a set’s prior probability or the number of propositions. Using this require­
ment, they define the notion of a maximal confidence boost, i.e., the confidence 
boost a set would have received if the information set had consisted of equiva­
lent propositions, in other words, if all of a1, …, an−1 had been zero (Bovens and 
Hartmann 2003a: 32–33). In that case an = 1−a0,
3 and so equation (4.5) reduces 
to 
∗ a0 pmax(R1 ∧ · · · ∧ Rn) = . (4.7) a0 + (1 − a0)(1 − r)n 
Next, one can define a measure cr (S) as the fraction of the actual boost over the 
maximal boost (for a derivation, see Bovens and Hartmann 2003a: 34): 
b (R1 ∧ · · · ∧ Rn) a0 + (1 − a0)(1 − r)
n 
cr (S) =df = ∑ . (4.8) 
bmax(R1 ∧ · · · ∧ Rn) 
n 
ai(1 − r)i i=0 
It is easy to see that cr (S) = 1 if R1, …, Rn are equivalent, and cr (S) < 1 if 
otherwise. Next, the difference function calculates the difference between the 
values of cr for two different sets: 
′ ′ fr (S, S ) = cr (S)− cr (S ). (4.9) 
Of course, this function still depends critically on the reliability of the witnesses. 
′ All else equal, a higher value for r will raise the value of fr (S, S ). As announced 
above, Bovens and Hartmann believe that coherence should be independent of 
witness reliability, and they cancel out the dependence on the reliability by defin­
ing the two-place relation of being no less coherent than, ‘≽’, as follows: 
′ ′ ′ for all S, S ∈ S, S ≽ S iff fr (S, S ) á 0 for all r ∈ (0, 1). (4.10) 
Interestingly, on this account there is no such thing as the coherence of a set: it is 
impossible to say whether a set is (in)coherent. Instead, only comparative judge­
′ ′ ments are possible: a set S is no less coherent than another set S iff fr (S, S ) á 0 
′ for all values of the reliability parameter.4 Also, since fr (S, S ) may be positive 
n3Since i=0 ai = 1 and in this case 
∑n−1 
i=1 ai = 0, we have a0 + an = 1. 
4One may feel that the introduction of the ‘≽’-relation as ‘being no less coherent than’ is rather 
awkward also. Would we not want our theory of coherence to produce a ‘≻’ relation of ‘being more 
′ ′ coherent than’? But this can easily be remedied by stipulating that S ≻ S iff fr (S, S ) á 0 for all 
′ values of r ∈ (0, 1) and fr (S, S ) > 0 for at least one value of r ∈ (0, 1). 
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for some values of r and negative for others, this analysis yields only a quasi­
′ ′ ′ ordering: there may be sets S and S such that neither S ≽ S nor S ≽ S. This 
is in accordance with the impossibility result. Indeed, it can be checked that the 
′ sets S and S that were used in the impossibility result do in fact constitute such 
an indeterminate case. 
More generally, it can easily be seen that in all cases where there is an impos­
sibility result like the one above Bovens and Hartmann’s difference function will 
′ not yield an ordering. For consider two sets S and S with an equal number of 
propositions and equal prior probability. In that case, the maximal confidence 
′ boost will be equal for both sets and fr (S, S ) becomes linearly dependent on the 
∗ ∗ ′ difference between p (S) and p (S ). Therefore, for all probability models such 
that there are values of the reliability parameter r1 and r2 such that our confi­
′ dence in set S is higher than our confidence in set S given reliability r1 and our 
′ confidence in set S is higher than our confidence in set S given reliability r2, it 
′ will be the case that fr (S, S ) is positive for values of r = r1 and negative for r = r2 
and thus no coherence ordering is possible. However, as the next two sections 
will show, a different problem emerges if we drop the condition that the number 
of propositions remains equal. 
4.4 A Different Kind of Impossibility Result 
In chapters 2 and 4 above, I presented various examples in which Bovens and 
Hartmann’s measure behaves counterintuitively. For instance, in subsection 2.5.4 
it appeared that independent sets are not generally less coherent than positively 
dependent sets, even if only in a ceteris paribus sense. Furthermore, in section 3.6 
of the last chapter it appeared that in cases where the propositions in one set 
have both a substantially larger relative overlap than in another set and support 
each other to a substantially higher degree, the first set is not necessarily more 
coherent than the second. It seems quite natural to claim that in such cases it does 
not really matter what notion of coherence we are trying to explicate. Instead, 
such examples seem to be devastating to all accounts that attempt to explicate 
our intuitive concept of coherence. Nonetheless, given the above impossibility 
result, Bovens and Hartmann may seem to have an easy reply to such examples. 
For if it is true that coherence cannot unqualifiedly increase our confidence in an 
information set, then it may seem not so awkward that in some specific examples 
it is indeed the case that it is indeterminate whether one set is more coherent than 
another. 
Unfortunately, this answer cannot work in all cases. That is, I believe that an 
argument can be made to the effect that in some cases one set should be more 
coherent than another according to Bovens and Hartmann’s discussion of what 
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it means for a property to be confidence boosting. And as will appear in this 
and the next section, the difference function discussed above does not give the 
correct verdict in all of these cases. 
To see how such an argumentmay proceed, recall that Bovens and Hartmann’s 
impossibility result shows us that there can be no complete coherence ordering. 
In the example two sets with equal prior probabilities are compared, but it turns 
out that for some values of the reliability parameter one set is more probable 
given positive reports by all of the witnesses, while for other values of the pa­
rameter the other set is more probable. And since the two other determinants 
of our posterior probability are equal in both cases, the differences between the 
posterior probabilities have to be due to differences in coherence. 
Clearly, this result tells us little if anything about cases in which the prior 
probability is not fixed in a similar fashion. For instance, a theory of coherence 
may yield an indeterminate verdict even if the posterior probability of one set is 
higher than the posterior probability of another for all values of the reliability 
parameter. For it may simply be the case that the difference in posterior prob­
ability is caused by the fact that the prior probability of the first set is higher 
than that of the second. However, the impossibility result does tell us that if two 
sets have the same prior probability, while one of the sets has a higher posterior 
probability than the other for all values of the reliability parameter, then a theory 
of coherence must classify the first set as more coherent than the second. For 
in that case the difference in posterior probability cannot be due to differences 
in either the prior probability or the reliability of the witnesses, and, since these 
are the only two other determinants of our confidence according to Bovens and 
Hartmann, the differences in posterior probability must be caused by differences 
in coherence. 
We have already encountered one example in which this condition is satisfied, 
namely, the Tweety example discussed in section 3.5. Recall that in the Tweety 
example the proposition that Tweety is a penguin is added to a set consisting of 
the propositions that Tweety is a bird and that Tweety is a ground-dweller. In 
Bovens and Hartmann’s version of the example, the value of the prior probability 
′ that the information is true is equal in both sets: a0 = a0 = .01. Moreover, it can 
be shown that the posterior probability of the second set is higher than that of 
the first for all values of the reliability parameter. Indeed, this is a consequence 
of the following, more general, theorem (for a proof, see Appendix 4 A): 
′ Theorem 4.1 Given two sets S = {R1, . . . , Rn−1} and S = {R1, . . . , Rn}, and with 
0 < p(Rn) < 1 and p(R1 ∧ · · · ∧Rn−1) = p(R1 ∧ · · · ∧Rn), it will be the case that 
∗ ∗p (R1 ∧ · · · ∧ Rn) > p (R1 ∧ · · · ∧ Rn−1) for all r ∈ (0,1). 
Therefore, in the Tweety example it should be the case that the second and larger 
set is more coherent than the first and, as is shown by Bovens and Hartmann 
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(2003a: 44–45), their theory of coherence agrees with this conclusion. 
But of course the above argument does not tell us that in some cases adding 
a proposition to an information set should increase its coherence. No, it tells us 
that in all cases where we add a contingent proposition to an information set that 
does not affect its prior probability, the coherence should increase. But, as the 
following theorem shows, for Bovens and Hartmann’s theory of coherence this 
will not always be the case (for a proof, see Appendix 4 A): 
Theorem 4.2 Adding a proposition Rm+1 to a nonequivalent set S = {R1, . . . , Rm} 
will increase S’s coherence iff Rm+1 is equivalent with S, i.e., iff p(R1 ∧· · ·∧Rm | 
Rm+1) = p(Rm+1 |R1 ∧ · · · ∧ Rm) = 1. 
Evidently, this theorem shows (as we have seen in their original Tweety example) 
that on Bovens and Hartmann’s theory of coherence it may be the case that adding 
a proposition to a set may sometimes increase its coherence. But on the other 
hand it also shows that the coherence cannot increase unless the proposition we 
add is equivalent to the conjunction of propositions in that set. But according 
to theorem 4.1, as long as the prior probability does not decrease, the posterior 
probability always increases. Therefore, we have a large class of counterexamples 
against Bovens and Hartmann’s theory of coherence as a confidence boosting 
property, to wit, all cases in which we add a contingent proposition to a set of 
propositions that is not equivalent to the conjunction of propositions in that 
set but which does not decrease its prior probability. For in all such cases the 
increase in posterior probability cannot be due to differences in either the prior 
probabilities of the sets or the reliability of the witnesses, while according to 
Bovens and Hartmann’s difference function it cannot be due to differences in 
coherence either. 
To illustrate this, consider the following variation of the Tweety example. In 
′ this example we compare the sets S = {B, F} and S = {B, F,A} with 
B: Our pet Tweety is a bird; 
F : Our pet Tweety is of a nonflying species; 
A: Our pet Tweety’s natural habitat is Antarctica. 
Assume that the probability distributions for the two sets are such that B and 
F are individually relatively probable and conditionally on each other highly im­
probable. Furthermore, assume that the conjunction of B and F entails A: in this 
case there are no ostriches or other ground-dwelling birds whose natural habitat 
is not Antarctica. But now assume that there is an extremely slight probability 
(say 10−10) that Tweety is a blue whale. More specifically, assume that the prob­
ability models for both sets are given by the diagrams in figure 4.2. Evidently, 
the prior probability of both sets is equal and, therefore, adding the proposition 
that Tweety’s natural habitat is Antarctica will increase our confidence that the 
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′ information is true. Nevertheless, it can be checked that fr (S, S ) < 0 for values 
of r below, approximately, 10−8. 
To conclude this section, it seems that we have derived a general class of 
counterexamples against Bovens and Hartmann’s theory of coherence as a confi­
dence boosting property. In the next section I will discuss a number of obvious 
solutions to these problems. 
4.5 Possible Solutions for Bovens and Hartmann 
While in the previous chapters I showed that Bovens and Hartmann’s theory of 
coherence leads to some strongly counterintuitive consequences, in this chapter I 
have shown that it is deficient also as an explication of coherence as a confidence 
boosting property. 
Now the question naturally arises whether any of these results are unavoidable 
given the model that Bovens and Hartmann have chosen for their analysis of 
coherence. As became clear above, Bayesian Epistemology makes fundamental 
use of the idea of coherence as a confidence boosting property and of the concept 
of modeling coherence as a property of an information set with independent 
witnesses reporting on the propositions of that information set. If the result 
derived in the previous section is the necessary byproduct of such an analysis, 
then this approach would be highly unsatisfactory for the analysis of coherence 
as a confidence boosting property. And, moreover, since it is unclear whether 
there are other approaches to the explication of coherence as confidence boosting, 
it may turn out that no satisfactory explication of coherence as a confidence 
boosting property is possible. For all proponents of BC or BC*, this would be a 
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highly unsettling result. 
In this section, I will argue that results like those derived in the last section are 
indeed the necessary consequences of Bovens and Hartmann’s model. Nonethe­
less, I will show in the next section that this does not seriously diminish the 
prospects for Bayesian Coherentism. I will propose a new model in which co­
herence is still a confidence boosting property, but in which at least the most 
counterintuitive results no longer arise. But let me first show that the prospects 
for Bovens and Hartmann’s own theory are not very bright. 
Perhaps the most obvious way in which one may attempt to salvage Bayesian 
Coherentism is by using another measure of support to measure the probability 
boost. Recall from the discussion above that Bovens and Hartmann define the 
probability boost as the ratio between the posterior and the prior probability: 
p(R1 ∧ · · · ∧ Rn |REPR1 ∧ · · · ∧ REPRn)
b (R1 ∧ · · · ∧ Rn) = . (4.11) 
p(R1 ∧ · · · ∧ Rn) 
That is, they use the ratio-measure of confirmation to measure the probability 
boost. But of course they could equally well have defined the probability boost 
by means of another measure of confirmation.5 
Nonetheless, I do not believe that such an approach would be successful. One 
reason for this is that neither of the two most popular alternatives – the difference 
measure and the likelihood measure – would do the job. 
Recall that the prior probability p(R1∧· · ·∧Rn) equals a0, while the posterior 
probability p(R1 ∧ · · · ∧ Rn |REPR1 ∧ · · · ∧ REPRn) is given by 
∗ a0 p (R1 ∧ · · · ∧ Rn) = ∑ . (4.12) n 
i=0 ai(1 − r)
i 
Measuring the probability boost by means of the likelihood measure would lead 
to the following function: 
bl (R1 ∧ · · · ∧ Rn) = 
p (REPR1 ∧ · · · ∧ REPRn |R1 ∧ · · · ∧ Rn) 
. (4.13) 
p(REPR1 ∧ · · · ∧ REPRn |¬(R1 ∧ · · · ∧ Rn)) 
In a similar fashion to Bovens and Hartmann’s derivation of their expression 
∗for p (R1 ∧ · · · ∧ Rn) we can rewrite this expression in terms of the reliability 
parameter r and the ai . If we again take the ratio between the probability boost 
and the maximal probability boost, the following measure results (the derivation 
is given in Appendix 4 B): 
bl (R1 ∧ · · · ∧ Rn) (1− a0)(1 − r)
n 
ncr
l (S) =df 
bl 
= ∑ . (4.14) 
max(R1 ∧ · · · ∧ Rn) i=1 ai(1 − r)
i 
5This strategy was suggested to me by Branden Fitelson. 
replacements
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′ l l ′ But the resulting difference function (fr
l(S, S ) =df cr (S)− cr (S )) performs even 
less satisfactorily than the original one. For according to this function it is the 
case in the Tweety example discussed above that the less probable set is actually 
more coherent. That is, while Bovens and Hartmann’s difference function classi­
fies the case as indeterminate, this alternative difference function classifies the 
wrong set as more coherent. 
Whereas the likelihood difference function performs less satisfactorily than 
Bovens and Hartmann’s original measure, measuring the probability boost by 
means of the difference measure leads to a more satisfactory difference function. 
For in that case we would have the following coherence measure: 
bd (R1 ∧ · · · ∧ Rn) 
cr
d(S) =df (4.15) 
bd max(R1 ∧ · · · ∧ Rn) 
a0 ∑n 
i=0 ai(1−r)
i − a0 
= (4.16) a0 − a0a0+(1−a0)(1−r)n 
1 ∑n − 1 
i=0 ai(1−r)
i 
= 
1 
. (4.17) 
− 1 a0+(1−a0)(1−r)n 
′ d d ′ The new difference function (fr
d(S, S ) =df cr (S)− cr (S )) actually gives the cor­
rect judgements in the Tweety example. Therefore, it follows immediately that 
′ theorem 4.2 does not hold for fr
d(S, S ). However, there still exist counterex­
amples against this measure. For consider the probability distribution for sets 
′ S = {B, F} and S = {B, F,A} (defined in section 4.4) given in figure 4.3. Clearly, 
′ ∗ ∗ ′ a0 = a0 and (by theorem 4.1) p (S) > p (S ) for all values of r . Nonetheless, it 
′ can easily be checked that fr
d(S, S ) < 0 for values of r between, approximately, 
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′ .55 and .72 and fr
d(S, S ) > 0 otherwise.6 Therefore, the type of counterexample 
presented in the previous section cannot be countered by measuring the proba­
bility boost by means of either the likelihoodmeasure or the difference measure.7 
Evidently, the fact that the difference measure seems to perform better than 
the ratio measure as a measure of the probability boost may encourage one to 
search for another measure of confirmation to measure the probability boost. 
However, I feel that there are good a priori grounds for believing that such a 
project will not be fruitful unless Bovens and Hartmann’s model is substantially 
altered. The reason for this is that I believe that Bovens and Hartmann’s model 
involves an inconsistency. 
In section 4.3, I indicated that Bovens and Hartmann need an additional el­
ement to distinguish coherence and prior probability, to wit, the maximality re­
quirement. As intimated there, this requirement stipulates that equivalent sets 
are maximally coherent per se, i.e., irrespective of the value of a0 and of the 
number of propositions. However, this requirement – which lies at the basis of 
Bovens and Hartmann’s measure – appears to be inconsistent with their view of 
coherence as a confidence boosting property. 
To see this, consider two independent witnesses with fixed reliability.8 As­
sume furthermore that they give equivalent reports, i.e., that the propositions 
they report as being true overlap completely. Next, suppose a new witness enters 
the stage, similar to the first two in that this witness too has a fixed reliability 
and positively reports on a proposition that is equivalent to the other two. Since 
the three propositions overlap fully, a1 = a2 = 0. Also, by theorem 4.1, 
∗ ∗ p (R1 ∧ R2 ∧ R3) > p (R1 ∧ R2) (4.18) 
6One may object here that this example is intuitively not as clear-cut as the other Tweety ex­
amples that I have presented. This is no doubt correct. However, for the argument in this section 
our intuitive judgements do not seem to matter much. Given Bovens and Hartmann’s theory of 
coherence, it simply must be the case that if the posterior probability increases for all values of r , 
while the prior probability remains the same, then the coherence increases also. But, as we have 
seen, this is not the case if we measure coherence by cr
d(S). 
Given that cr
d(S) squares much better with our intuitions in the Tweety example, one may also 
′ ′ wonder if fr
d(S, S ) performs better with respect to my other counterexamples against fr (S, S ). This 
is not the case, however: in all the other counterexamples against Bovens and Hartmann’s theory 
′ ′ that I have presented in this thesis, fr
d(S, S ) agrees with fr (S, S ) that they constitute indeterminate 
cases. 
7Interestingly, the three difference functions discussed so far agree with each other with respect 
to almost all the examples given in Bovens and Hartmann’s (2003a). The only two exceptions are 
the example they use to criticize Fitelson’s measure of coherence and the delta/epsilon version of 
the corpse in Tokyo example. Both of these will be discussed briefly in section 4.6. 
8One may assume that the witnesses are actual persons reporting on propositions and that 
long experience with these people has taught us the true- and false-positive rates of their reports. 
Alternatively, one may assume the witnesses to be independent measurement instruments of which 
we likewise know the rates of true- and false-positives. 
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for all a0 ∈ (0, 1): our confidence that the information is true has gone up. This 
is what we would expect, of course: various independent reports that something 
is the case will increase our confidence that it is in fact the case. However, in 
this example all three of the determinants of our confidence in a set remained 
constant: the reliability was fixed, the prior probability remained equal, and the 
set was maximally coherent to begin with, so the coherence must have remained 
maximal also. Therefore, given the fact that according to Bovens and Hartmann 
there are only three factors that determine our confidence in an information set, 
we have derived an inconsistency: since all three determinants of our confidence 
have remained equal, our confidence cannot have increased, while our confidence 
∗as measured by p (S) did in fact increase. 
We have thus arrived at a very general argument against Bovens and Hart-
mann’s theory of coherence, one that is in fact independent of the measure of 
confirmation with which we measure the probability boost. Therefore, we cannot 
salvage Bayesian Coherentism by replacing the ratio measure in our measure of 
the confidence boost by another measure of support. Fortunately, I believe that 
this does not mean that we have derived a general argument against Bayesian 
Coherentism. For there are still a number of options left. 
One of these is to allow for a fourth factor that determines our confidence that 
the information in an information set is true. Evidently, both of my arguments 
would cease to be compelling if we could find a fourth factor and if it would turn 
out that this factor does not remain constant if we add a proposition to an infor­
mation set. For in that case the increase in our confidence that the information is 
true may well be caused by an increase in the fourth factor and, consequently, the 
fact that the coherence does not increase need not pose a problem for Bovens and 
Hartmann’s theory of coherence. In their (2003: 21–22), Bovens and Hartmann 
discuss the possibility of a fourth determinant of our confidence that the infor­
mation in an information set is true. This question is important for them: clearly, 
their impossibility result only goes through if we cannot find such a fourth factor. 
In section 4.2 I agreed with Bovens and Hartmann that it is completely unclear 
what that factor might be. 
However, in Bovens and Hartmann’s impossibility result, the number of wit­
nesses is the same for both sets. This clearly is not the case for my argument 
against their theory. Therefore, could we not simply say that our confidence that 
the information in an information set is true also depends on the number of 
witnesses? 
I believe we can. Nonetheless, I also believe that this type of solution would 
present us with a number of difficulties. Firstly, the additional factor is quite 
ad hoc and it seems – at least to me – not as straightforward as the other three 
factors. Secondly, and perhaps more importantly, a proponent of this solution 
would also have to provide us with an explanation of why in the original Tweety 
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example the coherence increases, while in the Tweety example that I presented 
in the previous section this is no longer the case. Intuitively the cases seem to 
be very much alike and, consequently, it seems that if the coherence increases in 
the one case the same should hold for the other one. Here an appeal to speci­
ficity along the lines of Bovens and Hartmann (2005) (as discussed in section 3.6) 
seems to be of little help. For it seems that both sets are equally specific and, 
therefore, considerations of specificity cannot explain the counterintuitiveness of 
the results. Thirdly and finally, this approach has the disadvantage that it does 
not solve any of the counterexamples presented in the previous chapters. That 
is, according to this theory it will remain the case that in some intuitively very 
clear cases our theory of coherence as a confidence boosting property will still 
not judge either of the two sets to be more coherent than the other. 
Alternatively, one may attempt to replace the maximality requirement by an­
other condition. In section 4.3, I argued that no measure of coherence can be 
constructed on the basis of the idea that one should have more confidence in a 
more coherent set, given equal reliability and equal prior probability. The reason 
for this is that prior probability and coherence are not independent notions. Of 
course this need not be an impediment to the construction of a measure of co­
herence: as intimated above, Bovens and Hartmann simply add a requirement (to 
wit, the maximality requirement) from which their measure follows quite straight­
forwardly. Clearly, if we drop this requirement, the argument that Bovens and 
Hartmann’s account is necessarily inconsistent will no longer go through. For in 
that case the coherence of the set consisting of two equivalent propositions need 
no longer be maximally coherent, and, therefore, the coherence may increase if 
we add an additional proposition. Unfortunately, it is unclear what other require­
ment could take the place of the maximality requirement, so I will not pursue this 
option any further. 
However, I do believe that this section’s inconsistency argument does show us 
that the maximality requirement cannot lead to a satisfactory explication of co­
herence as a confidence boosting property. Therefore, it needs to be abandoned. 
However, instead of replacing it by a different condition, I will attempt to slightly 
alter Bovens and Hartmann’s account of what determines our confidence in an 
information set. It will appear that a relatively minor change will lead to some 
very different results. 
4.6 An Alternative to Bovens and Hartmann’s Differ-
ence Function 
In this section I will outline a different approach to coherence as a confidence 
boosting property. I will try to stay as close as possible to Bovens and Hartmann’s 
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original account. For example, in my explication of coherence as a confidence 
boosting property, coherence will still be a property of an information set and 
it will remain a confidence boosting property in the sense of BC*. What will be 
different, however, is the explication of the ceteris paribus condition in 
′ ′ BC1 For all information sets S, S ∈ S, if S is no less coherent than S , then our 
degree of confidence that the content of S is true is no less than our degree 
′ of confidence that the content of S is true, ceteris paribus. 
Instead of requiring equal prior probability of the conjunction of elements of an 
information set, I will require equal unconditional probabilities of the various el­
ements of an information set. That is, according to me, one should have more 
confidence in an information set if it is more coherent, given equal reliability 
and equal unconditional probabilities. This will make our confidence in an infor­
mation set depend on the unconditional probabilities of the various elements of 
the set, the witness reliability and the coherence, but no longer (directly) on the 
prior probability of the conjunction of the elements in the set. In that case, a 
set becomes more coherent if the marginal probabilities and the reliability of the 
∗witnesses remain equal while the value of p (R1 ∧ · · · ∧ Rn) increases. 
But, rather surprisingly perhaps, it has now become possible to construct 
a measure on the basis of only this description of coherence as a confidence 
boosting property. For while it is certainly not the case that prior probability and 
coherence are independent, it is not evident at all that unconditional probabilities 
and coherence cannot be modeled as independent. For example, it has become 
clear in chapter 2 that an explication of coherence as mutual support assumes 
sets consisting of independent propositions to have neutral coherence, no matter 
how plausible the propositions are. This at least seems to strongly suggest that 
the unconditional probabilities do not determine the degree of a set’s coherence 
as mutual support. Naturally, this does not show that the same should apply to an 
explication of coherence as a confidence boosting property, but it does indicate 
that it is a quite plausible option. 
But if the marginal probabilities of the propositions and the coherence of an 
information set are indeed independent, then it seems to follow naturally that we 
should compare the actual probability boost with the probability boost the set 
would have gotten had all its propositions been independent (but with the same 
unconditional probabilities and the same witness reliability). 
To formalize this idea, again consider the set S of all information sets. But 
∗ now define the notion pind(R1 ∧ · · · ∧ Rn) as the posterior probability of the 
information set S = {R1, . . . , Rn}, had the information come in as independent 
propositions with the same unconditional probabilities. Call the set consisting 
of the same propositions as S, with the same unconditional probabilities, but 
in which these propositions are independent, set S i and let bi ind(R1 ∧ · · · ∧ Rn) 
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be the probability boost of the independent set. Next, let aj 
i stand for the sum 
of the probabilities of the conjunctions consisting of n − j elements of S i and 
the negations of all the remaining elements of S i . From these elements, one can 
construct a new coherence measure:9 
bi (R1 ∧ · · · ∧ Rn) 
cr
i (S) =df 
bi 
(4.19) 
ind(R1 ∧ · · · ∧ Rn) 
∗p (R1∧···∧Rn) 
i a0 = ∗ (4.20) 
ind(R1∧p ···∧Rn) 
i a0 
∗p (R1 ∧ · · · ∧ Rn) 
= ∗ (4.21) pind(R1 ∧ · · · ∧ Rn) ∑n i a0 ai(1 − r)i i=0 = 
a0 
∑
i=0 ai(1 − r)
i
, (4.22) ni 
and a new difference function: 
′ i i ′ fr
i (S, S ) = cr (S)− cr (S ). (4.23) 
′ ′ As in the original case, S ≽i S iff fr
i (S, S ) á 0 for all values of r ∈ (0,1). 
Already at first glance, this account has some important advantages over the 
old one. For one, it now becomes possible to define the properties of coherence 
and incoherence of a set, which I will call i-(in)coherence: 
Definition 4.1 A set S is i-coherent iff cr
i (S) > 0 for all values of r ∈ (0,1); it is 
i-incoherent iff cr
i (S) < 0 for all values of r ∈ (0,1). 
Also, let me stress that this alternative measure leaves intact most of Bovens 
and Hartmann’s model: coherence is still a confidence boosting property of an 
information set, and the independence of the propositions of the information set 
is still analyzed in terms of independent witnesses reporting on propositions in 
an information set. 
′ But more importantly, it can be shown that for all sets S and S in which the 
∗ ∗ ′ propositions have the same marginal probabilities and for which p (S) > p (S ), 
′ it will be the case that S is more i-coherent than S . To see this, note that if the 
9One may wonder why I have defined the probability boost as the fraction of the posterior proba­
bility and the prior probability the set would have had if all the propositions had been independent. 
The quick response would be that otherwise it is no longer the case that the resulting difference 
function is indeterminate in all cases where there is an impossibility result. But I believe it also 
makes sense to define the probability boost in this fashion, since in this model it is no longer 
the prior probability that influences our confidence, but the coherence together with the marginal 
probabilities. 
∑
∑ ∑
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marginal probabilities of the proposition of the two sets are equal it is the case 
that 
p ∗ ind(S) = p 
∗ 
ind(S 
′ ) (4.24) 
and thus that ( )
′i i(1 − r)i
n aa a0i=0 0′ fr
i (S, S ) = − (4.25) ′ 
i (1 − r)
i 
,
i 
0 
n 
i=0 
n 
ai(1 − r)i aa i=0 
i(S, Sr
′ ∗ ∗ ′ i(S, Sr
′ ∗ ∗ ′ Evidently, f ) = 0 iff p (S)−p (S ) = 0 and f ) > 0 iff p (S)−p (S ) > 
0, just as we should expect if coherence is to be a confidence boosting property. 
Personally, I believe that this fact constitutes the main reason why my version of 
the difference function is a more satisfactory explication of coherence as a confi­
dence boosting property than Bovens and Hartmann’s original function. Nonethe­
less, it also has another important advantage over the original difference function: 
it appears to square much better with our intuitive notion of coherence. 
Firstly, it gives the same answers to most of the examples that Bovens and 
Hartmann present in their (2003a). To be precise, the new measure disagrees with 
Bovens and Hartmann’s intuitions in only three examples. The first of these is 
the example that Bovens and Hartmann (2003a: 50–53) use to criticize Fitelson’s 
(2003) measure, which I discussed in section 2.6. I argued that their contention 
that the coherence of a set should increase if a0 increases while a1 is left un­
touched is based implicitly on intuitions of relative overlap, and thus is not at 
home in an analysis of coherence as mutual support. Also, I argued in chapter 3 
that our intuitions of relative overlap are strongly connected to Fitelson’s version 
of what this chapter has dubbed the maximality requirement. Although there is 
room for disagreement, I am inclined to argue that by dropping the maximality 
requirement the justification for Bovens and Hartmann’s contention disappears. 
The same, or so I believe, is the case with the example that Bovens and Hartmann 
(2003a: 50) use to criticize Shogenji’s measure. I will not discuss the example 
in detail, but let it suffice to say that here, too, an appeal is made to the idea of 
equivalent propositions being very coherent. 
The final example on which the two theories of coherence differ might be con­
sidered more important, since it is the only example that Bovens and Hartmann 
(2003a: 40–41) give of two sets between which no coherence ordering is possible. 
The example is a corpse in Tokyo example, with a 100-square grid (for a descrip­
tion of the corpse in Tokyo example, see section 3.6). Now consider situations 
δ and ǫ: in situation δ the two witnesses report squares 41–60 and 51–70. In 
situation ǫ the witnesses report squares 39–61 and 50–72. 
Define ‘Sδ’ and ‘Sǫ’ as the information sets containing the witness reports of 
situations δ and ǫ, respectively. Given the above probabilities, we have aδ = .10, 0 
δ ǫ ǫ a = .20, a0 = .12, and a1 = .22. Since f (S
δ, Sǫ) is positive for values of r between 
0 and, approximately, .7 and negative for values of r between, approximately, .7 
1 
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and 1, we have neither Sδ ≽ Sǫ nor Sǫ ≽ Sδ . However, as figure 4.4 shows, 
fr
i (Sδ, Sǫ) is larger than 0 for all values of r , and therefore, Sδ ≽i S
ǫ . 
.1 
.3 
.2 
.4 
.2 .4 .6 .8 1 
Figure 4.4: Graph of fr
i (Sδ, Sǫ) 
According to the difference function there is no fact of the matter as to which 
set is more coherent, and Bovens and Hartmann believe that this constitutes a 
point in favor of their theory. In such cases, they think, a theory of coherence 
should withhold judgement. But it seems telling that almost all the other recently 
proposed probabilistic measures of coherence side with fr
i (Sδ, Sǫ). Fitelson’s, 
Shogenji’s and all of the mutual support measures proposed in chapter 2 all 
point to Sδ as being more coherent than Sǫ .10 Only according to Olsson’s (2002) 
measure and the overlap measure of coherence R proposed in chapter 3 is the 
opposite the case.11 
So there is at least some reason to argue that Sδ is more coherent than Sǫ . 
Moreover, this conclusion is not incompatible with Bovens and Hartmann’s claim 
that in this case it is intuitively not clear which set is more coherent. We may 
intuitively be unable to see the difference in coherence for the simple reason that 
it is too small for us to recognize. 
As can be seen from the values of the respective measures, according to all 
of the measures mentioned above the differences in coherence between the two 
sets are indeed minute, which would explain our being unable to identify the most 
coherent set. Of course, Bovens and Hartmann’s framework does not supply a 
mechanism with which to decide how much more coherent a set is than another, 
which makes it impossible to distinguish between intuitively very clear cases 
and intuitively less clear cases. This is just a natural result of their approach. 
10Shogenji’s (1999) measure yields Sδ = 2.5 and Sǫ ≈ 2.27; Fitelson’s (2003) measure yields 
Sδ = .6 and Sǫ ≈ .57, the three measures discussed in chapter 2 yield Cd(S
δ) = .3, Cd(S
ǫ) ≈ .29, 
Cr(S
δ) = 2.5, Cr(S
ǫ) ≈ 2.27, Cl(S
δ) = 4.0, Cl(S
ǫ) ≈ 3.6. 
11Both measures yield Sδ ≈ .333 and Sǫ ≈ .353. 
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′ However, it is quite easy to add such an element to fr
i (S, S ). For example, one 
′ could take the maximum value of fr
i (S, S ) or the area beneath its graph to be 
′ ′ indicative of the degree to which S is more coherent than S (provided fr
i (S, S ) á 0 
for all r ). In the case of Sδ and Sǫ, both proposals would lead to the conclusion 
that the difference in coherence between Sδ and Sǫ is much smaller than in all of 
the other examples discussed in this thesis. 
Therefore, I am inclined to conclude that my version of the difference function 
gives the correct judgements in all the intuitively clear examples presented by 
Bovens and Hartmann. But be that as it may, it certainly behaves much more in 
line with our coherence intuitions with respect to the counterexamples that this 
thesis has presented against their theory of coherence. Indeed, it gives the correct 
answer to all of the counterexamples against the original difference function, with 
only one exception. In this example (which I presented in subsection 2.5.4) we 
consider a set S = {C,E, T} with 
C: This chair is brown; 
E: Electrons are negatively charged; 
T : Today is Thursday. 
′ and compare it with another set S = {B,O,M} with 
B: This bird is black; 
O: This bird is a crow; 
M : This bird has a lifelong mate. 
Now suppose the probabilities for the two sets are given by diagram 4.5 (this is 
the counterexample against Bovens and Hartmann’s difference function given the 
ceteris paribus clause that the prior probabilities remain equal). Presumably, set 
′ S is intuitivelymuchmore coherent than set S. However, according to my version 
′ of the difference function, it is indeterminate whether S is more i-coherent than 
set S. Of course, this example does not constitute a point in favor of Bovens 
and Hartmann’s theory, since their difference function likewise does not classify 
one of the sets as more coherent. Nevertheless, one may feel that we do have a 
counterexample against my own difference function. But do we? 
I believe that whether or not the above example constitutes a counterexample 
against a theory of coherence depends on the notion of coherence we attempt to 
explicate. If we are after a notion of coherence as mutual support, relative overlap, 
or a combination of the two, then the example constitutes a true counterexample. 
For it is both the case that the mutual support is higher in the second set than in 
the first and that the relative overlap is larger in the second set than in the first. 
However, if we are after an explication of the concept of coherence as a confidence 
boosting property, I am not so sure what the intuitively correct judgement should 
′ be. For example, one plausible explanation why S should be more coherent than 
S is that the first set is independent, while in the other set all propositions support 
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Figure 4.5: New diagrams of the probability distributions corresponding to sets 
′ S (left) and S (right) 
each other. But we need to remember that we are trying to explicate the notion 
of coherence as a confidence boosting property and it need not be the case that 
the posterior probability of a positively dependent set is higher for all values of r 
than that of an independent set. Indeed, precisely the two sets above constitute 
a counterexample against that claim. For consider figure 4.6, which gives the 
difference in posterior probability. Clearly, this graph crosses the r -axis. 
� 
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� 
� 
.2 .4 .6 .8 
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.0002 
.0002 
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.0004 
∗ ′ ∗Figure 4.6: Graph of p (S )− p (S) 
Thus, it appears that given quite reliable witnesses an any–any coherent set 
(as defined by definition 2.4) can have a lower posterior probability than an inde­
pendent set and, furthermore, a set with a higher relative overlap can likewise be 
less probable than a set with a lower relative overlap. This remark is not meant 
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to imply that the example should constitute an indeterminate case (for the mar­
ginal probabilities are not equal in both sets), but it does at least suggest that 
our intuitions with respect to this example may well be less convincing from the 
standpoint of the explication of coherence as a confidence boosting property. 
As a last remark, let me note that although this measure does not satisfy 
the maximality requirement, it does satisfy a less stringent condition, to wit, that 
sets consisting of equivalent propositions are maximally coherent given constant 
unconditional probabilities and equal reliability of the witnesses (for a proof, see 
Appendix 4 C): 
Theorem 4.3 Any equivalent set S = {R1, . . . , Rn}with unconditional probabilities 
′ p(Ri) = α is more i-coherent than any nonequivalent set S with the same number 
of propositions and the same unconditional probabilities. 
Thus, given two sets with the same unconditional probabilities for all the propo­
sitions, if only one of them is equivalent it will be more i-coherent than the other. 
Or, alternatively, given fixed unconditional probabilities, the most i-coherent way 
information can accumulate is if the propositions are all equivalent. 
4.7 Conclusion 
In this chapter I have explicated the notion of coherence as a confidence boost-
ing property. From Bovens and Hartmann’s impossibility result it follows that 
coherence can only impose a quasi-ordering on the set of information sets. But 
whereas Bovens and Hartmann’s difference function does indeed impose such 
a quasi-ordering, it appeared that it also refrains from imposing an ordering in 
cases where such an ordering is required. 
I have argued that there are only two viable solutions to this problem, both 
of which make some alterations in Bovens and Hartmann’s model for the factors 
that determine our confidence in an information set given positive reports by 
all of the witnesses. The first solution is simply to add an additional factor, 
namely, the number of witnesses. Although this solves the counterarguments 
presented in this chapter, I find this solution less satisfactory than the second 
one, in which our confidence in an information set is still determined jointly by 
the probability of the results, the reliability of the witnesses and the coherence 
of the results, but in which we explicate the probability of the results in terms of 
the marginal probabilities of the respective propositions. The latter solution has 
the advantage of satisfactorily dealing with both the problems discussed in this 
chapter and those presented in the other chapters. 
Let me emphasize that I have discussed only one alternative to Bovens and 
Hartmann’s original difference function. Most notably, I have followed Bovens 
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and Hartmann in defining the probability boost via the ratio measure. But I could 
just as well have defined the probability boost bymeans of the difference measure 
or the likelihoodmeasure (or any other measure of confirmation, for that matter). 
Alternatively, I could also have defined the coherence of a set as the difference 
between the posterior probability and the posterior probability the set would have 
had if the propositions had been independent. This would result in the following 
coherence function: 
′ ∗ ∗ cr =df p (S)− pind(S) (4.26) 
None of these alternatives are ordinally equivalent. For example, replacing the 
ratio-measure by the difference measure in the definition of cr
i (S) will lead to the 
delta/epsilon version of the Tokyo example constituting an indeterminate case. 
However, the sets presented in Bovens and Hartmann’s impossibility result (see 
section 4.2) would cease to constitute an indeterminate case. Alternatively, using 
expression (4.26) for the definition of the coherence function seems to lead much 
more often to an indeterminate judgement (but not in any of the counterexamples 
that this thesis has brought forward against Bovens and Hartmann’s difference 
function). 
So far I have not succeeded in finding a definite ‘test-case’ against any of these 
alternative formulations and for the sake of clarity I have opted in favor of only 
discussing the alternative that comes closest to Bovens and Hartmann’s original 
formulation. Nonetheless, if somebody were to produce a decisive counterex­
ample against the measure of i-coherence proposed in this chapter, it would be 
interesting to find out whether all of the other options lead to the same results. 
∑ ∑
∑
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Appendix 4 A: Proofs of Theorems 4.1 and 4.2 
Theorem 4.1 Given two sets S = {R1, . . . , Rn−1} and S = {R1, . . . , Rn}, and with 
0 < p(Rn) < 1 and p(R1 ∧ · · · ∧Rn−1) = p(R1 ∧ · · · ∧Rn), it will be the case that 
∗ ∗p (R1 ∧ · · · ∧ Rn) > p (R1 ∧ · · · ∧ Rn−1) for all r ∈ (0, 1). 
′ Proof: Consider two sets S = {R1, . . . , Rn−1} and S = {R1, . . . , Rn}. For con­
′ ′ venience, substitute bi ’s for the ai ’s of S . Assume that p(R1 ∧ · · · ∧ Rn−1) = 
p(R1 ∧ · · · ∧ Rn). Then, a0 = b0. Next consider the difference in posterior prob­
abilities of the two sets: 
p ∗ (R1 ∧ · · · ∧ Rn)− p 
∗ (R1 ∧ · · · ∧ Rn−1) 
= 
b0 ∑n 
i=0 bi(1 − r)
i 
− 
a0 ∑n−1 
i=0 ai(1 − r)
i ( )
1 1 
= a0 ∑n 
i=0 bi(1 − r)
i 
− ∑n−1 
i=0 ai(1 − r)
i 
, (4.27) 
where I have made use of the fact that a0 = b0. In order to prove the theorem, I 
will have to show that if 0 < p(Rn) < 1, equation (4.27) is positive for all values 
of r . For this to hold, it must be the case that 
n−1 n 
ai(1 − r)
i − bi(1 − r)
i (4.28) 
i=0 i=0 
is positive for all values of r . In order to compare the two sums above, it is 
necessary to derive a relation between the ai ’s and the bi ’s. Let us start with 
¬Rndividing the bi ’s into two parts: b
Rn is the part of bi where Rn is true and bi is i 
¬Rn ¬Rn Rnthe part of bi where Rn is false. In that case, b
Rn + bi = bi and b0 = bn = 0. i 
Also: 
n n 
¬Rn 
∑
¬Rnbi = = 1 − p(Rn). (4.29) bi 
i=0 i=1 
Furthermore, b0 can be expressed in terms of a0 and b 
¬Rn by using the law of 1 
total probability: 
b0 = p(R1 ∧ · · · ∧ Rn−1 ∧ Rn) 
= p(R1 ∧ · · · ∧ Rn−1) − p(R1 ∧ · · · ∧ Rn−1 ∧¬Rn) 
¬Rn = a0 − b1 . (4.30) 
The same type of relation can be derived for all bi . By definition, b
Rn is the sum i 
of all possible combinations in which Rn is true and precisely i propositions are 
∑ ∑
∑ ∑
∑ ∑
∑ ∑ ∑
∑
∑
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false: 
Rn 
∑
= p(R1 ∧ · · · ∧ Rn−1 ∧ Rn), bi
i-many ¬Rk’s,
(n−1−i)-manyRk’s
with k à n − 1. Again by the law of total probability, 
bi
Rn = 
∑
(p(R1 ∧ · · · ∧ Rn−1)− p(R1 ∧ · · · ∧ Rn−1 ∧¬Rn)) 
i-many ¬Rk’s,
(n−1−i)-manyRk’s
= p(R1 ∧ · · · ∧ Rn−1) − p(R1 ∧ · · · ∧ Rn−1 ∧¬Rn). 
i-many ¬Rk’s, i-many ¬Rk’s,
(n−1−i)-manyRk’s (n−1−i)-manyRk’s
The first term on the right-hand side of the last equation equals ai : it is the sum 
of all the joint probabilities of all combinations of set S where i propositions are 
false and all others are true. The second term equals bi
¬
+
R
1 
n : it is the sum of the 
′ joint probabilities of all combinations of set S in which Rn and precisely i other 
propositions are false. Therefore: 
Rnbi = ai − bi
¬
+
R
1 
n 
and 
¬Rn ¬Rnbi = bi
Rn + bi = ai − bi+1 + bi 
¬Rn , (4.31) 
where an = bn+1 = 0. Substituting expression (4.31) in equation (4.28) yields: 
n−1 n 
ai(1 − r)
i − bi(1 − r)
i
i=0 i=0
n−1 n 
¬Rn = ai(1 − r)
i − (ai − bi+1 + bi 
¬Rn)(1 − r)i 
i=0 i=0 
n−1 n n 
¬Rn = ai(1 − r)
i − ai(1 − r)
i + (bi+1 − bi 
¬Rn)(1 − r)i 
i=0 i=0 i=0 
n−1 n 
= bi
¬
+
R
1 
n(1 − r)i − 
∑
bi 
¬Rn(1 − r)i, (4.32) 
i=0 i=1 
¬Rnwhere I have made use of the fact that an = bn+1 = b0 =0. Equation (4.32) can 
be further simplified: 
n−1 n 
¬Rn 
∑
bi+1 (1 − r)
i − bi 
¬Rn(1 − r)i 
i=0 i=1 
∑∑( )
∑
∑
∧
∑ ∑
∑ ∑
∑ ∑
∑ ∑ ( )
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n n 
¬Rn = bi 
¬Rn(1 − r)i−1 − 
∑
b (1 − r)i i 
i=1 i=1 
n 
= bi 
¬Rn(1 − r)i−1 − b 
¬Rn(1 − r)i i 
i=1 
n 
= bi 
¬Rn(1 − r)i−1 (1 − (1 − r)) 
i=1 
n 
¬Rn = bi r(1 − r)
i−1 . (4.33) 
i=1 
Suppose p(Rn) < 1. Then equation (4.33) is positive for all values of r and, 
∗ ∗therefore, p (R1 ∧ · · · ∧ Rn) > p (R1 ∧ · · · ∧ Rn−1) for all r ∈ (0, 1).  
Theorem 4.2 Adding a proposition Rm+1 to a nonequivalent set S = {R1, . . . , Rm} 
will increase S’s coherence iff Rm+1 is equivalent with S, i.e., iff p(R1∧· · ·∧Rm | 
Rm+1) = p(Rm+1 |R1 ∧ · · · ∧ Rm) = 1. 
Proof: I will start by showing that adding a proposition Rm+1 to any set S = 
{R1, . . . , Rm} will not increase S’s coherence if Rm+1 is not equivalent with S. To 
′ this end, consider two sets S = {R1, . . . , Rm} and S = {R1, . . . , Rm, Rn}, where 
′ ′ n = m + 1. Again, substitute bi ’s for the ai ’s of S . 
′ Either b0 = 0 or b0 > 0. In the first case, f (S , S) is not defined, and, there­
′ fore, S cannot be more coherent than S. Thus, b0 must be larger than 0 (and, 
consequently, a0 > 0 also). 
′ Note that it would suffice for S to be no more coherent than S if the derivative 
′ ′ of fr (S , S) is negative in r = 0. Using equation (3.16), the derivative of f (S , S) 
′ for sets S = {R1, . . . , Rm} and S = {R1, . . . , Rm, Rn} equals 
( ′ ) n−1 m−1d f (S , S) 
= (i − n)bi − (i −m)ai
dr r=0 i=1 i=1 
m−1 n−1 
= (m − i)ai − (n − i)bi. (4.34) 
i=1 i=1 
Substituting expression (4.31) in expression (4.34) and using n = m + 1 gives: 
m−1 n−1 
(m − i)ai − (n − i)bi 
i=1 i=1
m−1 n−1
¬Rn = (m − i)ai − (n − i) ai + bi 
¬Rn − bi+1
i=1 i=1
∑ ∑ ∑
∑ ∑
∑ ∑
∑
∑
∑ ∑
∑
( )
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m−1 m m m 
¬Rn = (m − i)ai − (m + 1 − i)ai − (n − i)b 
¬Rn + 
∑
(n − i)b i i+1 
i=1 i=1 i=1 i=1 
m−1 m m+1 
¬Rn = ((m − i)ai − (m + 1 − i)ai)− am − (n − i)b 
¬Rn + 
∑
(n − i + 1)b i i 
i=1 i=1 i=2 
m−1 m m+1 
¬Rn = (−ai)− am − (n − i)b 
¬Rn + 
∑
(n − i + 1)b 
i=1 i=1
m
i i 
i=2 
m m 
¬Rn 
∑
¬Rn= (−ai)− (n − 1)b 
¬Rn − 
∑
(n − i)b + (n − i + 1)b 
¬Rn + b1 i i n 
i=1 i=2 i=2 
m m 
¬Rn 
∑
¬Rn= − ai −mb 1 + bi 
¬Rn + bn
i=1 i=2
m n
¬Rn ¬Rn ¬Rn = − ai + − b1 −mb 1 .bi
i=1 i=1
Using equations (4.29) and (4.30) and substituting 
m 
= 1 − a0, it is possible i=1 ai 
′ to derive a simple expression for the derivative of f (S , S) for r = 0: 
′ d f (S , S) ¬Rn ¬Rn = −1 + b0 + b1 + 1 − p(Rn)− b 
¬Rn −mb 1dr r=0
1 
= b0 − p(Rn)−mb 
¬Rn 
1 
= p(R1 ∧ · · · ∧ Rm ∧ Rn) − p(Rn) − 
m p(R1 ∧ · · · ∧ Rm ∧¬Rn) 
= p(Rn) (p(R1 ∧ · · · ∧ Rm |Rn)− 1) − 
m p(¬Rn)p(R1 ∧ · · · ∧ Rm |¬Rn). 
′ From this it follows directly that the derivative of f (S , S) for r = 0 is negative if 
p(R1 ∧ · · · ∧ Rm |Rn) < 1, or if p(R1 ∧ · · · ∧ Rm |¬Rn) > 0. Therefore, adding a 
proposition Rm+1 to a set of propositions S = {R1, . . . , Rm} will not increase its 
coherence if Rm+1 is not equivalent with S. 
If Rm+1 is equivalent with S, coherence will increase if set S is nonequivalent. 
′ For consider the coherence function for set S = {R1, . . . , Rm, Rn}: 
′ b0 + (1 − b0)(1 − r)
n 
cr (S ) = ∑ .n 
0 bi(1 − r)
i 
i=
If Rn is equivalent with R1 ∧ · · · ∧ Rm, then b0 = a0, b1 = 0 and bi+1 = ai for 
i á 1. Therefore: 
′ a0 + (1 − a0)(1 − r)
n 
cr (S ) = ∑n 
a0 + i=2 ai−1(1 − r)
i 
= ∑
∑ ∑
∑
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a0 + (1 − a0)(1 − r)
n 
m 
a0 + ai(1 − r)i+1 i=1 
a0 + (1 − a0)(1 − r)
m 
(1−r) 
= a0 ∑ .m 
(1−r) + i=1 ai(1 − r)
i 
It is fairly easy to show that for all α, β, γ, δ ∈ (0, 1), if γ < δ, 
α 
β + γ α + γ 
α > . 
+ δ α + δβ 
If S is nonequivalent, then 
m m 
ai(1 − r)
m < ai(1 − r)
i, 
i=1 i=1 
and thus (1 − a0)(1 − r)
m < 
m 
ai(1 − r)
i . Therefore, for all 0 < r < 1 and all i=1 
0 < a0 < 1, we have 
′ a0 + (1 − a0)(1 − r)
m 
cr (S ) > ∑m 
a0 + ai(1 − r)i i=1 
= cr (S). 
′ ′ ′ Therefore, fr (S , S) =df cr (S )− cr (S) > 0 for all values of r and thus S is more 
coherent than S.  
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Appendix 4 B: Derivation of the Measure cr
l (S)
Consider a set S = {R1, . . . , Rn}. Measuring the probability boost by means of the
likelihood measure gives the following expression:
bl (R1 ∧ · · · ∧ Rn) = 
p (REPR1 ∧ · · · ∧ REPRn |R1 ∧ · · · ∧ Rn) 
. 
p(REPR1 ∧ · · · ∧ REPRn |¬(R1 ∧ · · · ∧ Rn)) 
First use Bayes’s theorem to obtain: 
p(REPR1 ∧ · · · ∧ REPRn |R1 ∧ · · · ∧ Rn) 
···∧REPRn)p(¬(R1 ∧ · · · ∧ Rn) | REPR1 ∧ · · · ∧ REPRn)
p(REPR1∧
p(¬(R1∧···∧Rn)) 
p (REPR1 ∧ · · · ∧ REPRn |R1 ∧ · · · ∧ Rn)p(¬(R1 ∧ · · · ∧ Rn)) 
= 
p(¬(R1 ∧ · · · ∧ Rn) | REPR1 ∧ · · · ∧ REPRn)p(REPR1 ∧ · · · ∧ REPRn) 
p (REPR1 |R1) · · ·p(REPRn |Rn)p(¬(R1 ∧ · · · ∧ Rn)) 
= 
p(¬(R1 ∧ · · · ∧ Rn) | REPR1 ∧ · · · ∧ REPRn)p(REPR1 ∧ · · · ∧ REPRn) 
pn(1 − a0) 
= ,
p(¬(R1 ∧ · · · ∧ Rn) | REPR1 ∧ · · · ∧ REPRn)p(REPR1 ∧ · · · ∧ REPRn)
where p is the true-positive rate of the witnesses (p =df p(REPRj |Rj), see also 
section 4.2) and where I have made use of the fact that p (REPR1 ∧ · · · ∧ REPRn | 
R1 ∧· · ·∧Rn) = p (REPR1 |R1) · · ·p (REPRn |Rn), which is proven by Bovens and 
Hartmann (2003a: 133). Also by Bayes’s theorem, we have: 
p(R1 ∧ · · · ∧ Rn | REPR1 ∧ · · · ∧ REPRn) 
p(REPR1 ∧ · · · ∧ REPRn |R1 ∧ · · · ∧ Rn)p(R1 ∧ · · · ∧ Rn) 
= 
p(REPR1 ∧ · · · ∧ REPRn) 
np a0 
= . 
p(REPR1 ∧ · · · ∧ REPRn) 
and thus, 
np a0
p(REPR1 ∧ · · · ∧ REPRn) = . 
p(R1 ∧ · · · ∧ Rn | REPR1 ∧ · · · ∧ REPRn) 
Filling this in in the expression above and using the negation rule gives: 
pn(1 − a0) 
p(¬(R1 ∧ · · · ∧ Rn) | REPR1 ∧ · · · ∧ REPRn)p(REPR1 ∧ · · · ∧ REPRn) 
(1 − a0)p(R1 ∧ · · · ∧ Rn | REPR1 ∧ · · · ∧ REPRn) 
= 
a0p(¬(R1 ∧ · · · ∧ Rn) | REPR1 ∧ · · · ∧ REPRn)
(1 − a0)p(R1 ∧ · · · ∧ Rn | REPR1 ∧ · · · ∧ REPRn)
= 
a0(1 − p(R1 ∧ · · · ∧ Rn | REPR1 ∧ · · · ∧ REPRn)) 
= ( ) . 
( )
= ∑
= ∑
= ∑ . 
= ∑ . 
 
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(1 − a0) 
1
a0 p(R1∧···∧Rn|REPR1∧···∧REPRn) − 1
Substituting p(R1 ∧ · · · ∧ Rn | REPR1 ∧ · · · ∧ REPRn) = ∑n (1−a0) ai(1−r)i gives i=1 
(1 − a0) 
1 
a0 p(R1∧···∧Rn|REPR1∧···∧REPRn) − 1 
(1 − a0) ( n 
ai(1−r)i 
)
i=1a0 − 1 a0 
(1 − a0) 
n 
ai(1 − r)i − a0i=0 
(1 − a0) 
n 
ai(1 − r)i i=1 
In case S is an equivalent set, this reduces to: 
bl 
(1 − a0) 1 
max(R1 ∧ · · · ∧ Rn) = = . (1 − a0)(1 − r)n (1 − r)n 
Combining the two gives: 
bl (R1 ∧ · · · ∧ Rn) 
cr
l (S) =df 
bl max(R1 ∧ · · · ∧ Rn) 
(1−a0) ∑n 
i=1 ai(1−r)
i 
= 
1 
(1−r)n 
(1 − a0)(1 − r)
n 
n 
ai(1 − r)i i=1 
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Appendix 4 C: Proof of Theorem 4.3 
Theorem 4.3 Any equivalent set S = {R1, . . . , Rn}with unconditional probabilities 
′ p(Ri) = α is more i-coherent than any nonequivalent set S with the same number 
of propositions and the same unconditional probabilities. 
Proof: Consider a set S = {R1, . . . , Rn} consisting only of equivalent proposi­
′ ′ ′ tions with probability p(Ri) = α. Next consider a second set S = {R1, . . . , Rn} 
with the same number of propositions, each of which has unconditional proba­
′ bility p(Ri ) = α, but in which at least one proposition or subset of propositions 
is not equivalent to all of the others. 
∗First, rewrite the expression for p (S): 
∗ a0 p (S) = ∑n 
i=1 ai(1 − r)
i 
a0 
= ∑n−1 
a0 + 1 ai(1 − r)
i + an(1 − r)n i=
1 
= 
1 + 
∑n−1 ai an . (1 − r)i + (1 − r)n i=1 a0 a0 
∑n−1 ′ Evidently, if set S is equivalent 1 ai(1− r)i = 0, and if set S is nonequivalent i=∑n−1 
i=1 ai
′ (1 − r)i > 0. Moreover, if the propositions in both sets have the same 
′ a′ ′ nmarginal probabilities, then a0 < a0 and an > an and therefore, a ′ > 
an . 
0 a0 
∗ ∗ ′ ′ ∗ ∗ ′ 
Next, note that since all propositions in both sets have the same uncondi­
tional probabilities, the posterior probabilities of the independent sets are equal: 
pind(S) = p ). Therefore fr 
i (S, S ) á 0 for all r iff p (S) − p (S ) > 0, or, ind(S 
1
alternatively, if p ∗
1 
(S) < ∗(S′) . As the following shows, this is indeed the case: p 
1 1 
−
∗ ′p (S) p ∗(S ) 
n n 
ai(1 − r)
i 
− 
∑
i=0 ai
′ (1 − r)i i=0 = ′ a0 a0  
n−1 ′ ′ an n = 1 + (1 − r)n −1 + ∑ a ′ i (1 − r)i + a ′ (1 − r)n aa0 i=1 0 a0 
′ n−1 ′ an an = (1 − r)n − ′ (1 − r)
n − 
∑ ai (1 − r)i ′ a0 a0 a i=1 0 ( )
n−1′ ′ an an = − (1 − r)n − 
∑ ai (1 − r)i ′ ′ a0 a0 a i=1 0 
< 0. 
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Since the above result holds for all r ∈ (0, 1), it follows that S is more i-coherent 
′ than S .  
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Chapter 5 
A Probabilistic Measure of 
Bootstrap Confirmation 
5.1 Introduction 
It is widely acknowledged that empirical testing crucially involves the use of aux­
iliary theories and is thus in an uncontroversial sense always relative to some the­
ory or theories. Nonetheless, in his Theory and Evidence Glymour has presented 
an important new confirmation theory according to which empirical theories can 
be confirmed in an absolute sense nonetheless. Glymour’s theory of bootstrap 
confirmation – as he called it – is a purely qualitative confirmation theory; it al­
lows us to say that the evidence confirms a given theory, but not that it confirms 
the theory to a certain degree. In the present chapter I will try to take some first 
steps toward extending Glymour’s theory into a quantitative account. 
This chapter is organized as follows. In section 5.2, Glymour’s theory of boot­
strap confirmation is briefly discussed and a qualitative but probabilistic defini­
tion of bootstrap confirmation is given. Next, section 5.3 will propose a number 
of desiderata for a quantitative measure of bootstrap confirmation and present 
a family of measures all of which satisfy the desiderata. In section 5.4, I will 
compare the different measures. Although it is clear that they behave strikingly 
different in a number of cases, I will not make an argument in favor of any of the 
measures for the simple reason that it seems intuitively unclear what would be 
the most satisfactory behavior for a measure of bootstrap confirmation in these 
cases. Next, section 5.5 will discuss a few objections that can be raised against the 
measures of bootstrap confirmation that the previous sections have proposed. 
As first sight it may seem that this chapter is of a very different nature than 
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the rest of this thesis. But although it is true that this chapter proposes a measure 
of confirmation instead of coherence, it will become clear that this measure bears 
some striking resemblances to the measures of coherence proposed above, espe­
cially to the class of measures of coherence as mutual support (see chapter 2). 
Indeed, as I will show in section 5.6, the measure of bootstrap confirmation pro­
posed in this chapter seems to be quite successful at explicating a notion of 
coherence that so far has not yet been given a formal explication, to wit, that of 
the coherence between a theory and the evidence. Although, as I will argue there, 
some alterations in the definition of the measure may seem appropriate if it is to 
be used for that purpose, it seems that the general framework discussed in this 
chapter goes at least some way toward explicating this notion of coherence. 
5.2 Glymour’s Qualitative Theory of Bootstrap Confir-
mation 
A confirmation theory is, roughly put, a theory that purports to specify, for any 
given evidence statement and any given hypothesis, whether or not the former 
supports the latter, or – in different terms that for present purposes can all be 
taken as equivalents – whether coming to know the evidence statement should 
increase our confidence in the hypothesis, whether the evidence adds to the justifi­
cational status of the hypothesis, whether it gives reason to believe the hypothesis. 
A confirmation theory may or may not also specify to what extent the evidence 
supports, or should affect our confidence in, a given hypothesis, how much it 
adds to the justificational status of a hypothesis, how much reason it gives to 
believe the hypothesis. If it does specify the extent of support, it is called a quan­
titative confirmation theory, if it does not, it is called a qualitative confirmation 
theory. 
All these formulations suggest that confirmation is a two-place relation, viz., 
a relation between a body of evidence and a hypothesis. And indeed this is what 
philosophers for a long time believed. However, as Duhem (1906/1954) was the 
first to argue, and as Quine (1953) famously repeated in his assault on the log­
ical empiricists’ reductionist semantics, confirmation is a three- rather than a 
two-place relation: evidence generally accrues to a hypothesis only relative to 
one or more auxiliary hypotheses. It is no exaggeration to say that today this is 
something of a commonplace among analytic philosophers.1 
1Subjective Bayesians may want to deny this. On their account, scientists are free – within 
the bounds of probability theory – in the probabilities they assign, and thus may also assign a 
probability to a hypothesis conditional upon the evidence alone (not conjoined to any auxiliaries, 
that is) that is greater than the unconditional probability assigned to the hypothesis (in which case 
the evidence confirms the hypothesis). However, the quantitative theory of bootstrap confirmation 
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Many have taken Duhem’s thesis to imply that all (dis)confirmation must be 
‘relative’ (dis)confirmation and it seems only one step further to argue for a rad­
ical holism according to which empirical claims face experience collectively, not 
individually. As is generally known, Quine has taken this idea to the extreme and 
argued that ‘any statement can be held true come what may, if we make drastic 
enough adjustments elsewhere in the system’ (Quine 1953: 43). Therefore, even 
the laws of logic and mathematics may be discarded, which, however, would be 
very inconvenient and therefore not be pragmatically justified (see, for instance, 
Ladyman 2002: 172). 
Glymour is very unhappy with such radically holistic conclusions. For him, 
the practice of the natural sciences does not warrant any extremely holistic con­
clusions at all: 
Taken literally, a radical holism makes it impossible to understand either 
the most elaborate or the most trivial of scientific arguments. What Ke­
pler, Galileo, Newton, Dalton, Maxwell, Perrin, Freud, Einstein, Eddington, 
whoever, were doing in much of their scientific writing – wherever they pur­
ported to relate particular pieces of evidence to particular pieces of theory – 
becomes an utter mystery. Whatever merit there may be in holism suitably 
qualified, to embrace a radical holism is only to confess that one does not 
know at all how science succeeds in doing what it plainly does. (Glymour 
1980a: 45) 
In his eyes, scientists very often relate a case of disconfirmation to a specific part 
of a theory and are often remarkably capable of altering precisely that part of 
the theory that seems to cause the trouble. Even when scientists acknowledge 
the fundamental role auxiliaries play in a certain test, they sometimes still draw 
the – according to Glymour – valid conclusion that a hypothesis is confirmed or 
disconfirmed by that test. 
In order to justify these ideas, Glymour tries to incorporate the claims by 
Duhem and Quine that confirmation is relative to auxiliaries while evading the 
radically holistic conclusions that many have believed follow from accepting 
these claims. More concretely, he argues that the indispensability of auxiliaries 
in the testing of single hypotheses is no impediment to absolute confirmation of 
complexes of such hypotheses or, as one may call them, theories. To make this 
general idea precise, Glymour presents a confirmation theory according to which 
the piecemeal confirmation of the individual hypotheses comprised by a given 
theory relative to other hypotheses comprised by the same theory may add up to 
an unrelativized confirmation of that theory as a whole. Whether it does depends 
to be developed below is neutral on the indispensability of auxiliaries in the sense that the measure 
of bootstrap support to be proposed also takes into account any support the evidence might give 
a hypothesis in isolation (in addition to the support the evidence may give the hypothesis relative 
to various auxiliaries). 
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on whether the separate tests of the various hypotheses could have turned out 
negative for these hypotheses. That is, only in cases where the auxiliaries do not 
shield the hypothesis from disconfirmation can true confirmation be achieved. 
Since its publication, it has become abundantly clear that Glymour’s theory 
of bootstrap confirmation as it is presented in Glymour (1980a and 1983) and in 
Earman and Glymour (1988) faces some important problems. Edidin (1983 and 
1988), van Fraassen (1983a), Horwich (1980) and Christensen (1983 and 1990) 
have all shown that the approach suffers from several serious defects. And 
although Glymour has successfully dealt with some of these challenges, many 
others remain.2 Owing to these problems many have concluded that Glymour’s 
theory is untenable and it seems no exaggeration to say that the theory has prac­
tically gone into oblivion (cf. Douven 2005b). 
Interestingly, almost all the criticisms of bootstrap confirmation have been 
directed against Glymour’s use of the Hempelian positive instance account of 
confirmation. Since Glymour has emphasized in his (1980a: 127) and again in his 
(1980b) that his account of bootstrap confirmation is independent of the specific 
theory of confirmation that one favors, it is surprising that virtually everybody 
working on the subject has taken the criticisms of Glymour’s Hempelian version 
of bootstrap confirmation to be indicative of a failure of bootstrap confirmation 
per se. One might have expected – especially due to the potential of bootstrap 
confirmation to overcome radical holism – the failures of Hempelian bootstrap 
confirmation to have encouraged others to pursue different accounts of bootstrap 
confirmation. However, it seems that no such attempts have been made. 
One of the reasons for this is undoubtedly that Glymour’s (1980a: 130–131) 
definition of bootstrap confirmation does not distinguish between his bootstrap 
intuitions and the account of confirmation used to cash out these intuitions. To 
see whether Glymour’s account can be salvaged after all, we therefore require 
a definition in which these two elements of Glymour’s account are separated 
more clearly than in Glymour’s original definition. As a definition of bootstrap 
confirmation that is independent of the account of confirmation that one favors, 
I propose the following:3 
2Noteworthy in this respect are Christensen’s examples of counterintuitive cases of confirmation 
condoned by Glymour’s theory of bootstrap confirmation. One of Glymour’s main reasons for 
rejecting both hypothetico-deductivism (H-D) andHempel’s (1965) account of instance confirmation 
is that they allow counterintuitive cases of confirmation like the proposition that the moon is 
made of green cheese confirming the proposition that salt dissolves in water (H-D) and a white 
shoe confirming the proposition that all ravens are black (Hempel’s account). But as Christensen 
(1983 and 1990) shows, there exist similar examples with respect to Glymour’s theory of bootstrap 
confirmation. For example, according to Glymour’s theory a black raven with wings bootstrap 
confirms the proposition that only gods can fly (Christensen 1990: 649). 
3A point about notation: in this chapter I use ‘T = {H1, . . . ,Hn}’ to mean that T has axioms 
H1, …, Hn, not that it has theorems H1, …, Hn. And a point about terminology: by ‘E confirms H 
with respect to T ’ (or ‘E confirms H relative to T ’) I will mean that E confirms H when the conjunction 
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Definition 5.1 Let T = {H1, . . . ,Hn}. Then evidence E bootstrap confirms T ex­
actly if T ∪ E ⊬ ⊥ and for each i ∈ {1, . . . , n} the following two conditions hold: 
′ ′ 1. there is a H ⊂ T such that Hi ∉ H and 
′ a. E confirms Hi with respect to H ; and 
′ ′ b. there is possible – but non-actual – evidence E such that E disconfirms 
′ Hi with respect to H ; 
′′ ′′ 2. there is no H ⊆ T such that E disconfirms Hi with respect to H . 
I have eight comments on this definition: 
(1) The reader should be warned that the definition reflects my understanding of 
Glymour’s theory, and that Glymour’s book leaves some room for interpretation.4 
Since my aim is not exegetical I will not argue for the correctness of this inter­
pretation of Glymour’s text. Moreover, it is arguable that even if definition 5.1 
should fail to capture what Glymour ‘really’ had in mind, it defines a notion of 
confirmation that is well worth considering in its own right. 
(2) The terms ‘confirms’ and ‘disconfirms’ in the clauses of the definition can, 
as already intimated, be cashed out in more than one way.5 For example, they 
can also be understood in hypothetico-deductive terms, or in probabilistic terms. 
Thus, this definition is no longer tied to the Hempelian account of confirmation, 
as is Glymour’s original definition. 
(3) Coupled with certain confirmation theories, in the face of subclause 1.a the 
second clause amounts to no more than the requirement that the theory at issue 
be consistent (and is thus redundant given the requirement that the theory be 
consistent with the evidence). Suppose for instance that the notions of confirma­
tion and disconfirmation are understood hypothetico-deductively. Without loss 
of generality, consider a theory consisting of three axioms, T = {H1,H2,H3}, and 
suppose that E confirms H1 with respect to H2, and thus that (a) {H1,H2} ⊢ E, 
but disconfirms H1 with respect to H3, and thus that (b) {H1,H3} ⊢ ¬E. Then 
T must be inconsistent. For it follows from (a) that {¬E} ⊢ ¬H1 ∨ ¬H2 and, 
similarly, it follows from (b) that {E} ⊢ ¬H1 ∨ ¬H3. And thus, by Construc­
tive Dilemma, {E ∨ ¬E} ⊢ (¬H1 ∨ ¬H2) ∨ (¬H1 ∨ ¬H3), or, put differently, 
′ of hypotheses in T is taken as an auxiliary. And similarly, by ‘E confirms H with respect to H with 
′ ′ H ⊂ T ’ I will mean that E confirms H when the conjunction of hypotheses in H is taken as an 
auxiliary. 
4Cf., e.g., Christensen (1997). Pondering various possibilities of how relative confirmation can 
provide ‘real’ confirmation, he conjectures that Glymour ‘[takes] certain complicated structures of 
interlocking relative confirmation to constitute real confirmation of a set of hypotheses’ (op. cit.: 
372). As may be clear, I think this conjecture is correct. Earman and Salmon (1992: 52ff) seem to 
interpret Glymour in the same way as I do. 
5Or better, the phrases ‘confirms with respect to’ and ‘disconfirms with respect to’; the exact 
understanding of ‘with respect to’ will depend on the interpretation of ‘confirms’/‘disconfirms’. 
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{E ∨ ¬E} ⊢ ¬H1 ∨ ¬H2 ∨ ¬H3. From which it follows that ⊢ ¬(H1 ∧ H2 ∧ H3), 
i.e., ⊢ ¬T . However, it will be immediately clear that according to the common 
probabilistic understanding of confirmation and disconfirmation, if some T and E 
satisfy clause 1 but not clause 2, that does not entail that T is inconsistent. So if 
the definition is to be neutral as regards theories of non-bootstrap confirmation, 
then the second clause cannot be dispensed with. 
(4) Glymour originally allowed bootstrap testing in which evidence could confirm 
a hypothesis relative to itself – what later came to be called ‘macho-bootstrapping’. 
However, under the pressure of criticism from, among others, Christensen (1983), 
Edidin (1983) and van Fraassen (1983a) he later restricted the auxiliaries admis­
sible in a test to hypotheses other than the one under scrutiny in that test (the 
so-called ‘wimp-bootstrapping,’ see Earman and Glymour (1988: 261)), as does 
clause 1 by requiring that the hypothesis under scrutiny not be in the set of hy­
potheses from which the auxiliaries in that hypothesis’s test are taken. (Notice 
that a similar restriction in clause 2 would be superfluous. If a hypothesis is 
disconfirmed by the evidence, then this seems to be no less – but rather more – 
damaging to that hypothesis, and hence also to any theory that includes it, when 
the hypothesis served itself as an auxiliary in that test, than when only other 
hypotheses did.) 
(5) Bootstrap confirmation as presented here is defined for finitely axiomatizable 
theories only. It is not theoretically impossible to generalize definition 5.1 to 
the infinite case, but it is hard to see how bootstrap confirmation of such theo­
ries could practically be achieved. Thus, in what follows, by ‘theory’ I will mean 
finitely axiomatizable theories.6 
6 Though Glymour does not note this, one must also assume that theories are naturally axiom­
atized (in some sense of ‘natural’) lest the notion of bootstrap confirmation become relative to a 
given axiomatization. To see this, just consider that since every finitely axiomatizable theory is ax­
iomatizable by just one axiom – given any finite axiomatization, take the conjunction of the axioms 
– and since, given that I have excluded macho-bootstrapping, a theory with only one axiom cannot 
be bootstrap-tested, without some notion of a natural axiomatization it may be possible to claim 
of one and the same theory both that it is and that it is not bootstrap confirmed by the evidence. 
With that notion, we can stipulate that a theory is bootstrap confirmed by the evidence if its nat­
ural axiomatization is bootstrap confirmed by the evidence. It seems that the notion of a natural 
axiomatization has been around in the logical literature for some time. However, only recently an 
attempt has been made to explicate it; see Gemes (1993) (also his (1994), (1997); Schurz’s (1991) 
theory of relevant deduction can also be thought of as such an attempt). I do not want to commit 
myself to Gemes’s or any other explication. For one, according to Gemes’s (1983: 483) definition, a 
theory will usually be naturally axiomatized by only one axiom, which would not be helpful for the 
question at hand. Only in a footnote (Gemes 1983: 483n3) an additional condition is suggested, 
according to which this no longer would be the case. 
For present purposes the intuitive notion of a natural axiomatization seems clear enough. Every 
theory to be presented by its axioms in this chapter, both in the examples and in the proofs of the 
theorems, is assumed to be naturally axiomatized in this intuitive sense. 
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(6) As in a bootstrap test of a theory T all the tests of the individual axioms of T 
rely on auxiliaries that also come from T , it might seem a questionable feature of 
this account that, provided both clauses of definition 5.1 are satisfied, it allows 
us to conclude that the evidence confirms the theory, period, and not just that 
it confirms the theory with respect to itself (a conclusion – note – that would 
be barely significant unless one is already willing to accept the theory). More 
than questionable, in fact: a common response of those who first learn about 
bootstrap testing is to exclaim that the procedure is patently circular. After all – 
it is said – the very theory the truth of which is at stake in the test is presupposed 
in that test in the sense that it is allowed to supply the auxiliaries needed in 
the tests of the separate hypotheses comprised by the theory. At first sight, the 
situation may indeed seem analogous to one in which we (correctly) derive some 
proposition A using A itself as a premise and then present that as a proof of A 
(instead of just as a proof of A → A, or of {A} ⊢ A). But it is not. Consider: 
if bootstrap testing were really circular, then how could any theory consistent 
with the evidence ever fail to be bootstrap confirmed? But if the ‘non-triviality 
subclause’ 1.b is satisfied, such a theory can fail to be bootstrap confirmed. For 
what the subclause ensures is that adopting certain hypotheses as auxiliaries in 
testing some other hypothesis does not guard the latter against disconfirmation 
whatever the data. This, I believe, is as straightforward a way as any to see the 
non-circularity of bootstrap testing.7 
(7) Definition 5.1 defines bootstrap confirmation. What about bootstrap discon­
firmation? Glymour does not say, and it seems this notion can be defined in more 
than one plausible way. Like Glymour I will mainly concern myself with bootstrap 
confirmation. Nevertheless, it will prove useful later on to have a definition of 
bootstrap disconfirmation at hand. As such I propose this: 
Definition 5.2 Evidence E bootstrap disconfirms theory T = {H1, . . . ,Hn} precisely 
′ if for at least one i ∈ {1, . . . , n} there is a H ⊆ T such that E disconfirms Hi with 
′ respect to H . 
(8) My final comment has a heuristic intent. It may be helpful to think of defini­
tion 5.1 as indicating some sort of coherence of the axioms of a theory both with 
one another and with the evidence. In chapter 1, I indicated that intuitively co­
herence is a matter of how well the various propositions involved hang together 
and, secondly, that coherence comes in degrees. Clearly, a positive bootstrap test 
by evidence E of a theory T = {H1, . . . ,Hn} is an indication of the hypotheses in 
7One may insist that the mere fact that a theory is (in a sense) presupposed in its own test is 
sufficient to make the procedure circular. Of course one may define circularity in any way one likes, 
but the crucial issue is whether the fact that a theory supplies auxiliaries for testing its own axioms 
is vicious. And I can only challenge anyone who holds that it is to point out why that is so. 
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T and E hanging together in a very clear sense: the hypotheses help each other 
to obtain support from the evidence. Of course the definition cannot quite be 
a definition of coherence, for it does not allow for coherence to be a matter of 
degree. The quantitative theory of bootstrap confirmation to be developed in 
this chapter does make graded judgements possible and I will come back to the 
relationship between the measure of bootstrap confirmation proposed below and 
our general coherence intuitions in section 5.6. 
This concludes my discussion of definition 5.1. As the second point above 
indicates, the definition is independent of any specific account of non-bootstrap 
confirmation. Nonetheless, in order to assess the merits of Glymour’s theory of 
bootstrap confirmation, we do need to combine it with such an account. Given 
the strong criticisms of Glymour’s original definition, Hempel’s positive instance 
account does not appear to be a viable option. Moreover, if we accept the claim 
that a quantitative account of bootstrap confirmation is more preferable than 
a merely qualitative account, then the most obvious option is to combine def­
inition 5.1 with the Bayesian theory of confirmation.8 To that effect we must 
reinterpret each of the conditions in definition 5.1 within a Bayesian framework. 
I will consider each in turn: 
′ (1) The first part of the first condition requires that there is a H ⊂ T such that 
′ ′ Hi ∉ H and E confirms Hi with respect to H according to some confirmation 
′ condition. Naively, it may appear that this condition is satisfied if p(H |H ∧E) > 
p(H). But although in that case the probability of the hypothesis is certainly 
raised, this may have nothing to do with the evidence since it could also be due 
′ to the auxiliary hypotheses H . Therefore, a better interpretation of this condition 
′ ′ is that p(H |H ∧ E) > p(H |H ). 
This leads to the following definition:9 
Definition 5.3 Evidence E probabilistically bootstrap confirms hypothesis H rela­
′ ′ ′ tive to a complex of auxiliaries H exactly if p(H |H ∧ E) > p(H |H ). 
For future reference, let me also define the notion of probabilistic bootstrap dis­
confirmation of a hypothesis: 
8By choosing a Bayesian approach I simply follow the mainstream in current analytic philoso­
phy. However, it is noteworthy – as an anonymous referee reminded Igor Douven and me – that 
there exist other quantitative approaches to confirmation besides Bayesianism, such as Shafer’s 
(1976) Dempster–Shafer belief functions, Zadeh’s (1978) possibility measures, and Spohn’s (1988) 
ranking functions (see Halpern (2003: Ch. 2) for an excellent overview of the different approaches 
to represent uncertainty). 
9As will become clear below, the use of the concept of bootstrap confirmation is different in the 
case of the evidence probabilistically bootstrap confirming a hypothesis relative to the auxiliaries 
than in the case of the evidence probabilistically bootstrap confirming a theory. I am confident that 
this will not lead to confusion. 
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Definition 5.4 Evidence E probabilistically bootstrap disconfirms hypothesis H rel­
′ ′ ′ ative to a complex of auxiliaries H exactly if p(H |H ∧ E) < p(H |H ). 
(2) The second part of the first condition reads that there should be possible – 
′ ′ ′ but non-actual – evidence E such that E disconfirms Hi with respect to H . This 
′ ′ ′ would translate as the requirement that there is an E such that p(H |H ∧ E ) < 
′ p(H |H ). However, this need not be listed separately for it follows directly from 
′ ′ definitions 5.3 and 5.4. For if p(H |H ∧ E) > p(H |H ), then there is possible 
′ ′ ′ ′ evidence E such that p(H |H ∧ E ) < p(H |H ), that is, if E bootstrap confirms 
′ Hi relative to H , then there is possible evidence disconfirming H relative to the 
same auxiliary or auxiliaries as that or those relative to which E confirms it. After 
all, by the law of total probability, we have that 
′ ′ ′ ′ ′ p(H |H ) = p(H |H ∧ E)p(E |H ) + p(H |H ∧¬E)p(¬E |H ). (5.1) 
′ ′ ′ Thus, since p(E |H ) = 1 − p(¬E |H ), the probability p(H |H ) is a mixture of 
′ ′ ′ ′ p(H |H ∧ E) and p(H |H ∧¬E).10 And so if p(H |H ∧ E) > p(H |H ), it must be 
′ ′ that p(H |H ∧¬E) < p(H |H ). 
′′ (3) The last condition of definition 5.1 was that there is no H ⊆ T such that E 
′′ disconfirms Hi with respect to H . Using definition 5.4, this condition translates 
′′ ′′ ′′ into the condition that there is no H ⊆ T such that p(Hi |H ∧ E) < p(Hi |H ). 
Summing up these conditions yields the following definition for probabilistic 
bootstrap confirmation:11,12 
Definition 5.5 Evidence E probabilistically bootstrap confirms a theory T = 
{H1, . . . , Hn} precisely if p(T ∧ E) > 0 and for each i ∈ {1, . . . , n} it holds that 
′ ′ ′ ′ 1. there is a H ⊂ T such that Hi ∉ H and p(Hi |H ∧ E) > p(Hi |H ); and 
′ ′10Here it may be helpful to note that if p(H | H ∧ E) > p(H | H ), it must hold that both 0 < 
′ ′ ′ ′ p(H ∧ E) < 1 and p(H ∧ E) ≠ p(H ), and hence also that 0 < p(E |H ) < 1. 
11 According to Duhem, Quine, and others, confirmation generally is three-place. Since I know 
of no air-tight argument showing that confirmation is necessarily three-place, it seems best to 
at least formally leave open the possibility that evidence confirms a hypothesis relative to the 
empty set, i.e., without the aid of any auxiliaries. Strictly speaking, the clauses of definition 5.5 
make no sense in case the subsets of T they refer to are empty. It should be obvious, however, 
′ ′ that in that case ‘p(Hi | H ∧ E) > p(Hi | H )’ is to be read as p(Hi | E) > p(Hi); similarly for 
′′ ′′ ‘p(Hi |H ∧ E) < p(Hi |H )’ in the second clause. 
12As an anonymous referee brought to the attention of Igor Douven and me, it is insufficient 
to require that T ∪ {E} ⊬ ⊥ (as is done in definition 5.1, and as we did in definition 5.5 in an 
earlier version of the (2005b) paper) given that T may be consistent with E and yet it may hold that 
p(T ∧E) = 0 (unless one assumes all probability functions to be strict, which I don’t); and of course 
one would not want to say that a theory can be confirmed in any sense by evidence conditional on 
which it has probability 0. 
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′′ ′′ ′′ 2. there is no H ⊆ T such that p(Hi |H ∧ E) < p(Hi |H ). 
For probabilistic bootstrap disconfirmation, I propose the following definition:13 
Definition 5.6 Evidence E probabilistically bootstrap disconfirms theory T = 
′ {H1, . . . , Hn} iff for at least one i ∈ {1, . . . , n} there is a H ⊆ T such that 
′ ′ p(Hi |H ∧ E) < p(Hi |H ). 
This concludes my discussion of Glymour’s theory of bootstrap confirmation. 
The next section will propose a measure of confirmation that is based on the 
definition of probabilistic bootstrap confirmation. 
Unless stated otherwise, from now on I will understand ‘bootstrap confir­
mation’ and ‘bootstrap disconfirmation’ as ‘probabilistic bootstrap confirmation’ 
and ‘probabilistic bootstrap disconfirmation.’ 
5.3 A Class of Measures of Bootstrap Confirmation 
Before I can begin to formulate a measure of bootstrap confirmation, I should 
start by considering what the desiderata for such a measure are. That is, I must 
make clear which relations between the hypotheses in the theory and the eviden­
tial statements matter intuitively for the measure in which the evidence bootstrap 
confirms a theory. I suggest that the following four desiderata are quite sensible 
(although there may be others): 
Firstly, if the hypotheses a theory T consists of are all bootstrap confirmed 
(according to definition 5.3) to a higher degree than those belonging to another 
′ theory T , then, all else being equal, the first theory should have a higher degree 
of bootstrap confirmation. 
The second desideratum is inspired by an argument Glymour (1980a: 139– 
142) presents against Bayesianism. According to him, Bayesianism cannot ex­
press the value of variety of evidence. For Glymour (1980a: 140) ‘[w]hat makes 
one way of testing relevantly different from another is that the hypotheses used 
in one computation are different from the hypotheses used in the other computa­
tion.’ I am not sure whether this is the best description of variety of evidence, let 
alone that it is the only possible one, but as a general desideratum it seems quite 
sensible. As a second desideratum, therefore, I would propose that given two 
′ theories, T and T , if T is tested with respect to a greater variety of (complexes 
13Again, I only give this definition for later purposes. Specifically, I am not arguing that it mirrors 
best our intuitions with respect to bootstrap disconfirmation. I simply need this definition in the 
construction of some of the theorems concerning the measure of bootstrap confirmation to be 
proposed later in this chapter. For heuristical purposes, I have labeled it probabilistic bootstrap 
disconfirmation. 
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′ of) auxiliaries than T , then, all else being equal, E should bootstrap confirm T to 
′ a greater extent than it bootstrap confirms T . 
Thirdly, a measure of bootstrap confirmation should increase if a larger num­
ber of propositions are bootstrap confirmed by the evidence and some auxiliaries. 
Lastly, it seems that the measure should allow for degrees in which hypothe­
ses are shielded from disconfirmation by other hypotheses. For while this shield­
ing from disconfirmation in Glymour’s approach can only be of the yes-or-no 
type, this is no longer so in a probabilistic setting. Instead, it seems that a mea­
sure of bootstrap confirmation should reflect the degree to which hypotheses are 
shielded by the auxiliaries. 
It can be readily appreciated that we can satisfy the desiderata by summing 
over the degree of confirmation all hypotheses receive from the evidence relative 
to all possible combinations of available auxiliaries. Therefore, the measure we 
are after has the form of a double summation, first over all the possible sets of 
auxiliaries with respect to which a hypothesis may be confirmed and then over 
the total bootstrap confirmation each of the hypotheses receives from all sets of 
auxiliaries and the evidence. 
Evidently, for this to be feasible, we need a measure for the degree to which 
a hypothesis Hi is confirmed by any of the subsets of T \ {Hi} and the evidence. 
Therefore, we need to adapt the Bayesian measures of confirmation so as to make 
them capable of measuring the confirmation of a hypothesis by the evidence rel­
ative to some auxiliaries. In this chapter I will limit my attention to the following 
four measures of confirmation: 
- the difference measure d: d(H,E) =df p(H |E)− p(H); 
- the log-ratio measure r : r(H, E) =df log [p(H |E)/p(H)]; 
- Carnap’s relevance measure c: c(H, E) =df p(H ∧ E)− p(H)p(E). 
- the log-likelihood measure l: l(H, E) =df log [p(E |H)/p(E |¬H)]; 
Interestingly, it seems that not all of these measures can be satisfactorily adapted 
to measuring bootstrap confirmation. For if a measure is to measure the degree 
to which evidence E bootstrap confirms H relative to a complex of auxiliaries 
′ H , it seems such a measure should equal 0 (or at least have a neutral value) 
if the hypothesis is independent of the evidence and the auxiliaries and that it 
should be larger than zero (or larger than the neutral value) if the hypothesis 
is bootstrap confirmed by the evidence relative to the auxiliaries and negative 
(smaller than the neutral value) if the hypothesis is bootstrap disconfirmed by the 
evidence relative to the auxiliaries. By definition 5.3, a hypothesis is bootstrap 
confirmed by the evidence relative to some auxiliary hypotheses if and only if 
′ ′ p(H |H ∧E) > p(H |H ). The difference measure, the ratio measure and Carnap’s 
relevance measure can all be readily adapted to satisfy this demand. Here are 
three proposals to that effect: 
〈 〉
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′ ′ ′ - d(H; H , E) =df p(H |H ∧ E)− p(H |H ); 
′ ′ ′ - r(H; H , E) =df log [p(H |H ∧ E)/p(H |H )]; 
′ ′ ′ ′ - c(H; H , E) =df p(H ∧H ∧ E)− p(H |H )p(H ∧ E). 
The following theorem shows that each of these three measures satisfies the 
above requirement (for a proof, see Appendix 5 A): 
′ Theorem 5.1 For any hypothesis H, evidence E and complex of auxiliaries H , it 
′ ′ ′ holds that d(H; H , E), r(H; H , E) and c(H; H , E) are zero when H is independent 
′ of E and H and positive (negative) if H is bootstrap confirmed (disconfirmed) by 
′ E with respect to H . 
But this is not the case for the most plausible adaptation of the log-likelihood 
measure: 
′ ′ ′ - l (H; H , E) =df log [p(H ∧ E |H)/p(H ∧ E |¬H)]; 
It can easily be checked that if a hypothesis is independent of the auxiliaries and 
′ the evidence, l (H; H , E) = 0. But to satisfy the above requirement, it should 
′ also be the case that if H is bootstrap confirmed by E relative to H , the value 
′ of l (H; H , E) is positive. However, as the following theorem shows, this is not 
always the case (for a proof, see Appendix 5 A): 
′ Theorem 5.2 Given a hypothesis H, evidence E and complex of auxiliaries H it is 
′ not always the case that l (H; H , E) > 0 if H is bootstrap confirmed by E relative 
′ to H . 
On account of this result, I will focus on the other three measures adapted to 
bootstrapping, which I will call the bootstrap difference measure, the bootstrap 
ratio measure and the bootstrap relevance measure. With the help of these it 
is relatively straightforward to define a measure of bootstrap confirmation. Let 
‘{Ti}’ denote the class of all finitely axiomatizable, deductively closed theories 
that can be formulated in a given language and ‘{Ej}’ the class of sentences of 
that language apt to report evidence (which I will assume to be coextensive with 
the class of all sentences). This leads to an expression of the measure I am after as 
a function B(T , E): {Ti} × {Ej} ֏ R. Next, let ‘{m}’ denote one of the measures 
of confirmation adapted to bootstrapping which can then be expressed as the 
′ function m(H;H , E): {Hi} × {Ej}֏ R, with ‘{Hi}’ the class of all hypotheses. 
Now let T = {H1, . . . , Hn}. Disallowing macho-bootstrapping, there are for 
each Hi ∈ T exactly 2
n−1 sets of auxiliary hypotheses also in T with respect to 
which it can be tested, namely, all the elements of the power set of T minus Hi , 
that is, ℘(T \ {Hi}). Given some ordering H
T , . . . , Hi
T 
2n−1 
of ℘(T \ {Hi}), let ‘Hi
T
j 
’ i1 
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denote the jth member of that ordering. Then the following defines a family of 
three measures of bootstrap confirmation: 
Definition 5.7 If a theory T = {H1, . . . ,Hn} is bootstrap confirmed by evidence E 
according to definition 5.5, then the measure in which E bootstrap confirms T is 
given by: 
n 2n−1 ∑ ∑ ( )
Bm (T , E) =df m Hi ; H
T 
ij
, E , (5.2) 
i=1 j=1 
for m ∈ {d, r, c}. 
I have three remarks on the definition of the measure of bootstrap confirmation: 
(1) I have explicitly demanded that T be bootstrap confirmed to avoid the rather 
awkward consequence that a theory can be bootstrap disconfirmed in the qualita­
tive sense of definition 5.6, while being bootstrap confirmed to a positive degree 
(that this is possible is shown by theorem 5.5 below). Alternatively, I could also 
simply resist making the connection between a positive value for any of the Bm 
and the evidence bootstrap confirming a theory. However, it will appear below 
that in that case the problem of independent hypotheses to be discussed in sec­
tion 5.5 becomes much more serious. 
(2) Although I have given a definition of bootstrap disconfirmation, I will not give 
a measure of it. This is primarily because it is not directly clear what such a 
measure would look like and how it could be distinguished from a measure of 
bootstrap confirmation. Explicating bootstrap disconfirmation would be one of 
the projects this chapter invites. 
(3) I have not included any weighing factors in definition 5.7. One reason for this 
is that from the desiderata above it follows that Bm should not be defined as a 
straight average of the different values of m ∈ {d, r, c}, for in that case the second 
desideratum would no longer be satisfied since it would no longer hold generally 
that if a hypothesis is bootstrap confirmed with respect to a larger number of 
auxiliaries, then the total value of bootstrap confirmation increases (for one way 
in which this may arise is by adding additional axioms to a theory, and it is easy to 
see that in that case the degree of bootstrap confirmation defined as the straight 
average of the different values of m ∈ {d, r, c}may decrease). Nevertheless, it may 
turn out to be necessary to add some other weighing factors later on. 
To get a feel for definition 5.7, it may be helpful to see an actual application of 
it. Consider the following example in which the bootstrap support the evidence 
supplies to a theory consisting of four hypotheses is calculated: 
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Example 5.1 Theory T consists of axioms H1, H2, H3, and H4. Each of these hy­
potheses has a prior probability of .25, and they are mutually probabilistically 
independent. Evidence E has a prior probability of .5. Further, the following con­
ditions hold:14 
• p(E ∧Hi) = .125, for all i ∈ {1, . . . ,4}; 
• p(E ∧Hi ∧Hj) = .05, for all i, j ∈ {1, . . . ,4} such that i ≠ j ; 
• p(E ∧Hi ∧Hj ∧Hk) = .015, for all i, j, k ∈ {1, . . . , 4} such that i ≠ j ≠ k; 
• p(E ∧H1 ∧ · · · ∧H4) = .0038. 
To calculate the measure of support E provides to T , first choose a specific measure 
one will use. I will use the bootstrap difference measure d. In that case, for all 
i ∈ {1, . . . , 4} it holds that 
• d(Hi, E) = 
p(Hi∧E) − p(Hi) = .125/.5 − .25 = 0;p(E) 
• for all j ∈ {1, . . . , 4} such that i ≠ j : 
p(Hi ∧Hj ∧ E) p(Hi ∧Hj) .05 .0625 
d(Hi ;Hj, E) = − = − = .15; 
p(Hj ∧ E) p(Hj) .125 .25 
• for all j, k ∈ {1, . . . ,4} such that i ≠ j ≠ k: 
p(Hi ∧Hj ∧Hk ∧ E) p(Hi ∧Hj ∧Hk)
d(Hi ;Hj ∧Hk, E) = −
p(Hj ∧Hk ∧ E) p(Hj ∧Hk) 
.015 .015625 
= − = .05; 
.05 .0625 
• for all j, k, l ∈ {1, . . . ,4} such that i ≠ j ≠ k ≠ l: 
p(Hi ∧Hj ∧Hk ∧Hl ∧ E) 
d(Hi ;Hj ∧Hk ∧Hl, E) = 
p(Hj ∧Hk ∧Hl ∧ E) 
p(Hi ∧Hj ∧Hk ∧Hl)
−
p(Hj ∧Hk ∧Hl) 
.0038 .00390625 
= − ≈ .003. 
.015 .015625 
14Here and in the rest of this chapter, probability functions will be specified without a proof that 
they are probability functions. It is nowadays easy to check that they are, however, by means of the 
function InequalityInstance of Mathematica (versions 4.1 and higher); see Fitelson (2001a: 93–100) 
for an explanation of how to do this. Alternatively, one may use the PrSAT package for Mathematica 
(version 5), which can be downloaded from http://www.fitelson.org. 
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Since for each Hi there is exactly one way in which it can be tested relative to 
no auxiliary hypotheses, three different ways in which it can be tested relative to 
one auxiliary hypothesis, three different ways in which it can be tested relative 
to two auxiliary hypotheses, and one way in which it can be tested relative to 
three auxiliary hypotheses, the total bootstrap support each of the Hi individually 
receives from E equals (approximately): (1)(0)+ (3)(.15)+ (3)(.05)+ (1)(.003) = 
.603. Since the bootstrap support T receives is just the sum of the bootstrap support 
each of its axioms receives, Bd(T , E) ≈ (4)(.603) = 2.412, with Bd the value of 
Bm (T , E), when calculated by using the bootstrap difference measure. 	 
As a conclusion to this section, let me present a number of theorems concerning 
the relation between the measures of coherence Bm (m ∈ {d, r, c}) and defini­
tions 5.5 and 5.6 (for the proofs, see Appendix 5 A). 
Theorem 5.3 For all T and E, if E bootstrap confirms T , then Bm (T , E) > 0 for all 
m ∈ {d, r, c}. 
Theorem 5.4 For all T and E and for all m ∈ {d, r, c}, if Bm (T , E) < 0, then E 
bootstrap disconfirms T . 
The next two theorems show that the converses of the above two theorems do 
not hold. 
Theorem 5.5 There is no a ∈ R and no m ∈ {d, r, c} such that, for all T and E, if 
Bm (T , E) > a, then E bootstrap confirms T . 
Theorem 5.6 There is no a ∈ R and no m ∈ {d, r, c} such that, for all T and E, if 
E bootstrap disconfirms T , then Bm (T , E) < a. 
Finally, the following theorem considers the relation between two different theo­
ries: 
′ ′ ′ Theorem 5.7 For all T , T , and E, if T ⊂ T and E does not bootstrap disconfirm T , 
′ then Bm (T , E) á Bm (T , E) for all m ∈ {d, r, c}; if in addition E bootstrap confirms 
′ ′ T , then Bm (T , E) > Bm (T , E) for all m ∈ {d, r, c}. 
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Each of the above theorems applies to all members of the family of measures 
of bootstrap confirmation. Nonetheless, it should not be concluded from this 
that the measures of bootstrap confirmation do not differ significantly. As the 
next section will show, there are some important differences between the three 
measures, although it will remain unclear which is the most satisfactory one. 
5.4 Comparing the Different Measures 
The similarities between the measures of bootstrap confirmation defined above 
and those of coherence as mutual support presented in chapter 2 are obvious. 
Both are measures of mutual support, both consider a number of confirmation 
relations between different parts of a theory and/or the evidence, and both define 
a family of different measures, each of which is based on an adaptation of a 
popular Bayesian measure of confirmation. In chapter 2, I argued that we have 
good intuitive grounds for preferringmeasure Cd over the other two measures. In 
this section, I will not make a similar claim. Instead, I will discuss a few important 
differences between the three measures of bootstrap confirmation and leave the 
answer to the question of which measure has the most satisfactory consequences 
to the reader. The reason for this is that I am not sure what conclusions to draw 
from the differences discussed in this section. 
5.4.1 Threshold Values 
Note that theorem 5.5 only indicates that there is no general numerical threshold 
value for qualitative bootstrap confirmation in the sense that, for any T and E, if 
one knows that Bm (T , E) for a given m ∈ {d, r, c} has a value above that threshold, 
one can immediately infer that E bootstrap confirms T . This leaves open the 
possibility that with every particular theory T some value a can be associated 
such that, if Bm (T , E) > a for some E and m ∈ {d, r, c}, then E bootstrap confirms 
T . The following theorems will show that this possibility holds for both the 
bootstrap difference measure and the bootstrap relevance measure, but not for 
the bootstrap ratio measure. For the first two, something stronger even holds. 
For in those cases there is a threshold that depends only on the number of axioms 
in the theory (for a proof, see Appendix 5 B): 
Theorem 5.8 For all n ∈ N, T , and E, if T = {H1, . . . ,Hn} andBm (T , E) á n2
n−1− 
1 for m ∈ {d, c}, then E bootstrap confirms T . 
However, the same does not hold for the bootstrap ratio measure (for a proof, 
see Appendix 5 B): 
[ ( ) ]
√
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Theorem 5.9 For all n ∈ N, T , and E, if T = {H1, . . . , Hn}, Br (T , E) can be arbi­
trarily large while E still bootstrap disconfirms T . 
5.4.2 A Second Difference Between the Three Bootstrap Measures 
of Confirmation 
The last subsection only showed that Bd and Bc differ from Br , not that Bd and Bc 
differ from each other. However, Bd and Bc, too, have some strikingly different 
consequences. For consider the following example: 
Example 5.2 Theory T has as axioms hypotheses H1, H2, and H3, each of which 
has a prior probability of .1; E has a prior probability of .5. Also the following 
hold: 
• p(Hi ∧Hj) = .015 for all i, j ∈ {1,2,3} such that i ≠ j ; 
• p(H1 ∧H2 ∧H3) = .005; 
• p(E ∧Hi) = .05 for all i ∈ {1,2,3}; 
• p(E ∧Hi ∧Hj) = x for all i, j ∈ {1,2,3} such that i ≠ j and x a variable; 
• p(E ∧H1 ∧H2 ∧H3) = a with a a positive constant; 
• for no Hi (i ∈ {1,2,3}) does E bootstrap disconfirm Hi relative to any subset 
of T ; therefore, and because x à p(Hi ∧ Hj) (i, j ∈ {1,2,3}, i ≠ j) and 
a à p(H1 ∧H2 ∧H3), it holds that .0075 à x à .015 and .333x à a à .005. 
15 
Using the bootstrap difference measure yields the following expression for Bd(T , E): 
x .015 a .005 
Bd(T , E) = 3 2 − + − 
.05 .1 x .015 
3a 
= 120x + − 1.9. 
x 
Evaluation of this function shows that it reaches its minimum at 
a 
x0 = . (5.3) 
40 
For this model, it turns out that one can choose values for a such that x0 > .0075 
(the lower bound on x). Given such values, and given that x0 is a minimum, 
Bd(T , E) will first decrease until it reaches x0, and only then increase – see, e.g., 
the graph in figure 5.1, which gives the value of Bd(T , E) as a function of x for 
a = .005. This means that, all else being equal, raising the probability of a hy­
′ pothesis conditional on the evidence and some T ⊂ T will sometimes have the 
effect of lowering the value of Bd(T , E). 	 
15If x < .0075, then d(Hi,Hj ∧ E) < 0 (for all i, j ∈ {1,2,3}, i ≠ j). Likewise, if a < .333x, then 
d(Hi ;Hj ∧Hk, E) < 0 (for all i, j, k ∈ {1,2,3}, i ≠ j ≠ k). 
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Figure 5.1: Value of Bd(T , E) as a function of x : .0075 à x à .015 
As the following two examples show, the above result does not hold for either 
the bootstrap ratio measure or the bootstrap relevance measure. 
Example 5.3 Take everything equal to example (5.2). But now measure the degree 
of bootstrap confirmation by means of Br(T , E) instead of Bd(T , E). Expressed as 
a function of x, the former becomes: ( [
.1 x 
] [
.015 a 
])
Br (T , E) = 3 2 log 
.015 .05 
+ log 
.005 x 
(5.4) ( [
400x 
] [
3a 
])
= 3 2 log 
3 
+ log 
x 
. (5.5) 
The derivative of this expression is given by: 
dBr (T , E) 3 
= . (5.6) 
dr x 
For all x > 0, this derivative is positive and, therefore, Br (T , E) increases as x 
increases. 	 
Example 5.4 Take everything equal to example (5.2). But now use Bc(T , E) to 
measure the degree of bootstrap confirmation, which is given by: 
Bc(T , E) = 3(2x − .015)+ 3(a − .333x) 
= 5x + 3a − .045. 
It is plain that, for any fixed value of a, this function increases linearly with x. 
This result can even be generalized. For it is easily seen that for any n ∈ N, 
if T = {H1, . . . , Hn}, then for any m: 1 à m à n, if Hij ∈ T for all j : 1 à j à m, 
Bc(T , E) is a linearly increasing function of p(E ∧Hi1 ∧ · · · ∧Him), all else being 
equal. 	 
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5.4.3 Choosing Between the Measures 
Clearly, the three measures of bootstrap confirmation have some notably differ­
ent consequences. Nonetheless, I do not feel that either of the two consequences 
provides a definite point in favor of one (or more) of these measures. Firstly, 
with respect to the first point, it seems that it does provide a point in favor of 
∗a measure of bootstrap confirmation m if there is a threshold value for Bm ∗ 
above which one can be sure that a theory is bootstrap confirmed. However, the 
threshold value for Bd(T , E) á n 2
n−1 − 1 seems so high that its usefulness is 
limited. 
With respect to the example in which the value of p(E∧Hi ∧Hj)was increased 
while p(E ∧ H1 ∧ H2 ∧ H3) and p(Hi ∧ Hj) were kept constant, it is unclear to 
me whether any of the Bm (m ∈ {d, r, c}) should be a monotonically increasing 
function of p(E∧Hi ∧Hj). For one, it is an elementary consequence of probability 
theory that 
p(E ∧Hi ∧Hj) = p(E ∧Hi ∧Hj ∧Hk)+ p(E ∧Hi ∧Hj ∧¬Hk), (5.7) 
and therefore, keeping p(E∧H1∧H2∧H3) constant while increasing p(E∧Hi∧Hj) 
will have the effect of increasing p(E ∧H1 ∧H2 ∧ ¬H3), which – one may feel – 
should cause a reduction in the degree of bootstrap confirmation. This would 
not directly explain the minimum in the graph of Bd, but it may indicate that one 
should not necessarily expect the graph to increase monotonically. 
Therefore, pending any intuitively clearer examples, it seems that there is no 
reason for preferring one of the three measures of bootstrap confirmation over 
the others. 
5.5 Anticipated Objections 
In this section I will consider a number of objections that can be raised against 
the theory of probabilistic bootstrap confirmation in general and the measures 
of the degree of probabilistic bootstrap confirmation in particular. 
5.5.1 Edidin’s and Horwich’s Arguments Against Bootstrapping 
To many it may appear strange that nobody has yet attempted to provide a 
Bayesian analysis of Glymour’s theory of bootstrap confirmation, especially be­
cause Glymour (1980b) explicitly lists it as one of the projects that his theory of 
bootstrap confirmation invites. Part of the reason for this must surely be that 
Glymour’s (1980a) presented a number of important problems for Bayesianism 
– like, for instance, the problem of old evidence (see Glymour 1980a: 85–93), the 
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solving of which to many Bayesians may have seemed much more pressing than 
explicating probabilistic bootstrap confirmation. But another plausible reason is 
that many Bayesian philosophers seemed to believe that bootstrapping did not 
need a special Bayesian analysis since it follows directly from Bayesian confirma­
tion theory. For instance, Roger Rosenkrantz (1983: 69) has argued that Glymour 
‘is a Bayesian [and] more so than many who march under that banner.’ And Aron 
Edidin has argued that after a number of necessary corrections to Glymour’s de­
finition of bootstrap confirmation (which need not concern us here) 
[w]hat was advanced as an alternative to the Bayesian theory turns out to 
be derivable from the theory. The principal advantage Glymour claims for 
his strategy is that it explains how evidence selectively confirms some hy­
potheses but not others. He argues that Bayesian theorists cannot do the 
same without recourse to ad hoc restrictions on prior probabilities. But if 
I’m right about the need to modify the strategy as I suggest, and about its 
subsequent derivability from the Bayesian theory, then it may be that the 
principal benefit of the strategy is that it shows how Bayesians can explain 
the selective relevance of evidence without ad hoc restrictions. (Edidin 1983: 
53–54) 
If the arguments by Rosenkrantz and Edidin are correct, it may be the case that 
my theory of bootstrap confirmation, too, can be derived from standard Bayesian 
confirmation theory. To evaluate this question, let evidence E probabilistically 
confirm theory T if p(T | E) > p(T) and let E probabilistically disconfirm T if 
p(T |E) < p(T). The next two theorems show that there is at least some relation 
between probabilistic confirmation and bootstrap confirmation (the proofs are 
given in Appendix 5 C). 
Theorem 5.10 For all T and E, if E bootstrap confirms T , then E also probabilis­
tically confirms T . 
Theorem 5.11 For all T and E, if E probabilistically disconfirms T , then E also 
bootstrap disconfirms T . 
That is, if a theory is bootstrap confirmed by the evidence it is also probabilisti­
cally confirmed by it and if it is probabilistically disconfirmed by the evidence it 
is also bootstrap disconfirmed by it. However, it cannot be the case that my mea­
sure of bootstrap confirmation is derivable from a Bayesian measure of support, 
for the next two theorems show that neither theorem 5.10 nor theorem 5.11 can 
be strengthened to a bi-implication (the proofs are given in Appendix 5 C). 
{ }
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Theorem 5.12 It is not the case that, for all T and E, if E probabilistically confirms 
T , then E also bootstrap confirms T . 
Theorem 5.13 It is not the case that, for all T and E, if E bootstrap disconfirms T , 
then E also probabilistically disconfirms T . 
Alternatively, it may also be the case that my measure of bootstrap confirma­
tion coincides with one of the above measures of confirmation or indeed with any 
of the other known measures of confirmation (see note 10 in chapter 2). Also, it 
may be that the degree of bootstrap support provided by some piece of evidence 
to a theory is just the degree of confirmation of the theory by the evidence given 
some of those measures of confirmation modulo some scale transformation. This 
is not the case, however. Note that each of the known measures of confirmation 
makes the degree of confirmation a theory T receives from evidence E a function 
of some subset of p(T), p(E), p(T |E), p(T | ¬E), p(E |T), p(E | ¬T) . Call any 
measure, whether or not actually proposed, that is a function of any such subset 
a non-bootstrap measure of confirmation. Then we have the following theorem 
(see Appendix 5 C for a proof): 
Theorem 5.14 For all m ∈ {d, r, c} there is no function f such that, for all T and E, 
Bm (T , E) = f ◦m(T, E), with m any non-bootstrap measure of confirmation. 
Therefore, there is no simple relation between bootstrap confirmation (qualitative 
or quantitative) and Bayesian confirmation theory. 
5.5.2 The Problem of Independent Hypotheses 
It may seem that generally adding a hypothesis to a theory that is independent of 
that theory should not increase its degree of confirmation. However, adding an 
independent hypothesis can increase a theory’s degree of bootstrap confirmation. 
For consider the following example: 
Example 5.5 Take everything equal to example (5.1). But now add a fifth hypoth­
esis, H5, such that it is independent of theory T = {H1, H2,H3, H4} and such that, 
furthermore, it is not bootstrap confirmed by the evidence relative to any non­
empty subset of T . Suppose also that the evidence bootstrap confirms H5 relative 
′ ′ to the empty set. In that case p(H5 | H ∧ E) = p(H5 | E) for all H ⊂ T . Also, 
′ ′ p(H5 |H ) = p(H5) for all H ⊂ T . Now assume furthermore that p(H5) = .25 
and that p(H5 ∧ E) = .15. In that case, the level of bootstrap support for the new 
′ theory T = {H1, . . . , H5} as measured with the bootstrap difference measure is 
approximately Bd(T , E) ≈ 5.624 – much higher than it was in the original case. 	 
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The result can even be generalized, for from the proof of theorem 5.5 it follows 
directly that adding an independent hypothesis to a theory will always increase 
the value of Bm for all m ∈ {d, r, c} and therefore, if a hypothesis is confirmed by 
the evidence and if a theory is bootstrap confirmed by the evidence, adding that 
hypothesis to the theory will always increase the theory’s degree of bootstrap 
confirmation. To many this may seem quite counterintuitive: if a hypothesis is 
independent of a theory, then how could it increase its degree of confirmation 
(bootstrap or otherwise)? Nonetheless, there are a few possible replies. 
Firstly, the hypothesis is still confirmed by the evidence. If this condition is 
not satisfied, then a theory’s degree of bootstrap confirmation cannot increase, 
since the theory is no longer bootstrap confirmed according to definition 5.1. But 
since in the above example H5 is confirmed by the evidence, it is no longer clear 
′ that the bootstrap confirmation of T = {H1,H2,H3,H4,H5} should not be larger 
than that of T = {H1,H2,H3,H4}. Instead, it seems to be a natural consequence 
of the desideratum that the degree of bootstrap confirmation should increase if a 
larger number of propositions are bootstrap confirmed by the evidence and some 
auxiliaries (the third desideratum; see section 5.3). 
Also, if we take seriously the remark above (in section 5.2) that bootstrap con­
firmation can be seen as indicating some sort of coherence between the axioms 
of a theory and the evidence, then it seems quite natural that the degree of boot­
strap confirmation should increase. For clearly, hypothesis H5 hangs together 
with the evidence – it is confirmed by it – and at least does not undermine any 
of the other axioms of the theory. Therefore, there seems to be little reason why 
the coherence between the two should not increase. 
5.5.3 Van Fraassen’s Critique of Bootstrap Confirmation 
What is the connection between bootstrap support and justified belief? Let me 
consider a puzzle raised in van Fraassen (1983b) which seems to show that qual­
itative bootstrap confirmation of some theory does not give reason to believe 
that theory. As will be seen, the quantitative theory of bootstrap confirmation 
presented above may give rise to basically the same puzzle. 
Consider a simple, comparative definition of justification in terms of boot­
strap confirmation: 
′ (B1) If E bootstrap confirms T but not T , then, if E is our total evidence, belief 
′ in T is more justified than belief in T . 
′ (B2) If E bootstrap confirms T to a higher degree than T , then, if E is our total 
′ evidence, belief in T is more justified than belief in T . 
Though appealingly simple, this appears to conflict with the following principle: 
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′ ′ (P) If p(T |E) > p(T |E), then, if E is our total evidence, belief in T cannot be 
more justified than belief in T , 
a principle that van Fraassen (1983b) presents as a truism. 
Van Fraassen’s argument that (B1) and (P) conflict goes roughly as follows: 
suppose T = {H1,H2,H3} is bootstrap confirmed by E (according to definition 5.5). 
Suppose in particular that E confirms H1 relative to H2 (and perhaps also relative 
to H3 and to H2 ∧H3), E confirms H2 relative to H3 (and perhaps also relative to 
H1 ∧H3, but not relative to H1), and E confirms H3 relative to H1 (and perhaps 
′ also relative to H1 ∧H2). Now the subset T ⊂ T , containing only H1 and H2, is 
not bootstrap confirmed by E (for E does not confirm H2 relative to H1). Without 
loss of generality, assume that {H1,H2, E} ⊬ H3. Then it is an elementary truth 
′ of probability theory that p(T |E) > p(T |E). So, according to (B1) we are more 
′ justified in believing T than in believing T , but according to (P) we are not. 
It must be immediately clear that although (B1) always conflicts with (P), this 
does not hold for (B2). In quantitative bootstrapping there are various ways 
in which a theory can become more bootstrap confirmed. Many of these will 
simply raise the probability of the theory given the evidence, and in such cases 
(B2) and (P) are in perfect accordance with each other. This said, it is not hard to 
see that in other cases (B2) and (P) will still conflict. 
′ For example, consider a subset T of T of example 5.1, consisting of hypothe­
ses H1, H2, H3. This theory has a probability of .03 given evidence E, which clearly 
exceeds that of T given E (= .0076). However, it is bootstrap-supported by E to a 
′ much lower degree than T , namely B(T , E) = 1.05 (while B(T , E) ≈ 2.412). Thus, 
′ according to (B2) we are more justified in believing T than in believing T , but 
according to (P) we are not. Hence, degree of bootstrap confirmation and proba­
bility may pull in opposite directions; they cannot always be jointly maximized. 
But then how can bootstrap confirmation be related to justification? 
Van Fraassen’s conclusion is that it cannot. This is not to say that van Fraassen 
believes a positive bootstrap test is insignificant. Quite the contrary – he believes 
it gives reason to accept a theory, where the notion of acceptance is considerably 
weaker than that of belief (van Fraassen 1983a and 1983b). More specifically, 
acceptance of a theory involves the belief that it is empirically adequate (roughly, 
true of the observable part of the world) as well as a commitment to use the the-
ory’s conceptual apparatus in describing future phenomena (van Fraassen 1980: 
Ch. 1). Should his view on bootstrap testing be correct, then that hardly detracts 
from the importance of having a quantitative account of bootstrap confirmation: 
surely it makes sense to say that one bootstrap test provides stronger reason 
to accept a given theory than another bootstrap test, and it seems that only a 
quantitative bootstrap theory is capable of capturing that intuition. However, 
van Fraassen’s conclusion may not be inescapable. 
Plausible though it may appear, principle (P) has been denied by, among oth­
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ers, Levi (1967), Kaplan (1981a, 1981b), Lehrer (1990), and Maher (1993), who 
have argued that, loosely, justification has the structure of a decision-making 
problem. In such a problem, one heeds not only the probabilities of the possible 
outcomes of a certain decision, but also their utilities. More exactly, in deci­
sion making one chooses the option that has the greatest expected utility of the 
available alternatives, where an option’s expected utility is just the sum of the 
utilities of its various possible outcomes weighted by the probabilities of those 
outcomes.16 According to the aforementioned authors, there is nothing in the 
way decision theory is set up that would prevent applying it to matters epistemo­
logical; we can perfectly well assign cognitive or epistemic utilities to the ‘acts’ 
of accepting, rejecting, and suspending judgement on particular hypotheses or 
theories under particular circumstances, and then apply the decision-theoretic 
apparatus to these acts in the normal manner in order to determine what the 
agent is justified to do. So, on this approach to justification, a person may well 
be more justified in believing one theory than he is in believing a second even if 
the former is less likely to him than the latter, because, given his probabilities 
and utilities, the former may well have a greater expected cognitive utility than 
the latter.17 
Now the notion of utility is anything but crystal-clear.18 The notion of cogni­
tive utility appears even more problematic. We are told that the cognitive utility 
of accepting some hypothesis depends on the informativeness of that hypothesis 
(cf., e.g., Lehrer 1990, Maher 1993). But the notion of informativeness itself is still 
very much in need of clarification. Maher thinks this notion is to be cashed out 
in terms of verisimilitude. However, given that there is still widespread disagree­
ment over the nature of verisimilitude (cf., e.g., Niiniluoto 1998), this suggestion 
16See Jeffrey (1983) for a lucid presentation of the theory’s basic machinery; also Resnik (1987). 
17It would take me too far afield here to discuss van Fraassen’s reasons for rejecting this view on 
justification. For criticisms of these reasons, see, e.g., Kukla (1998), Douven (1999, 2002, 2005c), 
Niiniluoto (1999), and Psillos (1999). 
18As, e.g., Gillies (2000) and Howson (2000) and (2003) have argued (whether a defense of 
Bayesianism that does not appeal to utilities is possible, as Howson claims, is doubtful, however; 
cf. Douven (2003)). For one, it is entirely unclear whether an agent’s risk-averseness should be re­
flected in his utility function; cf. Weirich (1986 and 2001), Rabin (2000), and Hacking (2001: 100 f) 
for discussion. As a further indication of the unclarity, see the divergent interpretations of utility 
proposed in, for instance, Hansson (1988), Hampton (1994), and Dreier (1996). Some believe that 
utilities are just theoretical posits that do not stand in need of any interpretation (this view seems 
to underlie Ramsey’s (1926) and Savage’s (1954) work in decision theory and is still not uncommon, 
as Rabin (2000) reminds us). But aside from the difficulties generally related to instrumentalist in­
terpretations of theoretical terms, on an instrumentalist reading decision theory, and hence also 
cognitive decision theory, can only be used as an explanatory device and not as a guide to decision 
making (see, e.g., Satz and Ferejohn 1994). So, in particular, cognitive decision theory could on that 
reading not inform us about when it is rational for us to believe a particular hypothesis or theory; 
at most it could be used post factum to explain why someone preferred to accept one rather than 
another hypothesis or theory. 
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seems rather unhelpful.19 One way in which my quantitative bootstrap account 
could be positively related to justification is by replacing, in cognitive decision 
theory, the ill-defined notion of cognitive utility by the clearly defined notion of 
degree of bootstrap support. In order to determine the justificational status of a 
hypothesis or theory we would thus have to weigh not probability and utility but 
probability and degree of bootstrap support against one another. This is only a 
rough proposal that can be filled out in quite diverse ways. I will not explore the 
possibilities here. My aim in this section merely was to point out that there may 
still be a positive role for degree of bootstrap confirmation even though a higher 
degree of bootstrap support does not generally indicate a higher probability.20 
5.6 Bm as Measures of the Coherence Between a Theory 
and the Evidence 
The bootstrap measures of confirmation presented in this chapter bear some 
close resemblances to the measures Cm presented in chapter 2. Both explicate an 
intuitive concept (either that of coherence as mutual support or that of bootstrap 
confirmation) in terms of the mutual support relations between the different ele­
ments of the set or theory, and both measure support by means of an adaptation 
of some of the more popular Bayesian measures of support. However, as the last 
of the eight remarks in section 5.2 already suggested, it seems that the analogy 
can go further than that. 
In the introductory chapter I briefly discussed Bonjour’s challenge to founda­
tionalists that they, too, require a theory of coherence. Recall that according to 
the foundationalist there are foundational beliefs that do not require any further 
justification; they are, so to speak, ‘self-justifying’. Coherentists deny that there 
are beliefs that have such a special status. Instead they believe that all of our 
19See Goosens (1976) for a more systematic critique of the concept of cognitive utility. 
20A way in which bootstrap confirmation could play a role in determining the justificational status 
of a theory that respects principle (P) is to assign a justificatory role to bootstrap support only after 
probabilistic considerations have been taken account of. This is, for instance, what the following 
principle does: 
′ ′ ′ (P*) If (i) p(T |E) > p(T |E) or (ii) p(T |E) = p(T |E) and E bootstrap confirms T but not T or 
′ ′ ′ (iii) p(T |E) = p(T |E) and E bootstrap confirms both T and T but Bm ∗ (T , E) > Bm ∗ (T , E) 
∗for one’s preferred measure of bootstrap confirmation m , then we are more justified in 
′ believing T than we are in believing T . 
Again another response to the puzzle would be to claim that justification is to be evaluated at 
the level of single hypotheses and not at the level of theories. It is perfectly compatible with one 
theory as a whole being more probable than another theory as a whole that the probability of any 
of the axioms of the latter exceeds the probability of each of the axioms of the former. This would 
be much along the lines of Merricks’s (1995) response to Klein and Warfield’s (1994) claim that 
coherence is not generally truth conducive. 
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beliefs are justified only relative to other beliefs, the justificational status of any 
specific belief then being determined by how well it coheres with our other be-
liefs. Clearly, for such a theory to be successful we require a theory of coherence. 
As may be recalled from my discussion in chapter 4, I believe that the difference 
function presented there goes at least some way toward providing such a theory. 
However, according to Bonjour, foundationalists, too, require a theory of co­
herence: 
[T]he concept of coherence … is also an indispensable ingredient in virtu­
ally all foundationalist theories; coherence must seemingly be invoked to 
account for the relation between the basic or foundational beliefs and other 
nonfoundational or ‘superstructure’ beliefs, in virtue of which the latter are 
justified in relation to the former. (Bonjour 1999: 124) 
According to Bonjour (1999: 140n), ‘strictly deductive or even enumerative induc­
tive inference from the foundationalist beliefs does not suffice to justify most of 
the superstructure beliefs that the foundationalist typically wants to claim to be 
justified.’ Without some recourse to the concept of coherence the foundationalist 
cannot justify the superstructure beliefs by reference to the foundational beliefs. 
As Douven (2005b) remarks, it seems likely that the notion of coherence that co­
herentists need to employ is different from the one required for foundationalism 
to succeed: 
the foundationalist concept of coherence must pertain to a relation that 
holds between a body of nonbasic beliefs… and a body of basic beliefs… That 
is, foundationalist coherence involves beliefs that do not, at least not initially, 
all have the same justificational status. For the coherentist, who denies that 
there is any kind of justification short of that provided by relations of co­
herence, coherence obtains or fails to obtain between beliefs that have, or at 
least may all have, the same justificational status. (Douven 2005b) 
In his (2005b), Douven presents a theory of the coherence between the foun­
dational (or evidential, in his terminology) and nonfoundational (or theoretical) 
beliefs, based on the measure of bootstrap confirmation Bd. Let me adopt the 
latter terminology. 
In chapter 2 I remarked that we have two general intuitions with respect to 
coherence, viz., that it is a matter of how well the various propositions involved 
hang together and that it is a matter of degree. It seems clear that all three 
measures of bootstrap confirmation respect both of these intuitions. As noted 
above, the qualitative definition of bootstrap confirmation (definition 5.1) can 
be interpreted as indicating the coherence of the axioms of a theory with each 
other and the evidence. Moreover, now that I have defined a class of measures of 
bootstrap confirmation, the second intuitive desideratum is satisfied also. 
This suggests that we can interpret the measures Bm (m ∈ {d, r, c}) as mea­
sures of the coherence between a theory and the evidence. Such a strategy would 
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throw an interesting new light on some of the issues raised in this chapter. For 
example, if we follow the same reasoning as we did in chapter 2 then we can 
answer affirmatively the question of whether to add any weighing factors to the 
definition of Bm : here, too, we could argue for a straight average as being the most 
plausible option. And if we would alter the definition in that way, the problem 
of independent propositions would no longer arise, for in that case it is easy to 
check that adding an independent proposition to a theory with a positive degree 
of bootstrap confirmation will always decrease the value of Bm for all m ∈ {d, r, c}. 
Seen from the perspective of the coherence between a theory and the evidence, 
the problem raised by van Fraassen acquires a new meaning also. For from that 
point of view, the question bears close resemblance to the discussion concerning 
the truth conduciveness of coherence. If my arguments in chapter 1 are correct, 
then the fact that the coherence between a theory and the evidence cannot be a 
truth conducive property per se does not affect the value of a measure of this 
type of coherence in any way. 
5.7 Conclusion 
This chapter has presented my proposal for an expression of bootstrap confir­
mation, which I have based on a few simple intuitive desiderata. One of the large 
projects still left open is to formulate other (possibly stricter) desiderata and 
see in what ways these would affect the different Bm (m ∈ {d, r, c}). It would be 
interesting to see how robust the various theorems in this chapter are if alterna­
tive desiderata lead to different versions of Bm or require us to adapt different 
measures of confirmation to measuring bootstrap confirmation. Moreover, other 
desiderata may help us to decide which of the measures of confirmation adapted 
to bootstrap confirmation is the most satisfactory. For whereas the different con­
sequences discussed in section 5.4 do not seem to point one way or the other, 
it seems not unreasonable to suppose that other desiderata may be capable of 
singling out one of the three as the most satisfactory measure of bootstrap con­
firmation. 
In contrast to the foregoing chapters, this chapter has not presented a mea­
sure of coherence but a measure of confirmation. However, in the last section I 
have described how an interpretation of the measure of bootstrap confirmation 
as a measure of the coherence between a theory and the evidence can be given 
shape. Moreover, it seems clear that such an interpretation will at least answer 
the problems noted in section 5.5. One of the problems that it will not solve, how­
ever, is the problem of different axiomatizations of a theory: in general different 
axiomatizations of a theory will have a different degree of bootstrap confirma­
tion as measured by Bm (m ∈ {d, r, c}). This problem will be taken up in the next 
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Appendix 5 A: Proofs of the Theorems 5.1–5.7 
′ Theorem 5.1 For any hypothesis H, evidence E and complex of auxiliaries H , it 
′ ′ ′ holds that d(H; H , E), r(H; H , E) and c(H; H , E) are zero when H is independent 
′ of E and H and positive (negative) if H is bootstrap confirmed (disconfirmed) by 
′ E with respect to H . 
Proof : The part of the theorem about independence is clear enough. Next con­
sider the case of (dis)confirmation for the adaptations of the difference measure 
and the log-ratio measure. First recognize that, by definition 5.3, if H is boot­
′ ′ ′ ′ strap confirmed by E relative to H , then p(H |H ∧E) > p(H |H ) and d(H; H , E) 
′ and r(H; H , E) are both larger than zero. By definition 5.4, if H is bootstrap 
′ ′ ′ ′ disconfirmed by E relative to H , then p(H |H ∧ E) < p(H |H ) and d(H; H , E) 
′ and r(H; H , E) are both smaller than zero. 
Next consider the adaptation of Carnap’s relevance measure c. First note that 
′ 
′ p(H ∧ H ∧ E) p(H |H ∧ E) = 
′p(H ∧ E) 
Suppose the hypothesis is bootstrap confirmed by the evidence relative to the 
auxiliaries. Then: 
′ ′ p(H |H ∧ E)− p(H |H ) > 0 
′ p(H ∧ H ∧ E) ′ ⇔ 
′
− p(H |H ) > 0 
p(H ∧ E) 
′ ′ ′ ⇔ p(H ∧ H ∧ E)− p(H |H )p(H ∧ E) > 0 
⇔ c > 0 
The case for disconfirmation follows directly from replacing ‘>’ by ‘<’. 
′ Theorem 5.2 Given a hypothesis H, evidence E and complex of auxiliaries H it is 
′ not always the case that l (H; H , E) > 0 if H is bootstrap confirmed by E relative 
′ to H . 
Proof : By the following probability model: 
′ ′ H H E probability H H E probability 
T T T 7/512
T T F 3/64
T F T 1/4
T F F 1/32
F T T 15/128 
F T F 1/2 
F F T 0 
F F F 21/512 
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′ It can easily be checked that in this case p(H | E ∧ H ) ≈ .105 > .0893 ≈ p(H | 
′ ′ H ) and therefore, that H is bootstrap confirmed by E relative to H . But also, 
′ ′ ′ p(E ∧H |H) = .04 < .178 ≈ p(E ∧H |¬H) and thus l (H; H , E) < 0. 
Theorem 5.3 For all T and E, if E bootstrap confirms T , then Bm (T , E) > 0 for all 
m ∈ {d, r, c}. 
Proof : Let T = {H1, . . . , Hn} and assume that E bootstrap confirms T . It follows 
from definition 5.5 and theorem 5.1 that, for all Hi ∈ T and all Hi
T
j 
∈ ℘(T \ {Hi}), 
m(Hi ; Hi
T
j
, E) á 0. Further, it also follows that for all Hi ∈ T there is at least one 
Hi
T
j 
∈ ℘(T \ {Hi}) such that m(Hi ; H
T , E) > 0 for all m ∈ {d, r, c}. Since Bm just ij 
adds up the bootstrap support each hypothesis receives relative to each set of 
possible auxiliaries as measured by m ∈ {d, r, c}, it follows that Bm (T , E) > 0 for 
all m ∈ {d, r, c}. 
Theorem 5.4 For all T and E and for all m ∈ {d, r, c}, if Bm (T , E) < 0, then E 
bootstrap disconfirms T . 
Proof : Let T = {H1, . . . , Hn}. IfBm (T , E) < 0, then, by definition 5.7, there must be 
at least one Hi ∈ T such that, for at least one Hi
T
j 
∈ ℘(T \{Hi}): m(Hi ; H
T , E) < 0. ij 
From definition 5.6 and theorem 5.1, it follows that in that case E bootstrap 
disconfirms T . 
Theorem 5.5 There is no a ∈ R and no m ∈ {d, r, c} such that, for all T and E, if 
Bm (T , E) > a, then E bootstrap confirms T . 
Proof : Toward a reductio, suppose that, for all T , E, if Bm (T , E) > c for some 
particular c ∈ R and one particular m ∈ {d, r, c}, then E bootstrap confirms T . 
′ ′ ′ Then let T = {H1, . . . , Hn} and furthermore let it be the case that Bm (T , E ) > c 
′ ′′ for some E and some m ∈ {d, r, c}. Now let T = {H1, . . . , Hn, Hn+1}with Hn+1 any 
′ hypothesis that is probabilistically independent of any subset of {H1, . . . , Hn, E } 
(one can, without loss of generality, assume that such an Hn+1 exist). Thus in 
particular the following facts hold: 
′ ′ ′ ′ ′ (i) p(Hi |Hi
T
j 
∧Hn+1) = p(Hi |H
T ) for all Hi ∈ T and all Hi
T
j 
∈ ℘(T \ {Hi});ij 
′ ′ ′ ′ ′ ′ (ii) p(Hi | Hi
T
j 
∧ Hn+1 ∧ E ) = p(Hi | H
T ∧ E ) for all Hi ∈ T and all Hi
T
j 
∈ij 
′ ℘(T \ {Hi}); 
′ ′ ′ ′ (iii) p(E ∧Hi
T
j 
∧Hn+1) = p(E ∧H
T )p(Hn+1);ij 
′ ′ ′ ′ (iv) p(E ∧Hi
T
j 
∧Hn+1 ∧Hi) = p(E ∧H
T ∧Hi)p(Hn+1);ij 
( ) ( )∑ ∑ ∑ ∑
∑ ( )
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′′ ′′ ′′ ′ ′′ (v) p(Hn+1 |H
T ∧ E ) = p(Hn+1 |H
T ) = p(Hn+1) for all H
T ∈ ℘(T \n+1k n+1k n+1k 
{Hn+1}). 
′′ ′ Dividing into three parts the sum that gives the value of Bm (T , E ) (see defini­
tion 5.7), yields 
n 2n−1 
Bm (T 
′′ , E ′ ) = 
∑ ∑
m 
(
Hi ; H
T ′ 
ij 
, E ′ 
)
+ 
i=1 j=1 
n 2n−1 2n ∑ ∑
m 
(
Hi ; H
T ′ 
ij 
∧ Hn+1, E 
′ 
)
+ 
∑
m 
(
Hn+1; H
T ′′ 
n+1k
, E ′ 
)
. (5.8) 
i=1 j=1 k=1 
′ 
Given (i) and (ii), we have, for all i such that 1 à i à n and all Hi
T
j 
such that 
′ ′ ′ ′ ′ 1 à j à 2n−1, that p(Hi | H
T ∧ E ) − p(Hi | Hi
T
j
) = p(Hi | H
T ∧ Hn+1 ∧ E ) −ij ij 
′ ′ ′ p(Hi |H
T ∧ Hn+1), and thus also that d(Hi ; Hij , E ) = d(Hi ; Hij ∧ Hn+1, E ) and ij 
′ ′ r(Hi ; Hij , E ) = r(Hi ; Hij ∧ Hn+1, E ). 
′ In similar fashion it follows from (i), (iii), and (iv) that c(Hi ;Hij , E ) = c(Hi ;Hij ∧ 
′ Hn+1, E )p(Hn+1). 
From this it follows that the first two summands in 5.8 are proportional to 
each other: 
 
n 2n−1 n 2n−1
′ ′′ ′ m Hi ; HiTj , E = α m Hi ; HiTj ∧ Hn+1, E , (5.9) 
i=1 j=1 i=1 j=1 
where α equals either 1 (for the first two measures) or p(Hn+1) (for the bootstrap 
relevance measure), and therefore α á 0. 
Furthermore, from (v) together with theorem 5.1 it can be immediately seen 
to follow that 
2n 
′′ ′ m Hn+1; H
T , E = 0. (5.10) n+1k
k=1 
′ ′ Since the first of the summands in 5.8 equals Bm (T , E ) for all m ∈ {d, r, c}, it 
′′ ′ ′ ′ follows from 5.9 and 5.10 that Bm (T , E ) = (1+α)Bm (T , E ) for all m ∈ {d, r, c}. 
′ ′ Since, furthermore, by supposition Bm (T , E ) > c, it must be the case that 
′′ ′ ′ ′′ Bm (T , E ) > c. Thus, E bootstrap confirms T . However, it follows from equa­
′ tion (5.10) that clause 1 of definition 5.5 is not satisfied, so that E does not 
′′ bootstrap confirm T . Hence, the assumption that there is a numerical thresh­
old for bootstrap confirmation leads to contradiction. Hence, there is no such 
numerical threshold. 
∑ ∑ ( )
∑ ∑ ∑ ∑( ) ( )
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Theorem 5.6 There is no a ∈ R and no m ∈ {d, r, c} such that, for all T and E, if 
E bootstrap disconfirms T , then Bm (T , E) < a. 
Proof : First, if E bootstrap disconfirms T , then that does not exclude that 
Bm (T , E) > 0 for any m ∈ {d, r, c}. To see this, consider a slightly changed version 
of the model given in example (5.1). Let in that model p(E ∧Hi ∧Hj ∧Hk) = .01 
(instead of .015), for all i, j ∈ {1, . . . ,4} such that i ≠ j . Then E bootstrap dis­
confirms T (for E disconfirms every Hi ∈ T relative to the conjunction of every 
Hj,Hk ∈ T such that i ≠ j ≠ k: p(Hi |Hj ∧Hk ∧ E) = .01/.05 = .2 < .25 = p(Hi | 
Hj ∧Hk)). Still, as an easy calculation shows, Bd(T , E) = 1.72, Br (T , E) ≈ 4.6372 
and Bc(T , E) = 2.002 and thus all Bm (T , E) > 0 are positive. Second, in the proof 
of theorem 5.5 it turned out that if one adds a hypothesis H to any theory T that 
is probabilistically independent of that theory together with the evidence E (in the 
′ ′ precise sense specified in that proof), then Bd(T , E) > Bd(T , E) for T = T ∪{H} 
and for p(H) > 0. So let then T be bootstrap disconfirmed by E and such that 
Bm (T , E) > c > 0 for all m ∈ {d, r, c}. Adding a probabilistically independent 
′ hypothesis to T will result in a theory T that is also bootstrap disconfirmed by E 
′ but for which Bm (T , E) > Bm (T , E) for all m ∈ {d, r, c}. Since this procedure can 
be repeated as often as one likes, there can be no a ∈ R such that Bm (T , E) á a 
indicates that T is not bootstrap disconfirmed by E. 
′ ′ ′ Theorem 5.7 For all T , T , and E, if T ⊂ T and E does not bootstrap disconfirm T , 
′ then Bm (T , E) á Bm (T , E) for all m ∈ {d, r, c}; if in addition E bootstrap confirms 
′ ′ T , then Bm (T , E) > Bm (T , E) for all m ∈ {d, r, c}. 
′ Proof : Let T = {H1, . . . , Hn}. Without loss of generality, assume that T = 
{H1, . . . , Hm} (m < n). From definition 5.7 it follows that for all m ∈ {d, r, c} 
n 2n−1 
′ 
Bm (T 
′ , E) = m Hi ; H
T 
ij 
, E 
i=1 j=1 
m 2n−1 n 2n−1 
= 
∑ ∑
m 
(
Hi ; H
T ′ 
ij 
, E 
)
+ 
∑ ∑
m 
(
Hk; H
T ′ 
kl 
, E 
)
. 
i=1 j=1 k=m+1 l=1 
′ Now note that, if E does not bootstrap disconfirm T , it must hold for all Hi ∈ T 
′ ′ ′ and all Hi
T
j 
∈ ℘(T \ {Hi}) that m(Hi ; H
T , E) á 0. Thus, for all m ∈ {d, r, c}ij 
2m−1m m 2n−1 
′ 
Bm (T , E) = m Hi ; Hi
T
j
, E à m Hi ; Hi
T
j
, E . 
i=1 j=1 i=1 j=1 
∑ ∑ ( )
∑ ∑ ( )
∑ ∑
145 5.7. CONCLUSION 
′ ∑n ∑2n−1 
Hence, if k=m+1 l=1 m(Hk; Hk
T
l
, E) á 0, the following must hold for all m ∈ 
{d, r, c}: 
n 2n−1 
′ ′ Bm (T , E) = m Hi ; Hi
T
j
, E á
i=1 j=1
2m−1m 
m Hi ; Hi
T
j
, E = Bm (T , E). (5.11) 
i=1 j=1 
′ But it is easy to see that the condition is satisfied. For since T is not bootstrap 
′ ′ disconfirmed by E, it must be the case for all Hi ∈ T − T that for all Hi
T
j 
∈ 
′ ′ ℘(T \ {Hi}), we have m(Hi ; Hi
T
j 
, E) á 0 (in virtue of theorem 5.1). If E bootstrap 
′ ′ ′ confirms T , then it must also be the case that for at least one Hi
T
j 
∈ ℘(T \ {Hi}), 
′ 
we have m(Hi ; Hi
T
j 
, E) > 0 (by definition 5.5 and theorem 5.1) so that 
n 2n−1 
′ 
m(Hk; H
T , E) > 0,kl 
k=m+1 l=1 
whence it follows that in equation (5.11) the ‘á’ can be replaced by a ‘>’. 
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Appendix 5 B: Proofs of the Theorems 5.8 and 5.9 
Theorem 5.8 For all n ∈ N, T , and E, if T = {H1, . . . , Hn} andBm (T , E) á n 2
n−1− 
1 for m ∈ {d, c}, then E bootstrap confirms T . 
Proof : Suppose Bm (T , E) á n 2
n−1 − 1 for all m ∈ {d, c} and for some E and 
T = {H1, . . . , Hn}. Then it follows from definition 5.7 that for no Hi ∈ T can it 
be the case that there is a Hi
T
j 
∈ ℘(T \ {Hi}) such that m(Hi ; H
T , E) à 0 with ij 
m ∈ {d, c}. Hence for all Hi ∈ T and all Hi
T
j 
∈ ℘(T \ {Hi}) it must hold that 
p(Hi |H
T ∧ E) > p(Hi |Hi
T
j
). And thus, by definition 5.5, E bootstrap confirms T .ij 
(To see that, if for even a single Hi the value of m(Hi ; Hi
T
j 
, E) with m ∈ {d, c} is 
lower than or equal to 0 for some set of auxiliaries, then the value of Bm (T , E) 
must be strictly smaller than, and hence cannot be equal to, n 2n−1 − 1, one only 
has to note that the range of both d and c is the open interval (−1, 1), and that −1 
′ ′ respectively 1 are not within the range because (1) for p(H |H ∧ E) − p(H |H ) 
′ to obtain those values, it would have to hold that p(H |H ∧ E) = 0 and at the 
′ ′ same time that p(H | H ) = 1, respectively, that p(H | H ∧ E) = 1 and at the 
′ same time that p(H |H ) = 0, neither of which combinations is possible and (2) 
′ ′ ′ for p(H ∧H ∧ E) − p(H |H )p(H ∧ E) to obtain those values, it would have to 
′ ′ ′ hold that p(H ∧H ∧ E) = 0 and at the same time that p(H |H ) = p(H ∧ E) = 1, 
′ ′ respectively, that p(H ∧H ∧ E) = 1 and at the same time that p(H |H ) = 0 or 
′ p(H ∧ E) = 0, again neither of which combinations is possible.) 
Theorem 5.9 For all n ∈ N, T , and E, if T = {H1, . . . , Hn}, Br (T , E) can be arbi­
trarily large while E still bootstrap disconfirms T . 
Proof : Consider a theory T = {H1, . . . , Hn}which is bootstrap disconfirmed by the 
evidence E. Then for at least one Hi and one Hi
T
j 
∈ ℘(T \ {Hi}, p(Hi |H
T ∧ E) <ij 
p(Hi | Hi
T
j
). Now suppose for another hypothesis Hk (k ≠ i) and some subset 
HT ∈ ℘(T \ {Hk} that p(Hk | Hk
T
l
) approaches, but is not equal to, zero, while kl 
p(Hk |H
T ∧ E) approaches, but is not equal to, unity. It can easily be seen that kl 
probability models to that effect exist. But in that case, the closer p(Hk | Hk
T
l
) 
is to zero, the larger r(Hk; Hk
T
l
, E) = log[p(Hk |H
T ∧ E)/p(Hk |H
T )] becomes. kl kl 
In the limit, r(Hk; H
T , E) will go to infinity and therefore Br (T , E) will likewise kl 
go to infinity. Thus, Br (T , E) can be arbitrarily large even if T is bootstrap dis­
confirmed. Thus, there is no numerical threshold for Br (T , E) above which T is 
always bootstrap confirmed. 
( ∣ )
( ∣ )
[ /]
( ∣ )
( ∣ ) ( ∣ )
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5 C: Proofs of Theorems 5.10–5.14 
Theorem 5.10 For all T and E, if E bootstrap confirms T , then E also probabilis­
tically confirms T . 
Proof: Let T = {H1, . . . , Hn} and suppose E bootstrap confirms T . Then, by 
′ clause 1 of definition 5.5, there must for every Hi ∈ T be at least one T ⊂ T \{Hi} 
′ ′ such that p(Hi | E ∧ T ) > p(Hi | T ). Thus in particular there must for H1 be a 
∗subset T of T \ {H1} such that 
∗ ∗ p(H1 |E ∧ T ) > p(H1 |T ). (5.12) 
Now let π1, …, πn! denote the permutations on 1, …, n. Clearly, 
p(E ∧ T) = p(E)p(Hπi(1) |E) · · · p Hπi(n) 
∣ E ∧Hπi(1) ∧ · · · ∧Hπi(n−1) 
= p(E)p(Hπj(1) |E) · · · p Hπj(n) 
∣ E ∧Hπj(1) ∧ · · · ∧Hπj(n−1) , 
∗for all i, j ∈ {1, . . . , n!}. Observe that for some k ∈ {1, . . . , n!}, p(H1 |E∧T )must 
occur as a factor in p(E)p(Hπk(1) |E) · · ·p(Hπk(n) |E∧Hπk(1)∧· · ·Hπk(n−1)). Next 
suppose, toward a reductio, that the consequent of the theorem does not hold, 
i.e., E does not probabilistically confirm T . Then p(T |E) à p(T), or p(T ∧ E) 
p(E) à p(T), or again written differently, 
p(E ∧H1 ∧ · · · ∧Hn) 
à p(H1 ∧ · · · ∧Hn). 
p(E) 
By the general multiplication rule and after canceling p(E) in the left-hand ex­
pression, this is equivalent to 
p(H1 |E) · · ·p(Hn |E ∧H1 ∧ · · · ∧Hn−1) à 
p(H1)p(H2 |H1) · · ·p(Hn |H1 ∧ · · · ∧Hn−1). (5.13) 
Given (5.13), the following must also hold: 
p(Hπk(1) |E) · · ·p Hπk(n) 
∣ E ∧Hπk(1) ∧ · · · ∧Hπk(n−1) à 
p(Hπk(1))p Hπk(2) 
∣ Hπk(1) · · ·p Hπk(n) ∣ Hπk(1) ∧ · · · ∧Hπk(n−1) . (5.14) 
From inequality (5.12) we know that for one i with 1 à i à n, it must hold that 
( ∣ ) ( ∣ )
p Hπk(i) 
∣ E ∧Hπk(1) ∧ · · · ∧Hπk(i−1) > p Hπk(i) ∣ Hπk(1) ∧ · · · ∧Hπk(i−1) . 
Combining this with (5.14), we get that for at least one j with 1 à j à n, 
( ∣ ) ( ∣ )
p Hπk(j) 
∣ E ∧Hπk(1) ∧ · · · ∧Hπk(j−1) < p Hπk(j) ∣ Hπk(1) ∧ · · · ∧Hπk(j−1) , 
( ∣ )
( ∣ )
[ ]
[ ]
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for else the left-hand side of (5.14) will be larger than the right-hand side. It 
′ ′ ′ follows that there is a Hi ∈ T and a T ⊂ T such that p(Hi |E∧T ) < p(Hi |T ). But 
this violates clause 2 of definition 5.5 and hence our assumption that E bootstrap 
confirms T . Thus the assumption that E does not probabilistically confirm T is 
false. 
Theorem 5.11 For all T and E, if E probabilistically disconfirms T , then E also 
bootstrap disconfirms T . 
Proof : Assume the antecedent, i.e., p(T | E) < p(T), where T = {H1, . . . , Hn}. 
Then 
p(T∧ E) 
< p(T), 
p(E) 
or, with T written out, 
p(E ∧H1 ∧ · · · ∧Hn) 
< p(H1 ∧ · · · ∧Hn). 
p(E) 
Multiplying both sides by p(E) yields 
p(E ∧H1 ∧ · · · ∧Hn) < p(E)p(H1 ∧ · · · ∧Hn). 
Using the general multiplication rule for both sides, we obtain 
p(E)p(H1 |E) · · ·p Hn ∣ E ∧H1 ∧ · · · ∧Hn−1 < 
p(E)p(H1) · · ·p Hn ∣ H1 ∧ · · · ∧Hn−1 , 
which can only be the case if 
p(H1 |E) < p(H1) ∨ · · · ∨ ( ∣ ) ( ∣ )
p Hn ∣ E ∧H1 ∧ · · · ∧Hn−1 < p Hn ∣ H1 ∧ · · · ∧Hn−1 . 
′ Thus there is at least one Hi ∈ T and at least one T ⊂ T \ {Hi} such that p(Hi | 
′ ′ E ∧ T ) < p(Hi |T ) and hence, by definition 5.6, E bootstrap disconfirms T . 
Theorem 5.12 It is not the case that, for all T and E, if E probabilistically confirms 
T , then also E bootstrap confirms T . 
Proof : Consider the probability model obtained if in example 5.2 the last clause 
saying E does not bootstrap disconfirm any of the Hi ∈ T relative to any of the 
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remaining auxiliaries is omitted and one lets a = .003 and x = .004. In this case, 
E does not bootstrap confirm T , since for all i, j ∈ {1,2, 3}: 
p(E ∧Hi ∧Hj) .004 
p(Hi |E ∧Hj) = = = .08,
p(E ∧Hj) .05 
which is smaller than .15 (= p(Hi |Hj)). A fortiori, this model violates clause 2 
of definition 5.5. However, E does probabilistically confirm T , for 
p(E ∧H1 ∧H2 ∧H3) .003 
p(T |E) = = = .006 > .005 = p(T). 
p(E) .5 
Theorem 5.13 It is not the case that, for all T and E, if E bootstrap disconfirms T , 
then also E probabilistically disconfirms T . 
Proof : From the probability model constructed in the proof of theorem 5.12. 
Theorem 5.14 For all m ∈ {d, r, c} there is no function f such that, for all T and E, 
Bm (T , E) = f ◦m(T, E), with m any non-bootstrap measure of confirmation. 
Proof: The proof of this theorem proceeds by specifying a probability model 
∗ ∗involving a theory T and evidence E for which the following hold (T and E 
∗ ∗ ∗ ∗are as in example 5.1): (i) p(T ) = p(T), (ii) p(E ) = p(E), (iii) p(T | E ) = 
∗ ∗ ∗ ∗p(T | E), (and thus also) (iv) p(E | T ) = p(E | T), (v) p(T | ¬E ) = p(T | 
∗ ∗ ∗ ∗¬E), and (vi) p(E | ¬T ) = p(E | ¬T), but (vii) Bm (T , E ) ≠ Bm (T , E) for all 
m ∈ {d, r, c}. It can readily be seen that, given (i)–(vi), and given how I defined 
the notion of a non-bootstrap measure of confirmation, there can be no function 
f such that f ◦m(T, E) = Bm (T , E) for all m ∈ {d, r, c}, where m is such a non­
bootstrap measure of confirmation. 
∗ ∗ ∗ Like T , the theory T consists of four axioms, H1 , …, H . Like the hypotheses 4 
∗ in T , the Hi all have a prior probability of .25, and are all mutually probabilis­
∗tically independent; we thus see immediately that (i) holds. Evidence E has a 
prior probability of .5 (like E in example 5.1; so (ii) holds). Further we have the 
following: 
∗ ∗ • p(E ∧Hi ) = .125, for all i ∈ {1, . . . , 4}; 
∗ ∗ ∗ • p(E ∧Hi ∧Hj ) = .045, for all i, j ∈ {1, . . . , 4} such that i ≠ j ; 
∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ • p(E ∧Hi ∧Hj ∧Hk ) = .0125, for all i, j , k ∈ {1, . . . , 4} such that i ≠ j ≠ k; 
∗ ∗ ∗ • p(E ∧H1 ∧ · · · ∧H4 ) = .0038. 
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∗ ∗ ∗ From the fact that p(E ∧H1 ∧· · ·∧H4 ) = p(E∧H1 ∧· · ·∧H4) it follows that 
∗ ∗p(T |E ) = p(T |E) (so (iii) holds; and given (i)–(iii), (iv) and, by the law of total 
∗ ∗probability, (v) and (vi) must hold as well). Now calculate Bd(T , E ) from the 
following values, which hold for all i ∈ {1, . . . ,4}: 
∗ • d(Hi ;E
∗) = .125/.5 − .25 = 0;
∗ ∗• d(Hi ;Hj , E
∗) = .045/.125 − .25 = .11, for all j ∈ {1, . . . , 4} such that i ≠ j ; 
∗ ∗ ∗ • d(Hi ;Hj ∧Hk , E
∗) = .0125/.045 − .25 ≈ .0278, for all j , k ∈ {1, . . . ,4} such 
that i ≠ j ≠ k; 
∗ ∗ ∗ • d(Hi ;Hj ∧H 
∗∧Hl , E
∗) = .0038/.0125− .25 = .054, for all j , k, l ∈ {1, . . . , 4}k 
such that i ≠ j ≠ k ≠ l. 
∗ ∗So, the bootstrap support each of the H gets from E as measured by Bd totals i 
(approximately): (1)(0) + (3)(.11) + (3)(.0278) + (1)(.054) = .4674. And thus 
∗ ∗Bd(T , E ) ≈ (4)(.4674) = 1.8696. This is unequal to the bootstrap support 
T was seen to get from E, namely 2.412, despite the fact that, as we saw, (i)– 
(vi) hold, and thus on any non-bootstrap measure of confirmation m, we have 
∗ ∗m(T , E ) =m(T, E). 
∗ ∗In similar fashion one calculates that Br (T , E ) ≈ 6.4223, while Br (T , E) ≈ 
∗ ∗7.8809 and that Bc(T , E ) ≈ 0.1827, while Bc(T , E) ≈ 0.2552. 
Chapter 6 
Anticipated Objections
In this chapter I will discuss two recent general arguments against the project of 
measuring coherence probabilistically: one by Siebel (2005) and the other one by 
Luca Moretti and Ken Akiba (2005). Although Moretti and Akiba do not make this 
claim themselves, it will become clear that if any of these two arguments is cor­
rect, there can be no satisfactory probabilistic measures of coherence. Nonethe­
less, my conclusion will be that at most these criticisms succeed at limiting the 
intended scope of such measures. For it will appear that if we exclude from our 
intended domain sets or theories in which the propositions or axioms are logically 
related, the problems no longer arise. 
The objections discussed in this chapter are objections that can be raised 
against all of the measures of coherence proposed in this thesis (and the sec­
ond objection even applies to the measure of bootstrap confirmation as well). 
This does not imply that these are the only possible objections against these 
measures. Rather, each measure runs into some potential difficulties of its own. 
Most notably, there is not one measure that can handle perfectly all the ‘test­
cases’ proposed in the literature. For example, measures of mutual support will 
not satisfy the examples based on intuitions of relative overlap, while relative 
overlap measures perform poorly with respect to examples in which our mutual 
support intuitions are pivotal. Such objections have all been discussed in the 
relevant chapters, and I will not rehearse them here. But I believe that the dis­
cussions in those chapters have made it clear that none of those objections can 
survive a critical discussion. 
Below I will not discuss Olsson’s (2005) paper called ‘The Impossibility of 
Coherence.’ The main reason for this is that although this paper claims to show 
that coherence is ‘not definable,’ it clearly only concerns the sense of coherence as 
a confidence boosting property: Olsson explicitly takes the model of witnesses 
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reporting on propositions for granted and even uses a reliability parameter to 
model the reliability of the witnesses. Therefore, even if his argument is correct, 
it would still only apply to the explication of coherence as a confidence boosting 
property.1 
6.1 Siebel’s Impossibility Argument 
In his ‘Probabilistic Measures of Coherence’ (2005), Siebel asks us to consider 
an example in which a physicist is not sure anymore which value the voltmeter 
′ read in a certain experimental set-up. Consider the sets S = {A1, A2} and S = 
{A1, A3}, with 
A1: The voltage was 1 V; 
A2: The voltage was 1 V or 2 V; 
A3: The voltage was 1 V or 50 V. 
According to Siebel the second set is much less coherent than the first: 
It would … appear that A2 fits together with A1 more than A3 does be­
cause A2’s alternative is much closer to A1 than A3’s alternative. If A1 is 
false because the voltage is 2 V, we are at least in close neighbourhood to A1. 
But if A1 is false because the voltage is 50 V, then the truth is miles away 
from A1. [A] purely probabilistic approach overlooks that coherence is also 
sensitive to such distances of numerical values, thereby ignoring an aspect 
which is highly important for scientists. (Siebel 2005) 
It is easy to see that since A1 implies both A2 and A3, then if A2 and A3 have the 
′ same marginal probability, the probability models for S and S are equal. There­
fore, each purely probabilistic measure of coherence must judge both sets as 
equally coherent under these circumstances. According to the quote above, this 
is highly counterintuitive, due to the difference in numerical distance between 
1 V and 2 V and 1 V and 50 V, respectively. 
I disagree. Firstly, I am not sure what the concept of ‘distance of numerical 
values’ refers to. The difference between two values is always relative to the 
scale that has been chosen to represent the values with. For example, choosing 
logarithmic scales leads to the values of .01 and 1 being further apart than 1 
1This does not mean that I believe that Olsson’s argument, considered as a criticism of explicating 
coherence as a confidence boosting property, is correct. Similarly to Bovens and Hartmann’s (2003a: 
19–22) impossibility result, his arguments only show that coherence cannot be a complete ordering. 
However, as I argued in chapter 4, this need be no impediment to explicating the sense of coherence 
as a confidence boosting property with the help of the notion of a quasi-ordering. It is not clear 
to me how Olsson would respond to such a challenge. Since his paper was written before the 
publication of Bovens and Hartmann’s (2003a), the idea of the relation ‘is more coherent than’ 
being a quasi-ordering is not discussed in Olsson’s paper. 
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and 50. More generally, it is always possible to introduce scales such that the 
distance between 1 and 50 is arbitrarily small. Therefore, the argument that 1 
and 50 are very far apart presupposes an a priori argument for a specific scale – 
an argument which no physicist would ever endorse. 
But secondly, andmore importantly, I believe that Siebel chooses a probability 
model that is inconsistent with the driving intuition behind his argument. The 
reason a physicist (or anyone else, for that matter) would intuitively feel that the 
first set is more coherent than the second is that the outcome of 1 V is muchmore 
probable given a reading of 2 V than of 50 V. That is, intuitively, the propositions 
in the first set overlap much more than those in the second set do. 
Everybody who has ever conducted a physical experiment in less than ideal 
settings knows that getting close is often as good as it gets. If standard physical 
theory predicts a value of 1.0 V, then one is often quite happy with a 1.2 V or even 
a 2.1 V result, depending on the cumulative measurement errors in the different 
pieces of equipment that have been used to conduct the experiment. However, 
this intuition can play no role in Siebel’s model, since in this case the outcomes 
of 2 V and 50 V are equally likely given that the real value is 1 V. What actual 
experiment can we think of that would satisfy such a constraint? Well, it appears 
that it must be an experiment in which the outcome does not have a measurement 
error: only then is it possible that the 2 V and the 50 V outcomes are equally likely 
(otherwise it will always be the case that 2 V is more likely than 50 V, conditional 
on the value being 1 V). 
But if there is no measurement error then either the probabilities of a reading 
of 2 V and a reading of 50 V have zero probability (in which case both sets simply 
consist of identical propositions so that there is no reason to argue that the 
coherence should be different) or the readings can only occur if something is 
wrong in the set-up of the experiment: maybe some pieces are broken or wrongly 
connected. Moreover, it is apparently assumed that on the condition of a faulty 
set-up the outcomes of 2 V and 50 V are equally likely. But in that case there is 
no reason to argue that the first set is more coherent than the second: both 2 V 
and 50 V point to a failure in the experimental set-up and from that point of view 
their closeness to 1 V is irrelevant. Siebel’s intuitions are only plausible on the 
hypothesis that given a true value of 1 V, an outcome of 2 V is much more likely 
than an outcome of 50 V. But this is excluded by his probability model. 
Therefore, it seems safe to conclude that on any of the possible interpreta­
tions of Siebel’s example, his claim that we intuitively feel there is a difference in 
coherence while there is in fact no difference, is no longer true. If the different 
values can only occur in the case of malfunctioning equipment or if they are not 
possible at all, then I believe we intuitively would not feel there should be a dif­
ference in coherence between the two cases. If, on the other hand, the different 
possible outcomes could be the result of measurement errors, then clearly the 
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probability models for the two sets cannot be equal, since one outcome (2 V) is 
much more likely than the other (50 V). 
6.2 Moretti and Akiba’s Equi-coherence Principle 
In their ‘Probabilistic Measures of Coherence and the Problem of Belief Individu-
ation’ (2005), Moretti and Akiba show that all the measures that had been pub­
lished at the time of their writing fail to satisfy, among other things, the Equi­
coherence Principle (henceforth EC): 
′ ′ EC If S and S are logically equivalent sets of beliefs, S and S have the same 
degree of coherence, 
′ ′ where two sets S and S are logically equivalent iff, for any R ∈ S, we have S ⊢R 
′ ′ ′ and for any R ∈ S , we have S ⊢R (cf. Moretti and Akiba 2005). If EC is not sat­
isfied, it follows that ‘there can be different sets of beliefs, which represent the 
same information set, that have different degrees of coherence’ (ibid.). Moretti 
and Akiba call this the problem of belief individuation. It is not hard to see that 
all of the measures of coherence proposed in chapters 2–4 violate EC (I will dis­
cuss one example below). Moreover, a similar problem arises for the measure of 
bootstrap confirmation introduced in chapter 5. As the following example shows, 
two equivalent theories may be bootstrap confirmed to a different degree:2 
Example 6.1 Consider again example (5.1). But now replace the original theory 
∗ ∗ ∗T = {H1,H2,H3,H4} with T = {H1,H2,H3 ∧H4}. Clearly T ≡ T (T is just a 
different axiomatization of T ) and if we accept the argument above it should be 
∗the case that Bm (T , E) = Bm (T , E) for all m ∈ {d, r, c}. But it is easy to appreciate 
that this is not the case for any of the Bm (m ∈ {d, r, c}). For instance, the degree of 
∗bootstrap support that T receives from the evidence as measured by the bootstrap 
∗difference measure equals Bd(T , E) ≈ .572, while Bd ≈ 2.412 (and similarly for 
the other measures). 	 
At first sight, EC may be quite plausible. For consider the following example. 
Suppose a murder suspect has so far told a rather incoherent story about his 
whereabouts the night the murder was committed. How could he make his story 
more coherent? Well, he might be able to boost the coherence of his defense 
2Note, however, that in note 6 in chapter 5, I made the measure of bootstrap confirmation apply 
∗only to theories that are naturally axiomatized. It is not clear that T and T in the example below 
are in fact naturally axiomatized. For instance, if Gemes’s notion of a natural axiomatization is 
∗considered and one accepts his (1993: 483n3) proposal for an additional condition, then T is not 
naturally axiomatized. 
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by adding to it some statement or statements that explain(s) away the apparent 
tension between the elements of his story so far. But instead he continues, ‘In 
other words, …,’ and he tells the same story again, though, as announced, in 
other words. Next he says, ‘To put it a third way, …,’ and he puts it a third way. 
Could it be that, just by rephrasing what he has already said, i.e., by adding to 
his defense some statements that (let us assume) are logically equivalent to ones 
already made, that defense comes to be coherent after all? Surely the answer 
must be negative. To increase the degree of coherence of his defense it seems as 
useless to rephrase what he has already said as it is to repeat it verbatim. 
Much the same would seem to hold if the defendant were to go on by drawing 
inferences from what he has already testified. For instance, suppose that, having 
said that he wasn’t in London on the day the murder was committed, but that he 
spent that whole day in Brussels, he goes on to say that he wasn’t in Amsterdam 
that day, and that he wasn’t in Paris, and that he wasn’t in Berlin. Again, it is 
hard to see how this could do anything to increase the coherence of his defense; 
the defendant is just asserting things which, though he did not expressly assert 
them, he did already imply by what he asserted. 
The foregoing at least suggests that there ought to be no difference between 
′ ′ the degree of coherence of a set S and that of another set S if S ⊂ S and for 
′ ′ ′ every proposition R ∈ S \ S there is an R ∈ S such that R ⊢ R. However, all 
the measures proposed in this thesis fail to satisfy this intuitive desideratum. To 
see this, consider a set S = {R1, R2, R3, R4} such that R1 ≡ R3 and R1 ⊢ R4, and a 
probability distribution p(·) on this set such that 
p(R1 ∧ R2 ∧ R3 ∧ R4) = .01 p(R1 ∧¬R2 ∧ R3 ∧ R4) = .2 
p(¬R1 ∧ R2 ∧¬R3 ∧ R4) = .05 p(¬R1 ∧ R2 ∧¬R3 ∧¬R4) = .15 
p(¬R1 ∧¬R2 ∧¬R3 ∧ R4) = .1 p(¬R1 ∧¬R2 ∧¬R3 ∧¬R4) = .49 
Now consider sets Sα = {R1, R2}, S
β = {R1, R2, R3}, and S
γ = {R1, R2, R4}. As the 
following table shows, these sets have different degrees of coherence on all of 
the measures of coherence (all values are rounded to three decimal places, ‘ind’ 
stands for indeterminate): 
Cd Cr Cl R S O F 
Sα − −
Sβ − −
Sγ −
.162 .227 .188 .024 .227 .024 .683 
.012 2.494 ind .357 1.08 .024 .087 
.071 7.814 ind .185 .63 .02 .036 
This means that both adding a proposition to Sα that is logically equivalent to R1 
and adding one that is logically implied by R1 lead to sets with degrees of coher­
ence different from that of the original set. 
It is worth briefly noting that Olsson’s measure comes closest to satisfying the 
intuitive desideratum that a measure of coherence be insensitive to the operation 
〈 〉
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of adding to a set (or subtracting from it) propositions logically implied by or even 
logically equivalent to ones already in the set. It is easy to see that on this measure 
it holds quite generally that adding logically equivalent propositions does not 
affect the degree of coherence. After all, because both R1 ∧· · ·∧Rn ≡ R1 ∧· · ·∧ 
Rn ∧Rn+1 and R1∨· · ·∨Rn ≡ R1∨· · ·∨Rn ∨Rn+1 whenever Rn+1 ≡ Ri for some i ∈ 
{1, . . . , n}, adding a logically equivalent proposition neither affects the numerator 
nor the denominator in the formula of Olsson’s measure. Note, though, that it 
does not generally hold on this measure that adding logical consequences cannot 
affect the degree of coherence. Of course, if for some i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, Ri ⊢ Rn+1, 
then again R1 ∧ · · · ∧ Rn ≡ R1 ∧ · · · ∧ Rn ∧ Rn+1. But the same condition does 
not guarantee that R1 ∨· · ·∨Rn ≡ R1 ∨· · ·∨Rn ∨Rn+1. Because R1 ∨· · ·∨Rn+1 
can be logically weaker, but not stronger, than R1 ∨ · · · ∨ Rn, adding a logical 
consequence can affect coherence only negatively. That is to say, adding a logical 
consequence cannot raise the degree of coherence on Olsson’s measure, but it 
can lower that degree – which is still to violate the desideratum. 
It is further worth noting that Bovens and Hartmann’s difference function 
does not satisfy the desideratum either, since it turns out that according to their 
theory both 
〈
Sα , Sβ
〉
and Sα, Sγ constitute indeterminate cases. And according 
to the revised version of Bovens and Hartmann’s difference function proposed in 
3chapter 4, f i , it is the case that both Sβ and Sγ are more i-coherent than Sα . 
From the above example it also follows that all known measures of coherence 
violate EC as well, except Olsson’s measure. The remark above that Olsson’s mea­
sure satisfies the desideratum that adding logically equivalent propositions does 
not affect the degree of coherence, may lead one to expect that it also satisfies EC. 
However, this is not the case. Instead, a quite simply argument seems to show 
that if EC is correct, then it will make all probabilistic measures of coherence 
redundant. For suppose that EC is correct, and compare a set S = {R1, . . . , Rn} 
with a set Sc = {Rc } with Rc equivalent to the conjunction of all the propositions 
in set S. Then by EC, S and Sc must have the same degree of coherence. However, 
a set consisting of one proposition has only one probabilistic property, to wit, 
the probability of that proposition.4 Thus, if a probabilistic measure of coher­
r 
3Nonetheless, this does not imply that on these accounts the coherence of the defendant’s story 
in the example changes when he repeats logically equivalent versions of his story (see below). 
4One may feel that this is too quick, for it appears that if the proposition Rc is composed of 
a number of different conjuncts, then the probabilities of each of the conjuncts may equally be 
considered to be part of the probabilistic features of the set Sc = {Rc }. However, this is no imped­
iment to the argument, which only attempts to show that no satisfactory probabilistic measures 
of coherence can ever satisfy EC. And it must be clear that not all propositions Rc that are equiva­
lent to the conjunction of a number of propositions R1, . . . , Rn are indeed composed of a number 
of conjuncts. For example, in the Tweety example discussed in section 3.5, the proposition that 
Tweety is a penguin is equivalent to the conjunction of the propositions that Tweety is a bird and 
that Tweety cannot fly (relative to the background knowledge), but clearly it is not composed of a 
number of different conjuncts. 
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ence is to satisfy EC, then it must be a function only of the probability that the 
conjunction of the elements of a set S is true: p(R1 ∧ · · · ∧ Rn) = p(Rc). But in 
that case coherence would be nothing more than the standard definition of the 
probability of a set. Thus, a full acceptance of EC would make any measure of 
coherence redundant. But need we accept EC? And if we need not, need we accept 
the intuitive desideratum, which would still discredit all the known measures of 
coherence? 
It seems that the answer depends partly on which sense of coherence we 
are trying to explicate. Firstly, EC seems to make little sense for Bovens and 
Hartmann’s model: if coherence is to be a confidence boosting property and if 
the only parameters that determine our confidence are witness reliability, prior 
probability and coherence, then it follows mathematically that sets S and Sc must 
in some cases have a different degree of coherence. Indeed, an easy calculation 
shows that for not fully unreliable witnesses: 
p(R1 ∧ · · · ∧ Rn |REPR1 ∧ REPR2 ∧ · · · ∧ REPRn) > 
(6.1) 
p(R1 ∧ · · · ∧ Rn |REP[R1 ∧ R2 · · · ∧ Rn]) 
Since by definition the prior probabilities of both sets are equal and since there are 
certainly cases in which the reliability is fixed also (for example, if the witnesses 
are independent measurement instruments of which we know the reliability), it 
follows that the difference in posterior probability must be due to an increase in 
coherence.5 
Furthermore, the example of the defendant repeating his incoherent defense 
over and over again does not seem to apply to Bovens and Hartmann’s measure. 
For clearly the different testimonies made by the suspect are not independent, 
and it seems that according to their theory the full testimony by the witness 
should be considered as one witness report, to be compared with other testi­
monies from other witnesses.6 
Next, consider the three measures of coherence as an epistemic virtue. In 
this case, the intuitive desideratum does seem to apply and it seems we have 
a genuine counterexample against these measures. But do we? A closer look 
at the example reveals an interesting point. For in order for the example to be 
5Of course this argument does not go through anymore if my suggestions for a revision of Bovens 
and Hartmann’s theory of coherence (see chapter 4) are accepted. However, in that case a similar, 
though less general, argument is still possible. For consider a set consisting of n probabilistically 
equivalent propositions S = {R1, . . . , Rn} and compare this with a set  
n  
Sc = Ri .  
i=1 
In that case the propositions in S and in Sc have the same marginal probabilities, while equation 6.1 
still holds. 
6As Stephan Hartmann has remarked (personal communication). 
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compelling, it seems that we must assume that the logical relations between the 
propositions are known, so that it is clear to us that one and the same story is told 
in a number of different ways. But as a general assumption this would certainly 
be too strong. And absent that assumption neither the intuitive desideratum nor 
EC can be upheld. The reason for this is that coherence is a hyperintensional 
notion: how information is presented to us matters to our intuitive judgements 
with respect to coherence.7 
But if we accept that coherence is a hyperintensional notion, then it should 
be totally unsurprising that logically equivalent sets can have different degrees 
of coherence, at least on any measure of coherence that tries to do justice to 
our intuitions. Therefore, neither EC nor the intuitive desideratum provide a 
compelling argument against the measures of coherence as an epistemic virtue. 
Nevertheless, the above discussion points to a serious problem for probabilis­
tic approaches to modeling coherence. For a consequence of the Kolmogorov 
axioms is that if A and B are equivalent, p(A) = p(B). But this can only be an ide­
alizing assumption with respect to our intuitive judgements of probability. This 
becomes clear if we consider the probability we would assign to two different 
necessary truths: 
1. A ∨¬A;
n + yn2. x = zn has no non-zero integer solutions for x, y and z when n > 2, 
the second being the famous Fermat’s theorem, which was proven in 1993 by 
Andrew Wiles. Since both are necessary truths, they are equivalent and thus 
they should have the same (unit) probability. Nonetheless, it seems extremely 
awkward to argue that everybody who, before the proof in 1993, did not assign 
both theorems the same probability, was irrational. Clearly, before the proof was 
completed, it seemed quite reasonable to assign Fermat’s theorem a significantly 
lower probability than the theorem that either A or ¬A. 
From this a general problem emerges for all probabilistic approaches to the 
explication of coherence. For such approaches attempt to model coherence with 
the help of a notion that is intensional only by idealizing assumption. Since in 
general both our coherence concept and our judgements of probability are hy­
perintensional, some clashes can be expected between this idealizing assumption 
and our intuitive judgements of coherence. 
7It may be instructive to consider an analogy with the concept of explanation. Consider the 
following example by Douven (2005a) in which two explanations are compared: 
1. Lois has nothing to fear, because Clark Kent is Clark Kent. 
2. Lois has nothing to fear, because Clark Kent is Superman. 
The two explanations of why Lois need not be afraid are equivalent (assuming that ‘Superman’ is a 
rigid designator). But, intuitively, only the second explanation really explains. The reason for this 
is that the concept of explanation is a hyperintensional notion: the way in which information is 
presented matters for our intuitive judgements with respect to explanation. 
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This discussion touches on some fundamental issues in analytic philosophy, 
which cannot receive a full discussion at this point. However, as to the problem of 
measuring coherence, I believe that there are at least a number of ways in which 
the problem may be alleviated. 
One possible option would be to stipulate that any set whose coherence we 
could aim to measure should consist of pairwise logically independent proposi­
tions. Although initially this may appear to be a rather ad hoc move, it seems 
a quite natural one to make if we seek to analyze a hyperintensional notion in 
terms of a (merely) intensional notion. 
Alternatively, we could simply admit that the measures of coherence have re­
stricted scope. This would not be too bad, either, if we recall that we are after 
an explication of our intuitive concept of coherence. From this perspective it 
is certainly not a priori the case that there must be one formal account of co­
herence that can handle adequately both sets of propositions that are pairwise 
logically independent and sets of propositions that are not (all) pairwise logically 
independent. 
Lastly, let me discuss the consequences of EC and the intuitive desideratum 
for my measure of bootstrap confirmation. As example 6.1 shows, different ax­
iomatizations of a theory may have different degrees of coherence. Moreover, it 
can readily be seen that accepting a principle similar to EC will have the same 
type of results as those discussed above. Just consider a theory T = {H1, . . . , Hn} 
and compare this with a theory Tc = {Hc } with 
n 
Hc ≡ Hi. (6.2) 
i=1 
Since macho-bootstrapping is not allowed, Tc is not bootstrap confirmed by the 
evidence even if T is bootstrap confirmed to a very high degree. But whereas 
coherence is clearly a hyperintensional notion, this is much less clear for confir­
mation. So how are we to respond to this problem? Well, let me at least give two 
suggestions for how the problem may be tackled. 
Firstly, note 6 in chapter 5 makes the measures Bm applicable only to theories 
that are naturally axiomatized. Although no fully satisfactory explication of that 
notion has yet been given, we can hope that on such an explication the natural 
axiomatizations of all equivalent theories come out as having the same degree 
of bootstrap confirmation.8 In that case, the problem evidently would no longer 
arise. 
Secondly, we may take seriously the hint at the end of the last chapter and 
interpret the measures Bm as measures of the coherence between a theory and 
the evidence. In that case the above remarks do apply and we can at least find 
8On Gemes’s (1993) account of such a notion, whether or not this is the case remains unclear. 
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an ad hoc solution to the problem by making Bm (m ∈ {d, r, c}) applicable only to 
combinations of theoretical and evidential statements in which all sentences are 
pairwise independent. 
6.3 Conclusion 
This chapter has discussed two general objections made against the general 
project of measuring coherence. Although I believe I have shown that the argu­
ment by Siebel fails, it is interesting to note that both arguments are concerned 
with the relation between measuring coherence and deductive logic. However, as 
this chapter has indicated, such problems could be expected given the fact that 
while we make the idealizing assumption that probability is not a hyperinten­
sional notion, we would not similarly want to make the same assumption with 
respect to the concept of coherence. 
Moreover, the most awkward consequences can be evaded by simply exclud­
ing sets in which not all of the propositions are logically independent from the 
intended domain of our measures of coherence. Although this does not solve a 
similar problem for the measure of bootstrap confirmation, it does remove the 
sting from the arguments with respect to the measures of coherence. Although 
evidently such a strategy makes these measures less generally applicable, we are 
left with a large range of cases in which they can still be used to measure the coher­
ence of sets of propositions or theories. One notable drawback of this solution, 
though, is that some of the counterexamples presented in this thesis no longer 
go through. For example, the second set in the Tweety examples against Olsson’s 
and Bovens and Hartmann’s accounts will be excluded if we accept the above 
suggestion. Nevertheless, this will not help these measures much: in each of 
the examples, the logical relations between the propositions were not the reason 
for the counterintuitiveness of the behavior of the respective measures. Instead, 
there are similar examples for each of the ones discussed above in which none of 
the propositions are equivalent to or logically entailed by any of the other propo­
sitions. One such alternative is already given in chapter 4, in which I replaced the 
set {B,G, P} by {B, F,A}. 
Chapter 7 
Conclusions
In this thesis I have proposed and defended four different explications of our 
intuitive concept of coherence (five, if we include the measure of bootstrap con­
firmation). Evidently, it would be more expedient to have only one single measure 
of coherence. However, in chapter 1 I have argued that this is highly unlikely to 
occur because the concept of coherence has been used in too many different 
contexts to allow for a single formal explication, even if we restrict ourselves to 
the philosophical concept of coherence, as I have done. According to Carnap, 
for an explication to be as satisfactory as possible, we must be very clear about 
what the explicandum is. From this it seems to follow that if the explicandum is 
best characterized by different and contrasting descriptions, we require different 
explications for each of the different senses that can be distinguished. 
Following Carnap’s approach to the explication of the concept of confirma­
tion, I have proposed probabilistic measures of coherence as explications of the 
different senses of the concept of coherence. At times I have availed myself of the 
more intuitive reasoning employed by Carnap in order to arrive at the most satis­
factory explication, at other times I have opted for the desiderata-based strategy 
that can be found in the works of Kemeny, Oppenheim and Fitelson. Nonetheless, 
I have not presented a general argument in favor of any of the two approaches. 
Rather, it appears that when sufficiently many desiderata can be found that are 
beyond question, the desiderata-based approach provides an objective strategy 
for arriving at the most satisfactory measure. But if on the other hand none or 
not enough of such desiderata can be found, it may be more appropriate to resort 
to some more intuitive considerations. 
I have discussed three general types of coherence. All of these have in com­
mon that coherence is explicated as a relation between propositions (or between 
a theory and the evidence) that has three general characteristics: it is a matter of 
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hanging together, it is a matter of degree and it is weaker than logical entailment 
but stronger than logical consistency. I have shown that these three characteris­
tics can support a large variety of different explications. 
Firstly, there were the explications of coherence as an epistemic virtue. Mc-
Mullin, for instance, has argued that coherence is one of the virtues that con­
tribute to a theory’s explanatory success. In this sense of coherence, the hanging 
together property has turned out to be pivotal. Indeed, it can be explicated in at 
least three different ways, which were discussed in chapters 2 and 3. Using these 
different explications of the hanging together property, these chapters have pre­
sented three different explications of this sense of coherence: that of coherence 
in the sense of mutual support, that of coherence in the sense of relative overlap 
and that of coherence as an epistemic virtue, where the third was defined as the 
weighted average of the other two. 
Secondly, I have discussed the sense of coherence as a confidence boosting 
property. According to some versions of the coherentist theory of justification, 
we can answer the claims of the epistemic skeptic with the help of the concept 
of coherence. More precisely, if the reports of some witnesses cohere strongly 
enough, we are entitled to believe these reports, even if the witnesses are highly 
unreliable individually. In chapter 4, I discussed the impossibility result of Bovens 
and Hartmann, which shows that coherence cannot be a truth conducive property 
per se, in the sense that a higher coherence implies a higher probability, all else 
being equal. However, their result does not exclude that coherence is truth con­
ducive in the more restrictive sense of Bovens and Hartmann’s version of Bayesian 
Coherentism. For according to them, the relation of ‘being more coherent than’ 
is a quasi-ordering: while in some cases a higher coherence does indeed increase 
our confidence that the information is true, ceteris paribus, in other cases the 
question must remain unanswered. The vital question in chapter 4 turned out to 
be how we should interpret the ceteris paribus clause. Whereas Bovens and Hart­
mann argue that the prior probability of the information and the reliability of the 
witnesses should remain constant, I have shown that if we instead let reliability 
and the marginal probabilities of the propositions remain equal, a very different 
picture emerges. I argued that the difference function that results from the latter 
ceteris paribus conditions is much more satisfactory, because it does not have 
the same counterintuitive consequences as Bovens and Hartmann’s theory. 
Finally, I have attempted to define a quantitative measure of Glymour’s theory 
of bootstrap confirmation. Although this measure is by definition a measure of 
confirmation rather than of coherence, I argued that it goes at least some way 
toward explicating the intuitive notion of coherence between a theory and the ev­
idence. More specifically, I discussed Bonjour’s claim that foundationalists need 
a conception of coherence to account for the relation between the foundational 
and the superstructure beliefs and I proposed that such a conception may be 
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based on my measure of bootstrap confirmation. 
Each of the measures presented in chapters 2–5 has remained tentative in 
nature. For three of the explications, viz., coherence as relative overlap, as an 
epistemic virtue and as bootstrap confirmation, I discussed a number of different 
measures that all seemed to be plausible explications of the intuitive sense of 
coherence under consideration. I made a tentative case for measures Cd and Es,o 
being the most satisfactory explications of coherence as mutual support and as an 
epistemic virtue, respectively, but I gave no argument in favor of any of the three 
measures of bootstrap confirmation defined in chapter 5. And although I have 
not found any measures that are as satisfactory as the measures of coherence 
as relative overlap defined in chapter 3 and no theories of coherence that are 
as satisfactory as the difference function presented in chapter 4, it seems quite 
probable that for these cases, too, many alternatives can be found, some of which 
may even outperform the measures proposed in this thesis. 
Nonetheless, I believe I have convincingly shown that the measures proposed 
in this thesis constitute more satisfactory explications of our various intuitive 
concepts of coherence than any of the other measures proposed in the litera­
ture. Of the measures proposed by Shogenji and Olsson, I have argued that they 
fail to take into account all the dependencies between propositions that matter 
intuitively. For Olsson’s measure I have shown how this lack of sensitiveness 
leads to the Tweety example devised by Bovens and Hartmann and discussed by 
me in section 3.5. And whereas Fitelson’s measure does take into account all of 
the dependencies that matter intuitively, it fails because it tries to satisfy both 
the equivalence and the dependence desiderata. This, as I showed in chapter 3, 
will necessarily lead to the counterintuitive consequence that two sets that seem 
intuitively almost equally coherent must have a very different degree of coher­
ence. Finally, of Bovens and Hartmann’s theory of coherence I have shown that 
it leaves indeterminate even some intuitively crystal clear cases. And, on top of 
that, I have shown that their account is actually inconsistent with their definition 
of the concept of coherence as a confidence boosting property. 
Equally importantly, I have shown that none of the counterexamples and gen­
eral criticisms of measures of coherence presented in the literature so far can 
undermine the project of measuring coherence or any of the specific explications 
of coherence proposed in this thesis. 
Although these two remarks can in no way diminish the tentative nature of the 
different explications of coherence proposed, I feel it is safe to conclude that each 
of the above measures of coherence constitutes a quite satisfactory explication 
of the respective sense of coherence, or at least a more satisfactory one than any 
of its contenders. 
Quite often in the philosophy of science – on in philosophy generally – the 
solution of a problem raises more questions than it answers. And this seems 
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to be the case for the explications of the concept of coherence proposed in this 
thesis also. One very large topic that has been fully neglected here is the question 
of truth conduciveness of coherence in any of the other senses of coherence than 
that of coherence as a confidence boosting property. It must have become clear 
that none of the other measures of coherence can be considered explications of 
coherence as a confidence boosting property, for in general it will not be the case 
that an increase in coherence (as measured by any of these measures) implies an 
increase in probability (even if we allow for indeterminate cases, as does Bovens 
and Hartmann’s account). But taken literally, to be a property that is conducive 
to a theory’s truth means that it will, in some still to be specified way and under 
some still to be specified circumstances, increase the probability that a theory is 
true. And it is not clear that the above explications cannot be truth conducive in 
this weaker sense of somehow promoting a theory’s probability. 
In this respect, an interesting result has been derived by Dietrich and Moretti. 
In their (2005), they show that under some general conditions there are threshold 
values for the measures of coherence proposed by Olsson and Fitelson such that 
a degree of coherence above that threshold implies that evidence for one of the 
hypotheses of that theory is also evidence for any of the other hypotheses. To 
me it seems that these measures can therefore be called truth conducive in the 
weaker sense. 
One of the problems of Dietrich and Moretti’s result is that it only applies 
to Fitelson’s measure for the case of two propositions and, more importantly, 
that the threshold level will in general be very high.1 It would therefore be very 
interesting to find out whether or not stronger results can be derived for the 
measures presented in this thesis. 
A second large topic that I have only briefly discussed is the question of the 
relation between the concept of coherence as a hyperintensional notion and the 
concept of probability, which is standardly formalized as an intensional (but not 
hyperintensional) notion. Many interesting questions remain and it cannot be 
excluded a priori that no other solutions to this problem can be found than the 
ones I have offered in the previous chapter. 
So, doubtless, the last word has not yet been said on the subject of measuring 
coherence in a mathematically precise way, which is just as it should be for a 
topic that has emerged only a few years ago. 
1For example, if p(R) = .6, p(E) = .1 and if p(R∧E) = .1 (so that E entails R), then the threshold 
value for Olsson’s measure is approximately .94 and for Fitelson’s measure approximately .96. 
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Samenvatting
Het onderwerp van dit proefschrift bevindt zich op het raakvlak van kennisleer 
en wetenschapsfilosofie. Meer in het bijzonder staat het geven van een precieze 
analyse van onze intuïtieve notie van coherentie centraal. Er wordt in de weten­
schapsfilosofie veel gesproken over de coherentie van een theorie en over de vraag 
of coherentie in het algemeen een indicator van waarheid kan zijn. Echter, een 
veel gehoorde klacht in deze discussies is dat het begrip coherentie hopeloos 
vaag is. 
In de laatste jaren zijn er een aantal voorstellen gedaan voor een formele ex­
plicatie van het concept coherentie. In het eerste hoofdstuk van dit proefschrift 
benadruk ik dat dit concept op verschillende intuïties berust en dat we niet uit 
kunnen sluiten dat elk van deze intuïtieve concepten op een verschillende wijze 
geformaliseerd dient te worden. Ik onderscheid (zonder te willen beweren dat dit 
de enige of zelfs de belangrijkste noties van coherentie zijn) drie verschillende 
betekenissen van het concept coherentie zoals dit in de wetenschapsfilosofie ge­
bruikt is. Deze zijn coherentie als een epistemische deugd, coherentie als een 
waarheids-bevorderende eigenschap en coherentie als een relatie tussen theorie 
en evidentie. 
Hoofdstukken 2 en 3 geven twee mogelijke explicaties van het concept co­
herentie als een epistemische deugd, te weten, coherentie als wederzijdse onder­
steuning en coherentie als relatieve overlap. In beide gevallen stel ik een proba­
bilistische maat voor en probeer te laten zien dat deze beter aansluit bij onze 
intuïties met betrekking tot deze vorm van coherentie dan de voorstellen die in 
de literatuur zijn gedaan. 
In hoofdstuk 4 bespreek ik Bovens en Hartmann’s explicatie van coherentie als 
een waarheids-bevorderende eigenschap. Alhoewel het zal blijken dat Bovens en 
Hartmann’s voorstel in tegenspraak is met hun eigen theorie van wat het betekent 
om een waarheids-bevorderende eigenschap te zijn, zal ik laten zien dat een aan­
tal kleine aanpassingen in hun model tot een nieuwe maat kunnen leiden, die niet 
tot dezelfde problemen leidt als Bovens en Hartmann’s oorspronkelijke voorstel. 
In hoofdstuk 5 bespreek ik Glymour’s theorie over bootstrap confirmatie. Ik 
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laat zien hoe de belangrijkste argumenten die tegen bootstrap confirmatie zijn 
ingebracht, niet langer geldig zijn als we de theorie in probabilistische termen 
weergeven. Alhoewel het hier een theorie van confirmatie betreft en geen theorie 
van coherentie, zal ik wel aangeven dat de notie van bootstrap confirmatie in 
ieder geval aan de basis zou kunnen staan van een explicatie van coherentie als 
een relatie tussen theorie en evidentie. 
In hoofdstuk 6 probeer ik vervolgens een aantal algemene tegenargumenten 
tegen probabilistische maten van coherentie te ontkrachten. 
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